

$6.50

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

Spring 1989

Foreign Policy
Research Institute

FOCUS ON MILITARY ISSUES

A New Soviet Military?

Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War

Illegal Arms Sales

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is an independent, publicly supported, nonprofit organization devoted to the public dissemination of scholarly research affecting the national interests of the United States. As a catalyst for the exchange of ideas, FPRI seeks to influence the climate in which American foreign policy is made. Research is conducted by the FPRI staff, supplemented by the work of Fellows and Associate Scholars.

In addition to ORBIS, the Institute publishes *The Philadelphia Papers,* a series of monographs dealing with current issues. The *FPRI Book Series* includes volumes on the cutting edge of research.

FPRI administers the *Inter-University Seminar on Foreign Affairs,* which regularly brings together scholars and businessmen for lectures, seminars, and workshops on international issues. Each year the Institute sponsors a competition for the *Thornton D. Hooper Fellowship in International Affairs;* the Hooper Fellow spends a year in residence at FPRI conducting independent research. The FPRI *Internship Program* provides opportunities for students who are contemplating a career in international affairs.

All contributions to the Institute are tax-deductible.

President
Marvin Wachman

Director
Daniel Pipes

Board of Trustees
John Gilray Christy
Chairman
Bruce H. Hooper
Vice-Chairman
W. W. Keen Butcher
Treasurer
Ronald Ross Davenport
Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Robert A. Fox
Kenneth W. Gemmill
William L. Grala
Frederick S. Hammer
Harry A. Kalish
Leslie Lenkowsky
David Lucterhand
John A. McKesson
Thomas P. Melady
Martin Meyerson
Ronald J. Naples
Milton L. Rock
Edward M. Snider
George P. Steele
Marvin Wachman
David V. Wachs
Daniel W. Weil
Albert J. Wood

Board of Advisors
James Courter
Midge Decter
David Eisenhower
Samuel P. Huntington
John F. Lehman
Bernard Lewis
William H. McNeill
Martin Peretz
Donald H. Rumsfeld
Richard Thornburgh
R. James Woolsey

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 33 NUMBER 2 SPRING 1989

A NEW SOVIET MILITARY? 163

Doctrine and Strategy Steven P. Adragna 165

Weapons and Budgets John McCain 181

The Next Generation Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer 195

Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War Efraim Karsh 209

The New Gunrunning Edward J. Laurance 225

Documentation

Unearthing the Great Terror Robert Conquest 239

Declaring Independence: Israel and the PLO Daniel Pipes 247

Review Essays

The Path Not Taken Deepak Lal 261

The Outer Limit of Glasnost? Nicolai N. Petro 266

Correspondence 273

Brief Reviews 281
World Politics 283
International Economics 287
War Studies 290
The United States 294
Europe 298
The Soviet Union 302
The Middle East 307
Africa 312
Latin America 316

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

Editor
DANIEL PIPES

Managing Editor
ROGER S. DONWAY
Manuscript Editor
JOANN TOMAZINIS
Assistant Editors
MARK W. POWELL
JAMES F. SMITH

Contributing Editors
PATRICK CLAWSON
ADAM M. GARFINKLE
MICHAEL RADU
VLADIMIR TISMANEANU
ARTHUR WALDRON
Circulation Manager
LISA ANNE BRODY

BOARD OF EDITORS

KENNETH ADELMAN
Institute for Contemporary Studies

PAUL BALARAN
Ford Foundation

ALVIN H. BERNSTEIN
U.S. Naval War College

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

HENRY S. BIENEN
Princeton University

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College, Emeritus

PAUL BRACKEN
Yale University

RICHARD V. L. COOPER
Coopers & Lybrand

ARTHUR CYR
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

PETER DUIGNAN
The Hoover Institution

MARK FALCOFF
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

ALTON FRYE
Council on Foreign Relations

ALEXANDER GEORGE
Stanford University

COLIN S. GRAY
National Institute for Public Policy

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts—Amherst

J. C. HUREWITZ
Columbia University

MARTIN INDYK
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

MORTON A. KAPLAN
University of Chicago

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
The Washington Post

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH
The Rand Corporation

WALTER A. McDOUGALL
University of Pennsylvania

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM
Council on Foreign Relations

KENNETH MAXWELL
Columbia University

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
Columbia University

RICHARD PIPES
Harvard University

STEVEN ROSEFIELDE
University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO
University of California–Berkeley

PAUL SEABURY
University of California–Berkeley

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

MARC TRACHTENBERG
University of Pennsylvania

MARK UHLIG
The New York Times

IVAN VOLGYES
University of Nebraska

W. BRUCE WEINROD
The Heritage Foundation

SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Editorial Assistant: Lara Strauch. **Circulation Assistant:** Lisa Riddell.

ORBIS (ISSN 0030-4387) is published quarterly by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

Submission of articles: The editors invite submission of articles (up to 7,000 words, including reference notes) bearing upon issues in world affairs. A brief summary should accompany the article. Manuscripts, including reference notes, should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate. Reference notes should only cite sources. A style sheet is available on request. Authors are requested to submit their articles on 5¼-inch double-sided, double-density IBM PC format diskettes, supported by MS-DOS in their own word processing program, plus a version in ASCII format. Diskettes must be accompanied with hard copy. Please submit articles to the Editor.

Books and publications for review: Materials should be sent to the Editor.

Subscriptions: Individuals-$25.00 per year; Institutions-$50.00 per year. Outside U.S.A., add $5.00 per year. Address correspondence regarding subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP). Postmaster: Send address changes to ORBIS, 3615 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, PA, and at additional mailing offices.

Advertising and Permissions: Correspondence should be addressed to the ORBIS Advertising Manager.

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute or the Editors of ORBIS. Reproduction of contents without permission is forbidden.

Copyright © 1989 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A NEW SOVIET MILITARY?

Doctrine and Strategy
by Steven P. Adragna

Weapons and Budgets
by John McCain

The Next Generation
by Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer

During the last three years, Soviet leaders and military theorists have developed new ways of describing the USSR's military posture, calling it a policy of "defensive sufficiency" or a "rational, sufficient defense." Further, the Kremlin has said this new posture implies that "political means" are now "the only means for resolving conflicts," and that "force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy." In December 1988, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced that he was backing up these words by making unilateral arms cuts in the Soviets' European forces, and by re-structuring the remaining forces in a way that would be purely defensive.

Observing these new Soviet declarations and moves, Western defense analysts have tried hard to understand them, and, in the course of that attempt, two major schools of thought have developed.

Some analysts believe the concept of "rational, sufficient defense" implies profound changes in Soviet military doctrine and military art. Above all, they claim to see a theater strategy that is less offense-oriented than before, or less reliant upon nuclear weapons, or both.[1] These analysts conclude that the Soviet leadership has come to view war against the West as unthinkable, and now shares the West's long-held concept of deterrence based on assured destruction.[2]

Other analysts, more skeptical, think this interpretation misreads developments in Soviet military art and the military doctrine from which it emanates. They believe there has been more continuity than change in the Soviet art of war, and they conclude that nuclear weapons continue to play a central role in Soviet planning for a possible armed conflict.[3]

[1] Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988.
[2] *The New York Times*, March 7, 1988.
[3] Leon Gouré, "New Soviet Military Doctrine: Reality or Myth?" *Strategic Review*, Summer 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Which of these interpretations is correct? In order to decide, the first step must be to look at what the Soviets are saying; the second must be to look at what they are doing; and the third must be to assess the way they are training the commanders of tomorrow. This is what the following three analyses do, and taken together they indicate more continuity than change in the Soviet leadership's view of war.

— *The Editors*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Soviet Military?

DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

by Steven P. Adragna

All Soviet divisions still remaining in the territory of our allies are being reorganized. They will be given a different structure from today's, and, after a major cutback of their tanks, will become unambiguously defensive.[1]

On December 7, 1988, General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev made this dramatic announcement to the United Nations concerning war and disarmament. Contrary to what many in the media seemed to suppose, his pledge was not a bolt from the blue. Rather, it resulted from a process that had begun in February 1986, when the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU endorsed a military strategy of "rational, sufficient defense."[2] In May 1987, the meaning of "sufficient defense" was further laid out, with great fanfare, when the Warsaw Pact unveiled a new, uniform military doctrine. Characterizing the pact's policy, Gorbachev asserted that: "Warsaw Treaty signatories have clearly stated their military doctrine, one that is subordinated to the task of preventing both nuclear and conventional war, is oriented on reasonable sufficiency in both volume and nature of arms and armed forces, and is exclusively defensive in nature."[3]

The principal difference between the old and new versions of Soviet military doctrine was summarized this way at a press briefing by Colonel General M. A. Gareyev, a deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff and a leading military theorist:

What is new here is the fact that, whereas military doctrine used to be defined as a system of views of the preparation for war and the waging of war, its substance is now based on the prevention of war. The task of preventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus of military doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed forces. Of course, a world war must be prevented chiefly by political means, but this must also be reflected in defensive activity. The chief essence of the political aspect of our military doctrine is that socialism unconditionally rejects

[1] *Pravda*, December 8, 1988.

[2] See M. S. Gorbachev, *Politicheskiy doklad tsentral 'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVII s"yezdu Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*; reprinted in *Kommunist*, March 1986, pp. 5-80.

[3] Quoted in Rear Admiral G. Kostev, "Nasha voyennaya doktrina v svete novogo politicheskogo myshleniya," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 17, September 1987, p. 9.

Steven P. Adragna is a research associate in the International Security Studies Program of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war as a means of resolving interstate political, economic, and ideological differences.[4]

Thus, when Gorbachev made headlines at the United Nations by proclaiming that "the use or threat of force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy," he was not breaking fresh theoretical ground. And when he announced unilateral military cuts that would "maintain our country's capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency," he was merely giving a three-year-old policy dramatic formulation for the general public.

But what does the policy mean? To determine that, three questions about recent Soviet statements and actions need to be answered carefully: (1) Does the Soviet policy of a "rational, sufficient defense" refer to a defense capable only of deterring, or if necessary resisting, an enemy? (2) Does Gorbachev's remark about "reasonable sufficiency in . . . [the] nature of arms" mean the Soviets now see a major threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare, one they would be reluctant to cross? (3) Are the unilateral arms cuts pledged by Gorbachev a step toward "demilitarizing international relations," as he said; and do they show that Moscow (in Gareyev's words) "rejects war as a means of resolving . . . differences"?

The starting point for answering these questions is an understanding of the wider context in which Soviet statements are made.

The Soviet World Order

Again and again, the Soviets' new military doctrine has been called "an expression of new political thinking." Yet, at its most basic political level, Soviet military doctrine is still based on such classic Leninist principles as the inevitable triumph of the socialist system and the aggressiveness of the capitalist states. Even in the era of new political thinking, Soviet military literature rests on ideological definitions, such as the following: "Warsaw Treaty military doctrine is a system of fundamental views about . . . the methods for waging armed combat in defense of socialism . . . ."[5] In short, the new military doctrine begins exactly where the old military doctrine began: with the Marxist-Leninist theory that the capitalist world must by nature pursue the destruction of socialism. As Gareyev puts it, "imperialism has endeavored, and will endeavor, to seek social revenge . . . [and] to eliminate socialism as a social system."[6]

[4] Colonel General M. A. Gareyev, press briefing, cited in Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikanorov, "S positsiy novogo myshleniya," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 23, 1988.

[5] Kostev, "Nasha voyennaya doktrina," p. 10.

[6] Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," published in the monthly series *Defense of the Homeland*, No. 11 (Moscow: Znaniye, 1987); translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, April 15, 1988. See also the new edition of the CPSU Program, reprinted in *Kommunist*, March 1986, pp. 99-152.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is not to say, as some in the West might say, that the polarization of the world creates a danger of war. Current Soviet doctrine, no less than before, blames the danger of war exclusively on Western imperialism. According to Gareyev, the threat of a nuclear war

> is rooted not in the contradictions between the two social systems but rather in the aggressive policy of imperialism.
>
> The Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress pointed out that . . . . "due to its own social nature, imperialism constantly generates an aggressive, adventuristic policy."... For this reason at the present stage and in the foreseeable future, the threat of war will objectively remain. The growth of this threat can be halted and pushed back, but as long as imperialism exists, it cannot be completely eliminated.[7]

As for the USSR and its social system, Soviet ideology holds that it is scientifically impossible for the Soviet Union to launch predatory, aggressive wars, and therefore all Soviet wars are necessarily defensive. This permits Soviet military doctrine to claim a uniquely defensive purpose, aimed only at repulsing imperialist attack. It follows that the United States alone is responsible for the arms race. And should war break out, that too would be the fault of the imperialists.[8]

The Soviets also continue to maintain that their defense efforts are forced upon them by the West's aggressive plans:

> The CPSU Program states that so long as the danger of imperialism's starting aggressive wars and military conflicts exists, the Party will focus unwavering attention on increasing the defensive might of the USSR and strengthening its security and the readiness of the Armed Forces to rout any aggressor . . . [9]

Joining the senior military leaders, Gorbachev himself has noted the need to prepare for the imperialist threat: "While the danger of war persists, while social revanche remains the pivot of the West's strategy and militarist programs, we will continue to do everything necessary to maintain our defensive might at such a level so as to preclude the military superiority of imperialism over socialism."[10]

Thus, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union remain an indispensable component of Soviet policy and will remain so until disarmament is accomplished — that is, until imperialism no longer disposes of military force. Accordingly, the need for constant improvement in Soviet military capabilities and the necessity of preparing the armed forces and the people for war remain key to the new military doctrine and its underlying foundation of "reasonable

[7] Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," p. 2.

[8] See Steven P. Adragna, *On Guard for Victory: Military Doctrine and Ballistic Missile Defense in the USSR* (Washington, D.C.: Pergammon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1987), chapter 3.

[9] Kostev, "Nasha voyennaya doktrina," pp. 10, 11. See also General of the Army Petr Lushev, "Defending the Gains of the Revolution," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1987, p. 62.

[10] M. S. Gorbachev, quoted in Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU) S. F. Akhromeyev, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti," *Trud*, February 21, 1988; translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, February 22, 1988 (hereafter FBIS: *SOV*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sufficiency." As V. G. Kulikov, then commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, explained in May 1988:

> [the limits of sufficiency] are set not by us but by the United States and NATO. Therefore, as long as they possess powerful armed forces and modern arms, including nuclear arms, for as long as the threat of war remains, the allied socialist countries are forced to maintain their armed forces in a configuration and at a level guaranteeing reliable defense against any aggression.[11]

In sum, as a consequence of their most basic principles, Soviet leaders and theorists continue to maintain that a fundamental class irreconcilability exists between the Soviet Union and the West, that the West remains an implacably aggressive enemy, and that the USSR must maintain an ability to (in Kostev's term) "rout" the imperialists for as long as they possess weapons.[12] Theoretically, Soviet leaders might abandon this philosophical heritage, but the comments cited above suggest no evidence that they have done so or are likely to do so in the foreseeable future. In determining the meaning of the Soviets' new military doctrine, therefore, we must keep in mind that it grows out of the same fundamental political principles as the military doctrine that preceded it.[13] Whatever is new in the new political thinking, it is not basic premises; those remain unshakably Leninist.

With an understanding of this background in mind, we approach the three questions of sufficient defense, the nuclear threshold, and the demilitarization of international relations.

What is "Sufficient Defense"?

Soviet military doctrine and art are said to have changed over the last three years, primarily by becoming more "defensive" in character. Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff, has said that: "Soviet military doctrine has a defensive character, with defense regarded as the principal form of military operation in repelling aggression. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union is building up its Armed Forces on the principle of adequate defense."[14] Many observers have taken this as a radical change in Soviet military thinking.[15] But before reaching this conclusion, the

[11] MSU V. G. Kulikov, in an interview published in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, May 9, 1988; translated in FBIS: *SOV*, May 10, 1988. See also the remarks by Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov on the occasion of the 43rd celebration of Victory Day, *Pravda*, May 9, 1988.

[12] See the thorough discussion of Soviet military doctrine in Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," especially pp. 4-7. See also Colonel K. Kozlov, "Sovetskaya voyennaya doktrina: debaty na programmu KPSS," *Voyennyye znaniya*, June 1986, pp. 8-9.

[13] See MSU Akhromeyev, "Doktrina predotvrashcheniya voiny, zashchity mira i sotsializma," *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 12 (1987): translated in *Soviet Press Selected Translations*, June 29, 1988; and General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, "Warsaw Treaty Military Doctrine — For Defense of Peace and Socialism," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1987.

[14] Interview with *New Times*, February 1988; reprinted in JPRS, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, May 3, 1988.

[15] See the comments of the various observers cited in *The New York Times*, March 7, 1988; and *Defense News*, August 10, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question of what "defensive" means for Soviet theoreticians should be given close attention. Does it mean that the Soviets now seek only the minimum military power needed to deter, or if necessary resist, an attack?

The answer is no. For the Kremlin, "defensive" bears almost no relation to what NATO means by the term. Soviet leaders will have nothing to do with the West's approach to deterrence through a balance of power, such as NATO attempts to maintain in Europe. In the Soviet view, "deterrence" connotes a permanent threat of war, and would permit the USSR's adversaries too much say over the security of the Soviet state. Indeed, in the words of one senior officer, such an approach is "fallacious, dangerous, and amoral."[16] Soviet political theory shows why.

For the Kremlin, "defensive" bears almost no relation to what NATO means by the term.

From the Soviet perspective, the capitalist world yearns by its deepest nature to unleash an attack against socialism; and that yearning can be held in check only by the military might of the Soviet Union. Thus, in order to deter an imperialist attack, the Soviet defenses must plan to do more than merely resist it; they must be ready to send it reeling. According to Marshal Akhromeyev, former chief of the Soviet General Staff, "defensive sufficiency" means having sufficient military potential to "reliably rebuff" aggression if the West unleashes it.[17] "In the event of aggression," Akhromeyev has written, "the main type of military operations by our Armed Forces will be defensive operations. But this defense will be active."[18] Likewise, Admiral Kostev observed that "The defensive nature of our military doctrine, one that counts exclusively on repelling aggression, in no way signifies that our operations will be of a passive nature."[19]

The concept of a military "rebuff" or "rout" shows how little the content of Soviet military doctrine has been changed; it remains concerned with the traditional requirements for fighting a war and destroying an aggressor.[20] The Warsaw Pact's "defensive orientation"

[16] Lushev, "Defending the Gains of the Revolution," p. 62. See also Nikanorov, "Spositsiy novogo myshleniya."

[17] See Akhromeyev, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti"; and Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," p. 5.

[18] Akhromeyev, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti."

[19] Kostev, "Nasha voyennaya doktrina," p. 11.

[20] See Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," especially pp. 4-7. See also Kozlov, "Sovetskaya voyennaya doktrina." For Western analyses of Soviet doctrine, see William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1988/89; Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Gerhard Wettig, " 'New Thinking' on Security and East-West Relations," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

implies an ability to mount a counter-offensive capable of destroying the enemy.

Along these lines, Gareyev declared: "it is impossible to achieve a complete defeat of the enemy by defense alone. For this reason in the course of the war (after repelling enemy aggression) the basic means of combat actions . . . will be decisive counter-offensive actions."[21] An article in *Krasnaya zvezda*, dealing with tactical training, made the point this way:

> It would seem that everyone has known for a long time that defense is strong through activeness. It is also well known that the activeness of the defense consists in the continuous defeat of the offensive forces by all means, the imposing of one's own will upon the enemy, the establishment of unfavorable battle conditions for him, and the carrying out of extensive maneuvering and counterattacks. After all, the final objective is to debilitate the enemy and to destroy him utterly.[22]

This is hardly consonant with Western conceptions of "defense." Save for the new label, this type of preparation exactly resembles the tactical and operational requirements described by Soviet military literature of the 1970s and early 1980s — the period that witnessed the greatest development of Soviet theories on the conduct of offensive maneuver warfare on an integrated nuclear/conventional battlefield.[23]

Is There a Nuclear Threshold?

The second major change claimed for the Soviets' new strategy is a sharper appreciation of the gap between conventional and nuclear war. To take but one symbol, NATO's procedures for unleashing tactical nuclear weapons, in the event of a European war, have so many checks on them that they may well exclude the timely use of such weapons.[24] Have the Soviets come to accept the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons in so sharp a fashion?

Several expressions of Soviet theory do lend credence to the view that Moscow looks on nuclear weapons as involving a radically different level of conflict. Consider, for example, Admiral Kostev's examination of the new military doctrine, in which he identified four

[21] Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," p. 14.

[22] Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Zhitarenko, "Chem sil'na oborona? Na etot vopros popytalis' otvetit' organizatory pokaznogo zanyatiya," *Krasnaya zvezda*, December 10, 1987. See also Colonel V. Chernyshev's reaction to the assessment of Soviet theater strategy described in the 1988 edition of the U.S. Defense Department's *Soviet Military Power*: "Dezinformatsiya neymetsa — Do novogo myshleniya daleko: vyshel v svet ocherednoy yezhegodnik Pentagona," *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 5, 1988.

[23] Among the many works on this topic, the following are especially instructive: Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, *Nastupleniye* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1970), translated by the U. S. Air Force in the Soviet Military Thought Series; Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, *Osnovnyye printsipy operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972), translated by the U.S. Air Force; Colonel F. D. Sverdlov, *Takticheskiy manevr* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982); Lieutenant General V. G. Reznichenko, *Taktika* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984); and General of the Army A. I. Radziyevskiy, ed., *Armeyskiye operatsii* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977).

[24] Andrew Goldman, "NATO Needs a New Missile," ORBIS, Fall 1988, p. 544.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new implications for Soviet military art. Foremost of these was a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This sounds dramatic. After all, the United States has not adopted such a pledge of "no first use" against the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet pledge is not all it seems, however, for the promise not to use nuclear weapons first is hollow. Kostev and other Soviet authorities stress that the USSR will not begin operations against any state unless the Soviet Union "becomes the target of an armed attack." But for the Soviets, a pre-emptive blow against an enemy judged likely to attack does not constitute a first use of force, and this holds for nuclear weapons as well as conventional ones. When the USSR is involved, pre-emption becomes retaliation, first strikes become responses.[25]

Still, as Western policy suggests, a pledge of no-first-use is not the only way of according importance to the difference between nuclear and conventional war. Have the Soviets taken other steps toward such a recognition? Are they, for instance, concentrating greater efforts on conventional weaponry, and lessening the occasions on which resort might be made to nuclear arms?

To the contrary, though improvements in conventional weapons (particularly those based on emerging technologies) are clearly an important element of Soviet military art, these improvements are made in addition to, not in place of, refinements in nuclear systems. Preparations and planning for nuclear conflict (albeit of a controlled nature, and especially within the European theater) have increased, if anything.[26] The Soviets, under their new thinking, profess to rule out nuclear war as a means of "resolving conflicts and disagreements," but they continue to prepare for any and all types of conflict in case war should be "thrust upon them." The following example of this thinking is common in Soviet defense literature:

> We must soberly develop a line of action for all possible situations. The dialectic of life is such that there is still the need to prepare the people morally and psychologically for organized, selfless, courageous actions under the increasing threat of nuclear war. A nuclear attack could force us to such an extreme retaliatory measure as nuclear weapons.[27]

Nevertheless, despite Soviet preparations for nuclear war, some Western analysts still claim to perceive a distinctly new Soviet aversion to the employment of nuclear weapons. But our evidence is to the contrary. Soviet comments on the subject of conventional conflict

[25] See William J. Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: McGraw-Hill Publications Co. and The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1982), pp. 275-76. See also Adragna, *On Guard for Victory*, pp. 17-19.

[26] Notra Trulock III, *Soviet Perspectives on Limited Nuclear Warfare*, Paper C55 (Camberley, Surrey: Soviet Studies Research Center, 1986), especially pp. 29-34.

[27] Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Serebryannikov, "Sootnosheniye politicheskikh i voyennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 18, September 1987, p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do not testify to a preference for all-conventional operations, and indeed much Soviet effort is given over to blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional war.

Traditionally, the Soviets have differed from the West in conceptualizing the fundamental types of arms. While the West tended to distinguish nuclear weapons from all others, the Soviets preferred to speak of "weapons of mass destruction," meaning nuclear and chemical weapons. Given the horrific nature of chemical weapons, however, this dispute did not seem to be one of great importance.

Lately, however, the Soviets have begun referring to "conventional weapons of mass destruction."[28] And they have begun stressing the virtual absence of distinction between the destruction caused by new conventional weapons and other "weapons of mass destruction." This line of argument has begun to manifest itself in a new Soviet scenario in which conventional weapons destroy nuclear power plants and chemical production facilities, leading to results "comparable with the aftereffects of a nuclear war."[29] In February 1988, Akhromeyev explained:

> In our day, a war using only so-called conventional weapons is also becoming increasingly dangerous. Such a war, if imperialism tries to unleash it, will in reality be far from "conventional" as it has been in the past. The use of the new high-accuracy means of destruction, which possess heightened destructive potential, a great effective range and speed of operation, the use of automated control systems, and the likelihood of the deliberate destruction of nuclear power facilities and chemically dangerous production units will give such a war a destructive character not only regarding armies and navies, but also to the peoples of all continents.[30]

Invoking fears of Chernobyl and Bhopal, Soviet writers also argue strongly that these horrible nuclear-chemical side effects from a conventional war would be visited far more heavily upon the West than the East. In a January 1988 article for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's theoretical journal *Kommunist*, one group of authors put it this way:

> Even a non-nuclear war on the European continent, saturated as it is with nuclear power plants, chemical works and huge fuel depots, would mean the practical destruction of all civilizations on that continent. This applies above all and especially to Western Europe, where population density and degree of urbanization on a smaller territory are higher than in Eastern Europe.[31]

Such comments seem intended first of all to frighten Western public opinion and to disabuse NATO leaders of the notion that emerging technology weapons, such as those designed to carry out second-echelon interdiction by non-nuclear means, will enhance Western

[28] See, for example, "Obychnyye oruzhiya ynichtozheniya," *Voyennyye znaniya*, December 1987, p. 32.

[29] Colonel V. Chernyshev, "Obychnaya voina v Evrope? Ob odnom tezise protivnikov yadernogo razoruzheniya na Zapade," *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 29, 1988.

[30] Akhromeyev, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti."

[31] V. V. Zhurkin, S. A. Karaganov, and A. V. Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti — staryye i novyye," *Kommunist*, January 1988, p. 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security. In this light, the notion of nuclear or chemical disaster resulting from a conventional conflict is just a new twist to the long-standing Soviet effort to inject paralyzing fear into Western decision making, thereby weakening NATO.

But it also offers further evidence of the basic continuity in Soviet military thought. Soviet writings in the Brezhnev period tended to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war,[32] and so too do writings in the Gorbachev era. In military art, too, the Soviets prepare to prosecute conflict in a tightly integrated nuclear/conventional environment, and consequently obscure the distinction between the use of nuclear and conventional weapons. Gareyev has declared: "Plans are being hatched [by NATO] to achieve the political aims of a war employing only conventional weapons, although it is apparent that in such a war the threat of employing nuclear weapons will exist constantly and neither of the sides possessing nuclear weapons will permit its defeat in a conventional war without having resorted to nuclear weapons."[33] Declarations such as this (as well as Akhromeyev's remarks, cited above, portraying conventional warfare as indistinguishable from nuclear warfare) cast serious doubt upon Mary FitzGerald's assertion that "numerous Soviet military figures have contrasted the stability of conventional conflict with the innate instability of nuclear conflict."[34] Moreover, while Soviet leaders would clearly wish to avoid war with the West if at all possible, there is little basis for contending, as Raymond Garthoff has, that "the prevention of nuclear war . . . became a guiding tenet of both the political and military-technical levels of Soviet military doctrine throughout the 1970s and continuing thereafter."[35]

The appointment of P.G. Lushev as commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in February 1989, replacing V.G. Kulikov, is seen by some as Gorbachev's break with the view that nuclear weapons would be employed in a European war — but this conclusion is premature.[36] Lushev believes the Soviet armed forces must be prepared to fight and win using any and all types of weapons, and he has encouraged Soviet forces to hone their ability to prosecute all

[32] Note especially: Lieutenant General M. M. Kir'yan, ed., *Voyenno-tekhnicheskiy progress i Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR* (Moscow: Voyenizdat: 1982); Colonel F. D. Sverdlov, *Taktichеskiy manevr* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982); Colonel P Konoplya and Colonel A. Malyshev, "Sovremennyy nastupatel'nyy boy," *Voyennyy vestnik*, No. 2 (February 1984). For earlier examples, see Leon Gouré, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy* (Miami, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), especially chapter five.

[33] Gareyev, "Sovetskaya voyennaya nauka," p. 2. See also Akhromeyev, "Na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti."

[34] *Defense News*, August 10, 1987. See also Mary C. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation," *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1986.

[35] Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988, p. 133.

[36] *The New York Times*, February 3, 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

types of conflicts. Further, as he indicated in an article in *International Affairs*, Lushev does not subscribe to Western theories on mutual security and superpower cooperation: "Essentially, the defense of peace and the defense of socialism have merged into a single whole and have become an important element in the struggle for civilization's survival."[37]

In short, this second fundamental innovation claimed for the Soviets' new military doctrine — a new appreciation for the nuclear threshold — turns out to be as illusory as the first. Again and again, the Soviets have proclaimed or implied their right to initiate "defensive operations" against NATO (as a pre-emptive strike against imperialist attack) and they have restated their belief that no meaningful political distinction exists between conventional and nuclear warfare. Those seeking fresh hope in the Soviet Union's new military doctrine must look elsewhere.

Has Foreign Policy Been Demilitarized?

In his speech to the United Nations, Gorbachev said:

> It is obvious . . . that the use or threat of force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy. This applies above all to nuclear arms, but that is not the only thing that matters. All of us, and primarily the stronger of us, must exercise self-restraint and totally rule out any outward-oriented use of force.

To back up his words, Gorbachev announced a unilateral cut in the Soviet armed forces to be made over a two-year period. The general secretary pledged to reduce total personnel strength by 500,000, with 50,000 troops to be removed from Eastern Europe. Further, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft will leave Eastern Europe and the European part of the USSR. And, perhaps most significantly, the number of tanks in that same area will be reduced by 10,000, with half coming from Eastern Europe. Specifically, six tank divisions will be withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and subsequently "disbanded." Other assault forces, including assault landing formations and river-crossing forces, will be removed from those countries. Finally, to back up Gorbachev's renunciation of an offense-oriented military doctrine, remaining forces in Eastern Europe will be reorganized so as to become "unambiguously defensive."

Since these pledges were made, several American and European policy makers and public figures (including Representative Patricia Schroeder, Paul Warnke, Senator Alan Cranston, and Robert Legvold) began calling for NATO to begin exploring reductions of its own as a next step in the process of reducing armaments. And certainly, if Gorbachev's planned actions are carried through, then they are no

[37] Lushev, *Defending the Gains*, p. 63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

token reduction, but a significant cutback.[38] Indeed, the sudden resignation of Marshal Akhromeyev lends credence to the supposition that Gorbachev's moves were opposed by upper echelons of the Soviet military (although there is no evidence of a "critical mass" of opposition to Gorbachev's programs within the Soviet political-military leadership).

Nevertheless, at this point, the nature of the reductions remains unclear. Will the Soviets remove modern weapons or old ones? Once removed, will the weapons be scrapped or mothballed or transferred to allies? Is the Gorbachev initiative nothing more than an attractive cover for a shift in emphasis away from armor and toward artillery? No mention was made of weapons production: will the removal of older weapons be followed by the deployment of newer ones? Will the assault and river-crossing units be disbanded, or merely relocated in the Soviet Union — or in Poland, which Gorbachev conspicuously did not mention in the address? How will the reductions be verified? Are the moves, though unilateral, intended to induce NATO responses — and what responses will they induce? None of these questions can yet be answered, and before they are, Gorbachev's moves — as well as announced defense cuts by several other Warsaw Pact states — cannot be intelligently assessed even as a short-term maneuver.

Looked at broadly, the Kremlin leadership has through seven decades always sought to maximize future Soviet military potential while maintaining current military power at a level commensurate with economic realities. Toward this end, it has on several occasions cut the size of the armed forces. In 1924, 1946, and the early 1960s, the armed forces — particularly the Ground Forces — were reduced in size while the state pursued an intense effort to reinvigorate the industrial base, develop or acquire new technology, and develop new skills in political and military leadership cadres. After several years, the armed forces emerged at a higher qualitative and quantitative level.

Given the frequent Soviet references to "qualitative improvements in the Armed Forces"[39] and the oft-mentioned economic objectives of perestroika, there is every reason to be concerned that Gorbachev's moves fit into this tradition. Perhaps they do not; but it is far too early to discern in this pledge alone such a major change in Soviet thinking as the renunciation of traditional and enduring doctrinal precepts.

[38] *The New York Times*, December 8, 1988; *Boston Sunday Globe*, December 11, 1988; *Newsweek*, December 19, 1988; and *Defense News*, December 12, 1988.

[39] See, for example, Colonel P. Skorodenko, "Voyennyy paritet i printsip razumnoy dostatochnosti," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 10 (May 1987); and Yazov, "70 let na strazhe sotsializma i mira," *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 23, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, when we recall from above that the Soviet theory of "defense," developed since the 1920s, implies a high-speed, offensive maneuver warfare, Gorbachev's U.N. pledge seems far less altruistic. Reductions in the number of tanks and a "reorganization" of Soviet forces would follow from developments in Soviet military art that have been taking place for at least the last several years.

Specifically, in an important 1985 book, General Gareyev identified the essential tasks confronting the USSR's armed forces in preparing for modern warfare, including the need to conduct offensive operations swiftly and to the depths of the enemy's positions.[40] To accomplish this, he said, attention must be paid to breaching the enemy's defenses, suppressing his forces, coordinating the actions of airborne troops and forward detachments, and exploiting the success of friendly forces.[41] Gareyev went on to describe modern "counter-offensive" operations as consisting of combined air, missile, and artillery strikes, a rapid advance by tank and motorized rifle troops, and support by tactical aviation and helicopters, with airborne and air-landed forces employed in bold strikes against the enemy's flanks and throughout his depth.

If examined from a purely military perspective, Gorbachev's U.N. pledge should be seen as following the military restructuring that the Soviet leadership began as early as 1985.

In an apparent attempt to implement such theory, a military restructuring has been taking place in the Soviet Union during the last several years. And while an exhaustive analysis of that restructuring is not possible here, we should note that the following innovations — which follow from Gareyev's theory — have apparently resurfaced in Gorbachev's promised "pullback."

A reconfiguration of the force structure, which makes possible reductions in the quantity of certain weapons, such as tanks, and in tank-heavy forces.[42]

A reorganization of airborne and air-assault forces, which represent a threat to NATO rear areas at all depths, al-

[40] Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, *M.V. Frunze — Voyennyy teoretik* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1985), p. 243.

[41] Ibid., p. 244.

[42] See David M. Glantz, "Force Structure: Meeting Contemporary Requirements," *Military Review*, December 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though they are a less visible threat than massed armor formations.[43]

Improvements in strategic lift and reinforcement, which make it possible to move large numbers of combat forces in a short period of time. With existing transports, at least fifty battalions could be moved from the western Soviet Union to East Germany in thirty-six to seventy-two hours.[44]

Increased artillery firepower: Self-propelled artillery continues to replace towed weapons, and it would be possible for the Soviets to remove the promised 8,500 tubes while retaining the bulk of the self-propelled weapons. Reconfigurations could result in fewer tubes overall but a greater concentration of firepower.[45]

In sum, if examined from a purely military perspective, Gorbachev's U.N. pledge should be seen as following the military restructuring (toward smaller, more balanced, and more independent units) that the Soviet leadership began as early as 1985. This does not mean that the political and economic motives behind the force reductions can be ignored. It does mean recognizing, however, that the promised cuts will not significantly diminish the ability of Soviet forces to satisfy the requirements of their theater strategy, but that they will bring tremendous pressure to bear upon the West to make force reductions that NATO can ill afford.

But if Gorbachev's announced cuts lend themselves to many interpretations, do they not also lend themselves to the interpretation he gave them? After all, many Soviet spokesmen now declare that political means are the only satisfactory tool for resolving conflicts. And if we are not to presume that the Soviets are engaged in some vast deception, as indeed we should not, what can this mean but a renunciation of aggression?

The answer can be found in Soviet writings. Consider this statement by Lieutenant General V. Serebryannikov, published in *Communist of the Armed Forces*: "The key to realizing the possibilities of preventing war and saving life on Earth is the active use of political means which under contemporary conditions have become the only means for resolving conflicts and arguments and guaranteeing se-

[43] See James F. Holcomb and Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Desant Forces," *International Defense Review*, No. 9 (1988) and No. 10 (1988).

[44] See Graham H. Turbiville, "Strategic Deployment: Mobilizing and Moving the Force," *Military Review*, December 1988.

[45] See "Beefing Up Soviet Artillery Battalions," *International Defense Review*, No. 2 (1988); R.H. Pepper, "3 Shock Army Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) 1990," *RUSI Journal*, June 1985; and Chris Bellamy, "Soviet Artillery and Missile Force Challenge," *International Defense Review*, No. 4 (1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curity."[46] Such a pronouncement certainly seems to imply a rejection of the use of force to settle disputes, perhaps even a desire to avoid war at all costs. And this interpretation leads many Western observers to discern a new, less aggressive, defense-oriented Soviet doctrine.[47]

Unfortunately for that thesis, the Soviets have a special way of defining the term "political means." For them, political means do not preclude military might; on the contrary, political means and military capabilities are inextricably bound together. The former cannot succeed without the latter. Serebryannikov makes the point clearly:

> A mismatch between political and military means and the violation of their harmony and especially an underestimation of proper military means can do a great deal of harm to the matter of defending socialist achievements . . . .
>
> The high level of military preparedness in the socialist community's armies is increasing the effectiveness of political methods under the conditions of military confrontation. Certainly if disarmament is accomplished and trust is established in the future, we will reduce the role of military methods. But this is only in the future and will be the consequence of coordinated actions by the parties to change historical competition exclusively into the channel of peaceful forms.

Helpfully, Serebryannikov provides specific examples of recent conflicts resolved through political means: "The comprehensive combination of political and military means to defend revolutionary achievements is also expressed in the national conciliation in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and other countries."[48] If the communist invasions and wars in Afghanistan and Cambodia were political, then the West has little reason to rejoice when the Kremlin talks about politics being the "only means for resolving conflicts."

Note, too, that Serebryannikov speaks of those invasions and wars as part of a "national conciliation." That interpretation would allow him to exempt even the most overtly military acts from Gorbachev's stricture that nations must forswear any "outward-oriented use of force." After all, national conciliation is not "outward-oriented," and communist military action in pursuit of national conciliation is only "the decisive repelling of military attacks by counterrevolutionaries who are incited by the West," in Serebryannikov's phrase. It is taken only "to halt the bloody undeclared war of imperialism and its minions."[49]

[46] Serebryannikov, "Sootnosheniye politicheskikh," p. 11.

[47] See Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine"; Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987) chapters two and three; Michael MccGwire, "Update: Soviet Military Objectives," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1987; and Mary C. FitzGerald, "Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation."

[48] Serebryannikov, "Sootnosheniye politicheskikh," pp. 12-13.

[49] Ibid., p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conclusion

Optimistic assertions about the USSR's growing defensive orientation and its rejection of the utility of nuclear weapons must, unfortunately, be judged groundless. As to the first, the Soviet concept of defensiveness does not correspond to the usual concept, but is shaped by an understanding of pre-emption as essentially retaliatory and by a view of the United States as an implacably hostile imperialist power. On the question of nuclear weapons, the Soviets seem more serious than ever about their need to be prepared to fight a war against their principal adversary using any and all means.

The question that has so preoccupied Western defense analysts — whether the Soviets are planning for nuclear or conventional operations — is the wrong question. The Soviets continue to emphasize both conventional and nuclear operations. They remain deadly serious about planning for a war against NATO in the event that one should be "forced upon them," and it is irrational to assume that they will eschew certain types of weapons merely because some Westerners cheerfully believe it makes sense for them to do so.

Two points are certain: the Kremlin prefers to achieve its goals by means other than armed conflict with the West; at the same time, it continues to develop plans for dealing with any military contingency. While shifts in what the Soviets call the correlation of forces — such as political developments, economic difficulties, and resource constraints, as well as changes in the military balance — lead to short-term changes, continuity remains the hallmark of Soviet military doctrine. The challenge to the West is to maintain the continuity and integrity of its own defenses.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book
...From Routledge



The Crisis of Marxist Ideology In Eastern Europe

The Poverty of Utopia

Vladimir Tismaneanu

"...displays an intimacy with the East European communist experience that is rare for its perspicacity and ability to see it as part of the larger evolution/revolution of Marxist doctrine and Soviet practice. This book is modest in size only. In insight it is immense—part of a new wave of truly critical scholarship in politics and society."—Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University

"...vitriolic and challenging...fills the gap of the unwritten chapter in Kolakowski's narrative of Marxism. Mr. Tismaneanu recounts the story of the grandeur and decline of East European Marxism."—Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, New School for Social Research

"...an excellent, highly original study which gains strength not only from the author's command of an enormous literature but also his background and experience as a native of Eastern Europe....Highly recommended to all those interested in the deeper understanding of the connections between ideas and social realities in our times."—Paul Hollander, University of Massachusetts

208 pp. $35.00/cloth

Vladimir Tismaneanu, a resident scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, writes regularly on Soviet and East European affairs. He is editor of two forthcoming volumes, ***Grassroots Pacifism: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*** *and* ***The Future of Communist States: Views From Within.***

Routledge

29 West 35th Street
New York, New York 10001-2291 • (212) 244-3336

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Soviet Military?

WEAPONS AND BUDGETS

by John McCain

What purpose is served by detailed investigations of the size and cost of Soviet forces? Such "bean counting," after all, can never reveal what the subtler arts of Sovietology and Kremlinology promise to reveal: Moscow's attitudes, policies, and strategies. And clearly, what the USSR possesses in military might is less important than what the Soviet government plans to do with its power. Nevertheless, bean counting has one indisputable advantage over the subtler arts: beans are visible, whereas attitudes and policies are not. If monitoring Soviet forces does not reveal Moscow's plans, it does provide hard data against which proclamations of those plans can be tested.

And tested they must be. No matter how promising relations with Moscow may seem at the moment, the West must continue to distinguish clearly between rhetoric and reality. This is especially true in the case of Soviet military efforts. The U.S. government and its allies cannot rely on Soviet words and ignore Soviet capabilities, especially when the most important statements of top Soviet leaders contain deep ambiguities. The practical meanings of terms like "defensive strategy" and "the demilitarization of foreign policy" remain unclear, to say the least.

Just how far the Kremlin shifts resources away from its military forces — in particular from the forces and weapon systems that serve aggression and political blackmail — will reveal Soviet military intentions. This provides the best test because changes in physical resources allocated to the military — plants, personnel, and equipment — can be closely monitored using satellites and other technical means in the possession of the U.S. government.

But before beginning a discussion of Soviet military resources, two caveats must be issued regarding the information employed in this article. The data cited in the text are unclassified information provided by U.S. intelligence sources in the fall of 1988. Where the precise data are classified, graphs have been used instead to make the relevant points. Naturally, because the graphs embody classified data, they have been drawn very roughly and must be regarded in that light.

John McCain is the junior U.S. senator from Arizona.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second, there is no fixed method for estimating the number of rubles Moscow spends on a given component of its military forces, nor is there any set way to give Soviet forces a dollar cost that will be directly comparable to U.S. costs for similar forces. Legitimate debates can arise over such calculations. Those debates, however, do not affect year-to-year comparisons of the scale and size of Soviet military efforts. So long as one translates physical assets into monetary units in a consistent manner, these trends are unaffected regardless of whether one's ruble estimates are the same as those used by Soviet planners, or one's dollar estimates are the same as those used by the Department of Defense in funding U.S. forces. In some of the comparisons made below, debates about monetary translations would matter if exact figures were necessary. But they are not; the points made require only rough approximations.

Larger and Better Forces

Recent studies by the U.S. intelligence community show that key elements of the USSR's military effort — offensive and defensive strategic forces, theater nuclear forces, conventional land forces, tactical aviation, and military stockpiles — have not yet been reduced. Looking only at military forces (excluding defense industries, and research and development), the USSR has conducted a major military build-up since 1980, particularly in combat-ready nuclear warheads, land forces, and offensive tactical air forces (see Table 1).

Even a brief look at the table shows that the Soviets have increased forces quantitatively in virtually every category of military hardware, with huge percentage increases in strategic bombers and the nuclear warheads carried by these aircraft, in nuclear attack submarines, helicopters, artillery, multiple-rocket launchers, and mortars.

But force quantity alone is not a measure of Soviet activity; quality must also be taken into consideration. For example, the number of long-range and medium-range attack aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons in a theater war has dropped from 4,375 in 1980 to 4,260 in 1987. But these aircraft more than doubled the range that they could carry a payload (and, within limits, comparably increased the payload they could carry a given range).

Likewise, the number of Soviet strategic defense fighters dropped from 2,550 to 2,250. But the entry into service of the MiG-31 has heralded a whole new generation of fighters with avionics and other performance characteristics equal to Western fighters. That the number of strategic surface-to-air missile launchers dropped from 9,330 to 8,400 is also not a sign for encouragement. Rather, it results from such factors as the continuing replacement of obsolete SA-1 and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
1980-87

CATEGORY	FORCE STRENGTH		CHANGE	
	1980	*1987*	*Number*	*Percent*
Active Military Personnel (1,000)	4,378	4,637	259	+5.9
Active Army Manpower (1,000)	2,450	2,840	390	+15.9
Divisions	185	209	24	+13.0
Militarized Security Forces (1,000)	459	550	91	+19.8
Strategic Nuclear Warheads on				
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	5,002	6,400	1,398	+27.9
Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles	4,880	5,632	752	+15.4
Bombers	295	1,214	919	+300.0
Theater Nuclear Missile Warheads	880	1,280	400	+45.5
Tanks	48,000	52,900	4,900	+10.2
Other Armored Vehicles	62,000	84,500	22,500	+36.3
Military Helicopters	2,000	4,200	2,200	+110.0
Anti-tank Guided Missile Launchers	25,000	38,200	13,200	+52.8
Artillery	19,300	28,700	9,400	+48.7
Multiple Rocket Launchers	5,000	7,100	2,100	+42.0
Surface-to-surface Missile Launchers	1,418	1,607	189	+13.3
Mortars	6,700	10,380	3,680	+54.9
Surface-to-air Missile Launchers				
Tactical	3,500	4,490	990	+28.3
Strategic	9,330	8,400	(930)	−10.0
Anti-aircraft Guns	9,500	11,355	1,855	+19.5
Strategic Bombers (Air Force)	220	326	106	+48.2
Tactical Land-based Aircraft				
Fighter/Attack	3,850	4,500	650	+16.9
Bombers	550	535	(15)	−2.7
Reconnaissance	675	685	10	+1.5
Total	5,075	5,720	645	+12.7
Carriers	4	5	1	+25.0
Cruisers	36	34	(2)	−5.6
Destroyers	64	60	(4)	−6.3
Frigates/Corvettes	168	180	12	+7.1
Other Surface Combatants	505	517	12	+2.4
Nuclear Attack Submarines	51	78	27	+52.9
Naval Aircraft	900	915	15	+1.7

NOTE: Because of the *Backfire* bomber's intermediate unfueled range (2,150 miles), the Soviet air force's *Backfires* are counted twice, as strategic and tactical. There were 75 in 1980, 165 in 1987.

SOURCE: Bernard C. Victory of the Congressional Research Service.

SA-2 systems with the advanced SA-10, and the investment in an entirely new anti-ballistic missile defense system for Moscow.

The number of combat ships remained virtually constant, but the Soviet navy began building advanced fleet carriers and far more advanced nuclear submarines (SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs). The Soviets also deployed new generations of ship- and air-launched anti-ship missiles, while greatly improving their naval command, control, and communications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1
COSTS OF U.S. AND USSR MILITARY PROGRAMS
1978-1987



NOTE: The U.S. data in Figures 1, 2, and 3 are based on the five-year Defense Program of the DoD as of August 1987 and the U.S. budget. It should be noted, however, that the budget authority has been declining since 1985.

More Money, More Resources

A review of Soviet military spending reveals four distinct periods: the 1970s, when total Soviet military effort rose at a steady rate; 1980-81, when this rise virtually halted; 1981-84, when the rise resumed at a much lower rate; and finally 1985-87, when it returned to the growth rate of the 1970s (see Figure 1).

These shifts in the trend of Soviet military spending led some analysts to conclude that the Kremlin had slowed its effort to increase military forces, devoting greater effort instead to the civilian economy.[1] In fact, the Soviet Union's reductions in military spending seem to have primarily involved production problems resulting from changing technology. Specifically, the Soviets found it very difficult to manufacture large amounts of advanced, varied military technol-

[1] For example, Franz Walter, "Soviet Defense Expenditures," in *The Soviet Union 1984/1985: Events, Problems, Perspectives*, edited by the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 165-66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ogy in the scheduled time. Much of the weaponry and military equipment planned in the late 1970s could not be put into production until three to five years later than originally expected; this accounts for much of the drop in Soviet procurement expenditures in the mid-1980s. By 1985, the bottlenecks had been removed and the annual rate of real increase in defense spending reverted to its former level.

Despite three years of decline since fiscal year (FY) 1985 in the (constant dollar) size of U.S. defense expenditures — and a great deal of Soviet rhetoric — General Secretary Gorbachev's tenure has seen no slowdown in Soviet military spending. To the contrary, the real growth of Soviet military spending since 1984, as measured in terms of resource inputs and the size of Soviet forces, has accelerated to about 3 percent per year. In contrast, the late 1970s witnessed only 2 percent growth per year.

Differences between the American and Soviet systems make comparisons much less certain than year-to-year comparisons of the Soviet military effort alone. Nevertheless, it is clear that the gap between the two military budgets narrowed in the early 1980s. The slowed increase in Soviet expenditures combined with the Reagan administration's revitalization of U.S. defenses brought U.S. spending near the level of Soviet spending by the mid-1980s. Keeping up with the United States has been something of a strain, however — measuring military expenditures against gross national product (GNP) indicates that Soviet military spending has risen from 15-17 percent of the GNP at the beginning of the 1970s to 17-19 percent today, compared to 5-6 percent of the GNP for the United States today.

Again, these estimates of military spending as a percentage of the GNP are more uncertain than estimates of the size of Soviet military forces, but it seems safe to conclude that the Soviet military effort has not dropped as a percentage of total Soviet economic production.

More Investment, Level Procurement

Because of their breadth, estimates of total military spending, or spending as a percentage of the GNP, tend to disguise the Soviet Union's increasing effort to improve the quality of its military forces. A clearer picture of this trend is seen in the level of Soviet investment in military forces, as provided by recent Department of Defense estimates (see Figure 2).

The data reveal that Soviet defense investment dropped during only one year, the period equivalent to the U.S. government's FY 1981. Soviet investment remained constant in FY 1982, rose in FY 1983, and remained constant in FY 1984. As noted above, however, the years 1981-84 mark the Soviets' period of difficulty in producing state-of-the-art military systems, such as avionics, command and con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2
COST COMPARISON OF U.S. AND USSR MILITARY INVESTMENT
1978-1987



NOTE: Military investment comprises funds spent on military research and development, testing and evaluation, procurement, and construction.

trol systems, sensors, "smart" and stand-off weapons, electronic warfare systems, and missiles. During these years the Soviets could not exploit the massive investments made in their defense industry in the late 1970s.

Once these production problems were overcome, though, Soviet investment in military research and development, procurement, and military construction resumed its former rate of increase. Consequently, the annual rise during 1985-87 was equivalent to the rise in Soviet military investment between 1974 and 1980. The net result was an increase in annual investment in defense spending (in 1989 dollars) from about $75 billion in 1965 to about $107 billion in 1975, $135 billion in 1985, and about $140 billion in 1987.

To put these figures in perspective, U.S. investment in defense did not catch up with Soviet investment until 1985, having lagged behind Soviet investment in every fiscal year since 1968. The Defense Department estimates that during the period 1969-1987 the cumulative gap between U.S. and Soviet investment in military forces was half a trillion dollars.

Military spending for procurement offers another perspective on the Soviet effort (see Figure 3). Looking only at procurement, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3
COSTS OF U.S. AND USSR MILITARY PROCUREMENT
1978-1987



gap between the United States and the USSR narrowed considerably during 1978-1987. During this period, Soviet procurement spending increased at an average rate of only 1.3 percent, versus 12 percent for the United States. Nevertheless, the estimated value of Soviet military procurement for the last decade (measured in 1989 dollars) was still 20 percent greater than that of U.S. defense programs. Even more important, the rate of increase in Soviet defense procurement expenditures during 1984-87 again rose to the relatively high rate of 3-4 percent per year.

Improvements in equipment quality drove much of the spending increases of the mid-1980s. The total value of equipment increased, but, as Table 2 shows, annual production in many important categories of equipment fell or remained constant. Thus, Soviet efforts must be measured in dollars and not simply in physical units.

Military Industries Outperform Civilian Ones

Resuming a high rate of annual increase in real Soviet military spending no doubt imposes major economic burdens on the USSR. Moreover, the revitalization of U.S. defenses since 1980 means that the Kremlin has less hope of gaining safely exploitable military advantage over the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION
1984-86

EQUIPMENT CATEGORY AND TYPE	NUMBER PRODUCED		
	1984	*1985*	*1986*
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	75	100	125
Long-range Intermediate Nuclear Missiles	125	125	25
Short-range Ballistic Missiles	500	450	400
Submarine-launched Cruise Missiles	700	700	1,100
Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles	50	100	100
Tanks	3,200	3,000	3,000
Other Armored Fighting Vehicles	3,800	3,500	3,000
Field Artillery	2,900	3,000	3,000
Self-propelled	1,000	1,000	1,000
Towed	1,900	2,000	1,300
Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems	900	700	500
Self-propelled Anti-aircraft Guns	50	10	100
Bombers	50	50	50
Fighter Bombers	800	650	650
Transports	250	250	200
Anti-submarine Warfare Aircraft	5	5	5
Military Helicopters	600	600	500
Submarines	9	8	8
Major Surface Combatants	9	8	9
Minor Surface Combatants	50	50	50
Auxiliaries	5	5	6

SOURCE: Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 1987, p. 122.

The Soviets also face continuing problems in upgrading force quality and improving technology. To be sure, the USSR has achieved technological parity with the West in many weapon systems and leads the West in some areas, such as armor and anti-armor, artillery, and surface-to-air missile technology. And, it must be acknowledged, the Soviets have a knack for fielding effective systems with limited technology. Nevertheless, Soviet military production in general remains inefficient and many key areas of Soviet military technology remain weak. Recent studies by U.S. intelligence indicate that it takes roughly three times the resources — electric power, steel, even bureaucrats — to produce advanced weapons in the USSR as it does in the United States; this may explain why Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders speak so often about the burden of military spending. Yet it is far from clear that this problem will lead to the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy; in fact, it may lead to just the reverse.

The major complaint of the Soviet leadership is not the level of military spending but the military's general lack of efficiency in using its resources. Before Western audiences, Soviet spokesmen claim that Moscow intends to reduce total military spending, and of course Gorbachev publicly announced some cuts at the United Nations on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

December 7, 1988. But within the Soviet Union, the emphasis on military modernization continues unabated. The major change is the extent to which the Soviet leadership has attempted to force the military to reallocate its resources and use them more efficiently. The Soviets seem less concerned than Westerners imagine with shifting resources to civilian production, and more concerned that producing military equipment costs them two to three times as much as it does the West. They are also deeply concerned about their problems in producing computers and semiconductors.

From a Western viewpoint, a more efficient Soviet Union is a safer Soviet Union only if military spending goes down and forces are cut. To date, there is no indication that Moscow is moving in that direction or interpreting perestroika to have that consequence.

To many Western observers it seems that Soviet leaders have good reason to shift away from military spending.[2] The Soviet economy is able to afford its huge military establishment even less than in the past, in large part because of declining growth rates (see Figure 4), and continuing problems in the agricultural sector. In contrast to the old pattern of always aiming for higher growth rates in the military machinery industry than in civilian industry, the Five-Year Plan for 1986-1990 set equal goals for the two (7-8 percent per year). But the planned increase in civil industry is to take place alongside, not at the expense of, military industry. Further, the scheduled growth of 7-8 percent in the military sector is no less than that of past plans. U.S. intelligence experts estimated in the fall of 1988 that, as things are turning out, the actual growth achieved by the military ministries during 1985-87 averaged 6-7 percent — versus 3-4 percent for the civilian ministries. The old priorities remain essentially in place, whatever the rhetoric and the formal planning.

Because Soviet military industries out-perform their civilian counterparts — owing to more and better managers, higher-quality materials, and better personnel — Soviet leaders are using them to assume the jobs of collapsing civilian industries. This, in turn, becomes an economic equivalent of martial law. Thus, in March 1988, one of the civilian machinery ministries was abolished due to its inability to retool the food-processing and light industrial sectors rapidly enough. These areas are critical for providing workers with material incentives such as food and consumer goods; this makes them a linchpin to spurring productivity, and thus to Gorbachev's entire reform plan. Most of the disbanded ministry's factories were transferred to military ministries.

The shake-up of the Soviet leadership that occurred on September 30, 1988, produced shifts that seem likely to strengthen such

[2] For example, Richard F. Kaufman, "Economic Reform and the Soviet Military," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988, p. 210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 4
USSR: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
1965-1988



NOTE: 1988 data are preliminary. Agricultural data exclude farm products used within agriculture and purchases by agriculture from other sectors.

military contributions to the civilian sector. One indication of this is the promotion of Aleksandra Biryukova, the deputy premier for light industry, consumer, and social affairs to candidate membership on the Politburo. Addressing the issue directly, Gorbachev promised the United Nations that he would shift some military plants to producing equipment for the civil sector.

But while many may have interpreted these words and actions to indicate a less-militarized economy, expansion of the military industry's role in the civil economy may actually allow military industries to gain even more control over the Soviet economy. This could allow the Kremlin to improve its forces at lower cost and increase its capacity for a major arms build-up.

In any case, there is no tangible indication of major changes in the performance of Soviet military industry. During the first three

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years of the 1986-1990 plan, the military industry ministries have continued their pattern of rapid growth. In contrast, the growth of the civilian machinery ministries fell disappointingly short and no significant increase took place in military output for the civil sector. In response, the Soviet leadership has merely criticized ministers of the military industries for failing to respond to their calls for greater help in modernizing the civil economy. Thus it would appear that so far the Soviet military-industrial complex has successfully resisted perestroika.

Monitoring Future Soviet Actions

Clearly, no significant shifts in the Soviet military effort have yet taken place. If anything, the intense effort that was made in the late 1970s under Brezhnev has continued under Gorbachev. At the same time, recent trends may not be a fair test of Gorbachev's long-term intentions. Problems in military production during the early and mid-l980s created a considerable backlog in many areas of the Soviet modernization effort, particularly in tactical aviation. Further, some U.S. intelligence experts argue that the Soviets are bound by their five-year plans. The plans lay down the major lines for resource allocation, and these become virtually inviolable. If this is so, then the true test of Gorbachev's intentions will become clear only as the structure of the next Five-Year Plan, the thirteenth (covering 1991-95), becomes apparent. This plan is being drafted in 1988-89, and some indications of Soviet intentions should be available by 1990.

Even then, the West will have to check those apparent intentions against the reality of Soviet actions and the changes in Soviet capabilities. Very close attention will have to be paid to the Soviet military effort and especially to military investment, military production, and force size. This will be even more imperative if the United States and the Soviet Union move forward on arms control agreements.

The Soviets have announced that the dismantling of SS-20s in accordance with the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty will save some 300 million rubles. This is but a tiny portion of the sum — at least 140-150 billion rubles — that the USSR tacitly admits spending on defense. Besides, the issue is not how much the USSR saves as a result of the INF Treaty, but how it uses these savings.

During the summer of 1988, for instance, it became clear that the Soviets are deploying road-mobile SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), rail-mobile SS-24 ICBMs, new *Blackjack* bombers, cruise missiles, new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and new versions of the heavy SS-18 ICBM. Further, these are being deployed at such a rate that they will soon completely offset the cuts in SS-20s and other missiles dismantled under the INF Treaty. Recent U.S. intelligence estimates suggest that the growing number of in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

creasingly accurate warheads in the Soviet strategic forces will, before long, enable the USSR to cover all the European and Asian targets it covered with the INF systems now being destroyed — and still increase its coverage of U.S. targets to saturation levels. This fact, as well as recent Soviet advancements in military transport capability which could help quickly redeploy the forces Gorbachev has promised to pull back, demonstrates the fallacy of the notion that real reductions in the Soviet military threat are being achieved. Similarly, unless the Kremlin cuts its forces in Eastern Europe and its combat-ready forces at home far more radically than Gorbachev has yet proposed, any declarations about defensive strategy are meaningless. By shifting resources to the modernization of weapons, cuts that do not involve total military spending can actually increase offensive capability.

These considerations must influence the West's approach to both the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and to conventional arms reduction talks. Regardless of the size of any future arms reductions, and the number of weapons systems destroyed or put into storage, the essential question remains: What is Moscow going to do with its remaining forces? And what will it do with the resources thus saved?

On the question of remaining strategic forces, even a full START agreement might not lead to major cuts in Soviet delivery vehicles for some five to seven years. In addition, if one assumes inclusion in a START treaty of the rules now proposed for strategic arms, such a treaty would affect only about 40 percent of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Further, it will actually allow the Soviets to deploy significantly larger numbers of nuclear warheads than they do today. To make matters worse, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to modernize and modify their strategic forces against vulnerabilities both real and perceived in the effort to maintain a deterrent against the initiation and escalation of nuclear war.

These realities mean that proceeding with strategic arms control requires the U.S. government to monitor a whole range of Soviet actions: the rate at which the Soviet military modernizes theater nuclear forces unaffected by the INF Treaty; how much Moscow invests in strategic defenses; and how much it invests in new strategic offensive systems for the next decade. More specifically, the West must scrutinize Soviet spending on systems such as a modified SS-18, the SS-24, the SS-25, the *Blackjack* bomber, and new SSBNs and SLBMs. Soviet actions in these areas will determine whether the cuts proposed in START improve Western security or lead to a new nuclear arms race using more sophisticated forces in smaller numbers.

With regard to conventional forces, arms control agreements will need to be followed by an especially close watch on the rate of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet investment in two areas: advanced conventional weaponry and rapid power projection outside the USSR (especially from east of the Urals to Europe). Soviet progress on these two fronts might well negate any Soviet pullback agreed upon in a treaty.

Fortunately, the West also has two opportunities to test Soviet intentions in the near future. According to Pentagon estimates, Moscow had some 116,000 men in Afghanistan before it began withdrawing troops in 1988.[3] Its forces included the equivalent of four divisions and two independent brigades, with some 270 combat helicopters, massive amounts of armor and artillery, and an air army with 145 combat aircraft.[4] Assuming the withdrawals have taken place as announced, the Kremlin will have two major options: demobilize some or all of these units and reallocate the resulting savings to the civil sector — or redeploy the units to strengthen offensive conventional capabilities.

The second test concerns the implementation of the force reductions Gorbachev announced to the United Nations, the details and timing of which were not specified. He will send a truly important message to the West if (1) the cuts take place quickly; (2) the changes actually reduce the Soviets' war-fighting capabilities and military advantages; (3) he does not press the West for parallel reductions; and (4) he does not seek a halt in NATO's theater nuclear modernization.

The Soviet leaders tell us that they have changed in their relations with the outside world; whether or not this is the case will be in large part determined by which of these routes Gorbachev adopts.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1988*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 24.

[4] David C. Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army* (London: Jane's, 1988), pp. 34-35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Where is Gorbachev Leading the Soviet Union?

Find out in . . .

GORBACHEV'S ERA OF NEW THINKING

In the upcoming ***Journal of International Affairs***, these leading policy-makers and experts examine the interaction of domestic and international factors inherent in Gorbachev's program of reforms:

Michael Armacost	Moshe Lewin
Seweryn Bialer	Allen Lynch
George Breslauer	Martha Olcott
William Butler	Condoleezza Rice
Richard Ericson	Carol Saivetz
Vitalii Korotich	David Shipler
Aleksandr Yakovlev	William Taubman

By ordering a subscription today, you will receive GORBACHEV'S ERA OF NEW THINKING, as well as our upcoming issue on the United States and its alliance relationships heading into the 1990s.

The ***Journal of International Affairs***, in a unique single topic format, brings together noted scholars and policy-makers for in-depth discussion of a current topic in world affairs. The ***Journal*** is thus not only stimulating reading when it first arrives, but also an important resource for future reference.

Subscribe today:

☐ Individual ($12.00)
☐ Institution ($24.00)

Single Issue:

☐ Individual ($6.00)
☐ Institution ($12.00)

Name_____

Institution_____

Address_____

City/State_____

Send order to JIA, Box 4, International Affairs Building, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027. Foreign postage: $4 per year. No postage necessary for U.S., Canada or Mexico.

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A New Soviet Military?

THE NEXT GENERATION

by Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer

The whole atmosphere of our life and joint labor, the family and school, the army, culture, literature and art are called on to shape and foster in Soviet people of all nationalities, and primarily among young people, the noblest sentiments of internationalism and Soviet patriotism.[1]

When General Dwight Eisenhower paid a goodwill visit to Moscow, shortly after the Second World War, Joseph Stalin invited him to see a children's sports exhibition in Red Square. As he found himself watching five hours of goose stepping and other military displays, Eisenhower became acutely uncomfortable. His discomfort turned into downright concern as Stalin leaned over to him and boasted: "This develops the war spirit."[2]

Not much has changed four decades later. Today's Soviet leadership continues to encourage "war spirit" among its youth, and in similar ways. From the time Soviet children begin school at about age six, classroom instruction extols patriotism and praises the sacrifices made by the Soviet military. Classes also instill in children the need to serve the motherland and the cause of socialism. From grade three (age eight), military themes receive increased emphasis, and civil defense training against nuclear attack begins. From about age ten until graduation at eighteen, training in weapons, military tactics, and paramilitary operations constitutes a regular part of the curriculum. Extracurricular activities include participation in quasi-military exercises. Girls seem to receive somewhat less military training per se (in weapons and tactics) than males, but they probably make up for this by spending more time in related fields such as civil defense and emergency medicine.

Most worrisome is the trend: the training that Soviet children receive in military subjects has increased during the Gorbachev years.

[1] Mikhail Gorbachev, quoted in *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, February 3, 1987; translated in British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: The Soviet Union*, February 21, 1987 (hereafter BBC: *SOV*).

[2] Jules Archer, *Battlefield President: Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 115.

Ronald R. Nelson is the executive director of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C., and **Peter Schweizer** is an associate analyst at the National Forum Foundation in Washington, D.C. They co-authored *The Soviet Concepts of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence and Detente* (University Press of America, 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reforms seek to make this segment of the Soviet educational system more efficient and expand the resources and facilities (such as firing ranges) available to it. Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev has himself spoken a number of times about the necessity for enhanced military-patriotic education. Despite promises of a less monolithic and militarized Soviet society under Gorbachev, these efforts are accelerating as major facets of the program undergo intensification to promote greater "vigilance" in today's Soviet children.

The persistence of militaristic education has particular importance when so many Western observers take it for granted that Gorbachev is a constructive reformer of Soviet society who seeks to reduce tensions internationally. For this reason, what the Soviets have in mind for military-patriotic education merits close scrutiny.

The Goal: *Homo Sovieticus*

In the West, the primary purpose of education is to implant knowledge; in the Soviet Union it is to produce "good citizens of our country."[3] The prime goal of Soviet education is to turn out a particular type of citizen who possesses certain characteristics. Soviet education is supposed to produce "The Soviet Man," whose class consciousness and "communist morality" make him a steadfast defender of the state.

For the Kremlin, the success of military-patriotic education pertains directly to the perpetuation of Soviet rule. "Show me your young people," as one official put it, "and I will immediately determine what the state will be like in the future."[4] Igor Mikhaylovich Ilinskiy, a director of the Komsomol Central Committee, was even more specific: "This world of tomorrow will be largely the way young people conceive of it today. The ideals, value orientations, plans, needs and interests of young people are subjects of special social concern, for it is through the young generations that society reproduces itself biologically and socially."[5] The February 1988 Party Plenum statement on education reflected this attitude: "It is the task of our educational system to comprehensively strengthen the continuity of generations of the Soviet people and kindle in students a desire to augment the historical experience of the fighters for socialism. It has to raise people of courage, people with a highly developed sense of their revolutionary pedigree, their motherland, their social system."[6]

[3] Andrew Wilson and Nina Bachkatov, *Living With Glasnost: Youth and Society in a Changing Russia* (London: Penguin, 1988), p. 45.

[4] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 11, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, April 2, 1987.

[5] Igor Mikhaylovich Ilinskiy, "Development of Socialism and Youth," *Kommunist*, no. 6, 1987; translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: *Kommunist*, July 23, 1987.

[6] "On the Restructuring of Secondary and Higher Education and the Party's Tasks in Implementing This Restructuring," *Kommunist*, no. 4, 1988; translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: *Kommunist*, May 9, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For these reasons, Mikhail Heller has described military-patriotic training as "the most important element in the Soviet educational system."[7] Indeed, since 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power, political indoctrination and militarization of Soviet youth have been among the regime's most persistent goals.

Gorbachev sees in the younger generation the potential for the spiritual renewal of Soviet society. Although this generation grew and developed during the "years of stagnation and corruption," young people are capable of "rescue from the collective demoralization" currently prevalent in Soviet society.[8] Their spiritual future, he believes, is his to determine, and crucial to his survival as general secretary. He recently expressed his hopes for reviving Soviet idealism at a Komsomol Congress: "This [spiritual renewal] is your civic and patriotic duty, the main predestination of each succeeding generation, not only to continue the cause but also to elevate the country to new heights."[9] By intensifying the military-patriotic indoctrination of children, Gorbachev hopes to "elevate the country."

Songs and Slogans: Preschool to Third Grade

By the time the average Soviet youth graduates from high school, he will have undergone more than 180 hours of classroom instruction on the art of war. The average youth will more than likely participate in extracurricular militarized sports and games, and be subjected to politicized stories and poems extolling the virtues of international communism and condemning the threats posed by "imperialism." More than 50,000 military instructors are employed full time by the Ministries of Education and Defense to teach children the deadly skills of shooting, grenade throwing, and military tactics. Military-patriotic education is a systematic phenomenon, which includes most major political, military, cultural, and educational institutions in the Soviet Union. It is sometimes difficult for outsiders to comprehend the totalist nature of these efforts.

The undertaking begins at the age of six, when a Soviet child first enters school. Officials see children as one component of national defense. Further, Soviet educators see the earliest days of a child's education as the most crucial in creating the proper psychological outlook, and therefore promote martial and patriotic values with real energy. "Participation by the children in the nation-wide defense movement is a splendid tradition," said the Soviet paper *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* and outlined the task this way:

[7] Mikhail Heller, *Cogs in the Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man*, (New York: Knopf, 1988), p.158.
[8] Wilson and Bachkatov, *Living with Glasnost*, p. 20.
[9] Soviet Television, February 20, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 24, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the very beginning education work must be carried out on the basis of the principles of the close combination and indissoluble unity of the future citizen's rights and duties. This way, from an early age the concepts of duty and responsibility toward society and the proud sense of belonging to a united multinational homeland are laid as the foundation of the developing personality.[10]

Or as Defense Minister Yazov put it in his 1987 book: "It is so important for young people to thoroughly grasp the great meaning of the military service at the very beginning of their civic development."[11]

The schools purvey spirited and ideologically charged readings, rhymes, and stories, right from day one. One popular nursery rhyme reads:

> November seventh, it is clear
> Is the reddest day in all the year.
> Through the window look ahead
> Everything outside is red!

Children listen to stories like "The Sunflower," about a talented young artist who serves as a border guard in a watchtower along the Soviet frontier. A border violation sparks a valiant response: "He jumped on the hated back, feeling he had a hundred horsepower within him. He heard the uneven breathing of the other man and dug his teeth into the man's neck." The hero suffered fatal injuries in the struggle, but he had carried out his duty. "What he did," ends the story, "merits the highest praise."[12] Another often-heard story, *Air-Raid Signals*, "describes how the fighters in a local anti-aircraft defense unit, themselves weak and swollen, help the injured," and then die at their post.[13]

Defense Minister Yazov encourages mothers to supplement these efforts in early childhood by promoting patriotism in their children at home. "Maternal instructions to the future fighting men, which express the hope and confidence that the filial duty of protecting the homeland will be fulfilled with honor, have great moral force."[14]

Early on, children begin taking regular treks to "battlefield museums and rooms" and "museums of revolution, combat and labor glory."[15] On these trips, teachers are encouraged to teach children

[10] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, February 3, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 21, 1987.

[11] General D.T. Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace* (London: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1988) p. 121. This is the British Broadcasting Corporation's translation of Yazov's *Na strazhe sotsializma i mira* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987).

[12] See Ekaterina Markova, "Podsolnukh," *Yunost*, no. 8, 1983, p. 12.

[13] See Udo Helmer, "Civil Defense for All," Radio Tallin, October 19, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, November 7, 1987.

[14] Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace*, p. 101.

[15] *Cina* (Latvia), September 12, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, September 28, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slogans such as "Take your stand next to a hero,"[16] and "A military specialty for everyone, and a military badge for everyone!"[17] In Arkhangelsk, for example, children go to "The Eternal Flame" dedicated to soldiers from the region. In Bryansk *oblast'*, children receive "lessons in courage" at the "Partisan Clearing Memorial." Near Murmansk there is the "Valley of Glory." And so forth.

Teaching on these occasions focuses on the "Great Patriotic War" of 1941-45 and on the military traditions of the revolution. Children hear about heroes and their deeds to "protect the motherland." The lessons are belligerently militaristic, not peaceful or historical. In theme and in tone they celebrate victory, rather than the cessation of the fighting.

Actual Military Training: Grades Three to Eight

In grades three through six, children begin actual training with military equipment and the pressures become more overt and specific. The "training of schoolchildren for protection against weapons of mass destruction" begins in the third grade. For the next five years, children spend thirty-five hours a year learning how to protect themselves from chemical and nuclear weapons. Nina Petrovna Treyeva, a schoolteacher, describes the effort at her school as follows: A civil defense classroom also serves

> as an anti-radiation shelter. It comprises the following: a room for the head of the civil defense head-quarters, a room for the commandant, a special room with all the equipment for the formation, for medical service; then there is, over and above those, special fire-fighting equipment — all this equipment makes up a set for [an] anti-radiation shelter. The children enter the shelter to work through organizational skills such as being disciplined and organized. We have tables there for each form [grade], containers of drinking water, a special table for determining the sizes of the means of personal protection.

At her school, Treyeva notes, "all this material base serves as an inseparable part of the pupils' lives."[18]

Despite the emphasis on self-defense, Soviet officials see the program less as a means to save lives in the event of war, and more as psychological training. Designed "resolutely to expose the aggressive essence of imperialism," civil defense training firmly places in the child's mind the sinister prospects of a nuclear war caused by "international imperialism." A subtle "siege mentality" is the desired result. In a Ukrainian school, for example, civil defense instructors

[16] Admiral A. Sorokin, "An Assignment from the Party and the People," *Sovety narodnykh deputatov*, no. 10, 1987; translated in Joint Publications Research Service: *Soviet Military Affairs*, February 29, 1988.

[17] Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace*, p. 104.

[18] "Civil Defence of All," Radio Tallin, January 19, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 13, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

started large-scale (but controlled) fires to add realism to a civil defense drill.[19]

Defense Minister Yazov approves of such techniques as necessary for youth to develop a clear understanding of the "aggressive preparations of those who are nudging mankind toward nuclear catastrophe and who are laying the material foundation for a new world war."[20] Soviet officials hasten to note that, in contrast to the older generations which lived through the war years and have personal memories of privations and tragedies, the younger generation does not understand that war is possible.[21] Civil defense courses aspire to keep the threat of attack alive.

By the fourth grade, military themes take on even more importance. Visits to battlefield sites and recounting of war stories continue; but, in addition, military themes permeate much of the curriculum. Defense Minister Yazov considers this crucial:

> The effectiveness of the military-patriotic education of the student youth depends to a considerable degree upon whether the social science, history, geography and literature instructors take an active part in it along with military instructors.[22]

This militarization of academic disciplines gives teaching real value:

> This is why the mission of teachers of history, literature and other humanities disciplines is such a high and rewarding one. It is within their power to ensure that nobody in their classes remains indifferent, that, within the consciousness of their heirs, a deep sense of respect is born and grows for their fellow countrymen, known and unknown, for whom the good of the motherland is dearer than life.[23]

In the fourth and fifth grades children are introduced to art and literature not as ends in themselves but as part of the effort at military indoctrination. According to Lieutenant General Plekhanov, art education serves the cause: "All types of art must be used to debunk pacifism, to show in a bright and talented way the heroism of the younger generation travelling the road of their fathers."[24] Poetry is seen as an effective vehicle to convey military messages. V. Lednev's "Square of Fallen Warriors" is commonly used because it "has comparable ideological and emotional resonance" to the heroism sought from children. It reads in part:

> Our city has a special square here
> whose lot has been troubled in life.

[19] "Unwavering Attention to Mass Defense Work," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, December 22, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 26, 1988.

[20] Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace*, p. 104.

[21] Inara Mikuzane, "To the Inhabitants about Civil Defense," Radio Riga, January 19, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, March 3, 1987.

[22] Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace*, p. 106.

[23] Sorokin, "An Assignment from the Party and the People."

[24] Lieutenant General V. Plekhanov, "Waiting Means Losing: Notes on Young People's Military-Patriotic Education," *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 16, 1987 (first edition); translated in BBC: *SOV*, September 18, 1987. The article was written while Plekhanov was head of the political directorate of the Odessa Military District.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . The Square of Fallen Warriors —
the square of our own soldiers,
who safeguarded their Land as they saved it.
The square of youthful hearts,
the square of wondrous hearts,
burning out in the fray, where they faded.
Here the hearts of the fallen, unstinting, consign
their bright flame to the hands of the living,
that their dream we may raise with the loftiest praise,
this to oncoming centuries giving
that we
may be scorched
by the unruly flame
stainless flame
sterling flame
Eternal Flame!

Students at school No. 50 in Volgograd read the poem, and student reactions were recorded:

Our people hated the fascists. It's the flame of hatred for the enemy.

[The Eternal Flame] burns in people's hearts. They will always remember the heroes who gave their lives for the freedom of their motherland.

[The flame] is the flame of revolution, the flame of work done for the sake of the motherland, the flame of love for the motherland.

The teacher then concludes the lesson with an observation: "To love the Homeland, to cherish it, to beautify it with our work — that is what 'the hearts of the fallen' bid, that you should continue the great undertaking they have begun."[25]

Like much of the rest of the military-patriotic effort, such literature is the product of a systematic effort to influence the child. Soviet writers of children's literature gather regularly to coordinate their efforts.[26] "Let our writers fly high," concluded one such meeting, "in their various activities on the ideological wings of internationalism and Soviet patriotism."[27]

[25] A.E. Agureeva and N.N. Semenova, "Lessons in Courage," *Soviet Education*, October, 1986, pp. 84-96. This article, translated from *Literatura v shkole* (Leningrad: Prosveshchenic Publishers, 1985), details poetry reading assignments for sixth graders.

[26] Vilnius Radio, June 2, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, July 7, 1987.

[27] Leonid Novichenko, "Ukrainian Soviet Literature in the Patriotic and Internationalist Education of Working People," *Literatura Ukrainia*, June 25, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, July 25, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Extracurricular Activities and War Games

Between ages ten and thirteen, most Soviet children are first exposed to military training, paramilitary games, and target shooting. In 1977, 40 percent of all schools had their own firing ranges,[28] but the figure is now higher. Children are encouraged to improve their shooting abilities, and can win awards such as "Young Rifleman" and "Sharpshooter."[29] Since 1986, children have "participate[d] in exercises with submachine guns using live ammunition."[30] Most schools have other facilities for militarized sports. In Moldavia, for example, 20 percent of the children from ten to seventeen participate in "sports with military applications" every week.[31] "Shooting [along with marching] finds favor with the majority [of children]," reports instructor Captain Grigory Bondarenko, "and the study of the construction of the submachine-gun."[32] Children also have opportunities to learn parachute jumping, radio operations, martial arts, and any other "sport" deemed applicable to the needs of the military.

Students can also join a variety of organizations at school which are intended to have them become "protectors of the state." Perhaps the most frightening of such organizations is "Young Friends of the Borderguards," an organization committed to exposing children to the activities of KGB guards who arrest or kill Soviet citizens seeking to flee their country. The organization is promoted as follows by the Soviet press:

> In our country, the inhabitants themselves help to guard the state frontier, also the pupils who live and learn near it. Units of the Young Friends of Border Guards have been formed at schools in which only the very best, sharp-eyed and resourceful boys and girls are accepted.

The same news service gave an account of the activities of one local chapter:

> Border troops frequently visit them, tell about their service and various happenings at the frontier. They jointly go on marches, organize sports games and teach various skills useful in life. For two sunny days in Kurzeme region varied joint ventures of soldiers and pupils happened as the second republic's gathering of the Young Friends of Border Troops took place . . . [They] viewed the training alert of the border troops, listened to the adventures of the veterans of this work. And then, a run along a real obstacle zone and lunch at a temptingly steaming real soldier's field kitchen. However, according to common opinion, the most romantic part turned out to be the 'frontier' game, in which the participants of the gathering, together with border

[28] Mervyn Matthews, *Education in the Soviet Union: Policies and Institutions Since Stalin* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 47. Similar figures have appeared in the Soviet press. See, for example, *Zarya vostoka*, April 12, 1988.

[29] Peter Schweizer, "Educating Igor," *National Review*, May 13, 1988, p. 41.

[30] A.I. Mikheyev, "Bryansk DOSAAF Official on Preinduction Training," *Za rulem*, no. 11, 1986; translated in BBC: *SOV*, December 11, 1986.

[31] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, December 22, 1987.

[32] Quoted in Andrus Normet and Kaur Hanson, "Our Class: Today We Are Talking About . . . Basic Military Training," *Noorte haal*, February 24, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, March 24, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troops and their service dogs had to follow the tracks of a frontier transgressor and in the end detain him.[33]

Other organizations outside of the school also collaborate in the military training of Soviet children. The largest of these is the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Fleet (DOSAAF), which boasts over 100 million members.[34] DOSAAF officials claim that one in three boys in the USSR and thousands of girls participate in their programs every year.[35] The most popular activity sponsored by DOSAAF is a series of paramilitary summer camps held every year. According to David Powell, more than 35 million children attend such camps annually.[36] Zarnitsa (summer lightning) is a game for children aged seven to fourteen,[37] Orlenok (little eagle) for ages fourteen to eighteen. Children learn to field-strip the army's widely used Kalashnikov assault rifle, throw hand grenades, build fortifications, and execute basic military tactics. The camps are strikingly similar to those of soldiers: reveille, morning exercises, special training, general military training, drill, weaponry studies, and political studies.[38]

The Georgian newspaper *Akhalgazrda komunisti* carried an account of Zarnitsa in 1986. "A mock war exercise in a Pioneer encampment [of ten- to fourteen-year olds] " was held near the town of Dusheti, "to test the campers' quickness and skills." The paper notes that "at 0600 hours they were in formation, in full array, and ready to move out. The exercise was very realistic, with plenty of smoke and explosions — even chemical weapons — and the treacherous enemy was beaten back within the hour, after which the campers repaired to the mess halls for breakfast." The resulting noise "startled" townspeople "out of sleep."[39]

In 1988 the British Broadcasting Corporation carried the following account of a traveller who stumbled across a Zarnitsa game in Estonia:

A female holidaymaker and her young granddaughter could not sleep last night at Klooga [a holiday resort near Tallin] because of a wargame which lasted until 2 a.m., held by one of the local pioneer camps with excellent sound effects. The head of the pioneer camp explained that there was nothing extraordinary about this, and that similar games had always taken place in the camp once a month, either from

[33] Riga Domestic Service, May 24, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, September 1, 1987.

[34] G.M. Yegorov, Soviet Television, January 22, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 16, 1987. Yegorov is the Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee.

[35] Aleksandr Lobukhin, Radio Minsk, January 22, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 18, 1987.

[36] Schweizer, "Educating Igor," p. 41.

[37] For an unexpected side-effect of a Zarnitsa game in Belorussia, see page 241 of this issue.

[38] S. Khlopotov, "Lads Join the Army: Readiness of Conscripts," *Turkmenskaya iskra*, July 2, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, August 13, 1987.

[39] Kakha Sikharulidze and Zaza Gomaretli, untitled report, *Akhalgazrda komunisti*, June 24, 1986, p. 2; translated in FBIS: *Military Affairs*, December 3, 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

11 p.m. until 1 a.m. or from 5 a.m. until 7 a.m. She did not find this particular one noisy, and said that her own 4-year-old child slept well through it.[40]

The games are highly competitive, with local winners advancing on to regional and national games. Children who win the national championships receive awards from the defense minister himself.

In addition, thousands of supposedly unofficial military-patriotic clubs operate throughout the USSR. These clubs have names such as "Duty" and "Rosy Dream," and their activities are not dissimilar to those of a military camp. At one club, according to its director, Leonid Fedorovich Markelov, young boys "study the practical handling of weapons," and "the general status of the Armed Forces."[41] Veterans are encouraged to tell war stories and relate personal experiences to the children. As ever, the emphasis is on "glory" and "honor," not on the horrors of war. By extolling the virtues of military service, officials hope that war veterans will promote generational continuity, and that a "love" of the armed forces will result. Yazov writes:

> The heroic history of our country and of the Soviet Armed Forces is reflected in the lives of the veterans. Using their lives as examples, the veterans teach young people devotion to the homeland, loyalty to their patriotic and international duty and constant readiness to fulfill it with honor.[42]

Gorbachev and Spiritual Renewal

Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985 has given hope that the future holds a less monolithic, bellicose, and militarized Soviet adversary. But if reforms in Soviet military-patriotic education are any indication, there is little hope that such promises will be realized. In Gorbachev's Soviet Union, children are being exposed to increasing amounts of military indoctrination, as more resources flow into the program, and curriculum changes designed to intensify the actual military training of children come into force. Administrative reforms, such as the creation of a military board to oversee Soviet education, are ominous signs that programs to militarize children are here to stay, and are likely to continue expanding.

Western attention has been focused on Soviet reforms and changes in Soviet cultural and political life. But during the Gorbachev era, the cult of the military has not only remained strong, it has grown — as the Soviet leaders themselves acclaim.[43] In June 1986, at Gorbachev's encouragement, the Central Committee and the Soviet Council of Ministers passed a decree entitled "On Further Improving Party Supervision of the Komosomol and Enhancing Its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of Youth."

[40] BBC: *SOV*, August 20, 1988 (original story by a British correspondent).
[41] *Komsomolskaya pravda*, February 21, 1988, p. 4; translated in BBC: *SOV*, February 26, 1988.
[42] Yazov, *On Guard over Socialism and Peace*, p. 112.
[43] See BBC: *SOV*, March 18, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Among other things, the decree emphasizes "the importance of military-patriotic education of youth for their preparedness to perform feats to defend the homeland." The decree poses "the task of raising such preparation to a higher qualitative level."[44] Since this decree, military-patriotic education has become more intensive, with more facilities now available for children participating in militarized extracurricular activities. Military training is being intensified and made more realistic. As Soviet commentators report: "Our schools are going over to new programmes that provide for a considerable increase in the time spent on practical exercises."[45] The idea behind these changes is to improve the practical and military side of the activities of the DOSAAF and study organizations and "to bring study there closer to the real situation of combat sub-units, to assess the performance of the school and club not by average indices and points but by the standard of instruction of each student."[46]

According to Red Army spokesmen, under Gorbachev, "mass political work has become more intensive. The forms and methods of patriotic and internationalist upbringing of young people have become richer, and they are being told about revolutionary, combat and labor traditions." These officials go on to note that because of the decree and Gorbachev's efforts, "the study and material base of primary military and physical education in secondary schools has [*sic*] become firmer and the number of firing ranges and tactical and civil defense training grounds has increased."[47]

Zarnitsa and Orlenok are reportedly growing in popularity. Schools receive large amounts of obsolete military equipment. With new resources, "defense sports health camps, shooting ranges, and tactical training fields" for children are cropping up across the USSR.[48] According to Major General Aleksey Leonidovich Mamayev, DOSAAF is creating new organizations "endowed with opportunities to develop military training and technical applied sports" for children.[49] Red Army veterans, particularly from the Afghan war, are being recruited in increasing numbers to take part in activities with Soviet youth.

For better resource allocation, officials are working to "improve the sponsorship ties between military units and military education

[44] Colonel V. Malinin, "Review: Preparing Young People for Military Service," *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 21, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, April 19, 1987.

[45] I. Kostash, "Combat Reserve," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, December 19, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, January 22, 1988.

[46] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, December 22, 1987.

[47] "The Country's Armed Forces Should Receive Worthy Reinforcements," *Zarya vostoka*, April 13, 1988; translated in BBC: *SOV*, May 11, 1988.

[48] V. Golovin, "Our Common Concern: On the Threshold of Military Service," *Krasnaya zvezda*, September 30, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, October 29, 1987.

[49] Major General Aleksey Leonidovich Mamayev, Moscow Home Service, January 29, 1988; BBC: *SOV*, February 4, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishments and educational establishments."[50] Military units take responsibility for specific schools to make military personnel more accountable. In early 1987, a Youth Affairs Commission was established in the Supreme Soviet under the control of the Soviet military, and given advisory oversight of all educational efforts.

The Soviet War Culture

More than any state in the twentieth century (even including Nazi Germany), the Soviet Union consciously desires and works toward a militarized youth. For the Soviet child, growing up means exposure to what can only be called a "war culture." If, in the words of Gorbachev, "the whole atmosphere of Soviet life" is called upon to promote martial values and xenophobia, Soviet youth will have little chance of completely escaping that culture's effects.

Soviet officials continue to see education much in the terms laid down by Lenin: "At the foundations of Communist morality lies the struggle to strengthen and complete communism. That is the basis of communist upbringing, education, and learning."[51] Military-patriotic education seeks not only to encourage obedience to the state but also to instill fear of the outside world. Such indoctrination is intended to promote a near siege mentality, which will keep today's youth as pliable as their elders.

This psychological climate makes it easier for the regime to justify shortages and repression. Military-patriotic education gives purpose to Soviet rule. Threatened by external enemies, children are taught that the party and army will save the "motherland," just as they did during the Great Patriotic War. In a hostile world, citizens will be loathe to challenge party rule.

It is impossible to gauge the full effect that these programs have on the children of the Soviet Union. These children, like their counterparts in the West, absorb only so much information. Soviet students who are bored by military teaching probably retain little specific knowledge. But the heavy emphasis on military-patriotic education must leave some impressions that officials hope to draw upon to mobilize support for the regime.

Whatever the failings of the program, Soviet officials clearly feel that it has value. Opponents of the regime also feel that the program is important to Soviet rule. The challenge from ten prominent émigrés to Mikhail Gorbachev to bring real reform to the Soviet Union included the "ending of militarization of Soviet society, [and] stopping military training in schools."[52]

[50] Colonel G. Miranovich, untitled article, *Krasnaya zvezda*, October 17, 1987; translated in BBC: *SOV*, October 20, 1987.

[51] V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 41 (Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1977), p. 313.

[52] The advertisement appeared in *Le Figaro*, March 8, 1987; *The London Times*, March 16, 1987; and *The New York Times*, March 22, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The intensification of military programs for Soviet youth would seem to be out of character for a government seeking to make the Soviet educational system competitive in technological fields and to diminish the size of its military forces. Yet the Soviet leaders seem to believe that these reforms are very much in character with the remainder of Gorbachev's programs. It is perhaps too early to draw the conclusion that Gorbachev seeks only a change in the form and not the substance of the Soviet system, but continuing and intensifying the militarization of Soviet youth clearly seems to be a revalidation of Lenin's tenet that at the foundation of communist morality lies the need to strengthen and complete communism.

The war culture that exists in the Soviet Union is a product of the concerted efforts of the state and its apparatus. Military-patriotic education plays a crucial role in that culture, promoting martial values and a "psychological outlook" deemed desirable by the regime. Mikhail Gorbachev's unwillingness to challenge this effort, and indeed his clear willingness and desire to abet and enhance it, should give pause to those optimistic about his program and intentions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transaction



THE LONG SHADOW
CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Daniel Pipes

This is a book about politics by a historian, about a region where the past casts a long shadow on the present. Written by Daniel Pipes, director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and editor of Orbis, the essays in this volume cover five broad topics: Islam, the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism, and U.S. policy in the Middle East. From Soviet Muslims to suicidal terrorists, from Kuwaiti oil wealth to Louis Farrakhan, Mr. Pipes ties together recent developments and the enduring truths of the Middle East.
ISBN: 0-887382-207 (cloth) 320 pp. **$32.95**

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book



VIOLENCE AND THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES

Michael Radu, editor

In a fresh departure from most literature on revolution in Latin America--which tends to focus on social injustice or U.S. interests--this volume deals with flesh-and-bone revolutionary cadres. It raises the question of how well the leaders actually represent the people they claim to speak for and casts doubt on the "progressive" character of revolutionary movements. Includes contributions by Ernst Halperin, Paul Hollander, Irving Louis Horowitz, Douglas Payne, Michael Radu, William Ratliff, Vladimir Tismaneanu, and Antonio Ybarra-Rojas.
ISBN: 0-88738-195-2 (cloth) 246 pp. **$24.95**

A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book

Order from your bookstore or
direct from the publisher.
Major credit cards accepted.
(201) 932-2280

transaction publishers
Department PIR 1
Rutgers–The State University
New Brunswick, N.J. 08903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILITARY LESSONS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

by Efraim Karsh

The eight-year-long war between Iran and Iraq will not be remembered as a model of military competence. Rather, the Third World's bloodiest conflict in a half century will be seen as a costly exercise in futility, one in which both combatants failed to apply most of the classic principles of war — from the assignment of realistic war aims to the adoption of appropriate tactics. Yet knowledge derives from mistakes no less than from masterstrokes, and the disastrous war in the Persian Gulf did produce half a dozen significant military and strategic lessons.

These lessons can be summarized as follows: Limited wars do not usually remain limited. While morale cannot substitute for military art, it is nonetheless necessary for winning. Consequently, air power — particularly the bombing of population centers — can be a key element in achieving victory. Even the most ferocious escalation may be a more rational process than it is often considered. Finally, the war taught that self-imposed restraint can be no less detrimental than overreaching.

Wars Are Not Easily Limited

A war is limited to the extent that it (a) involves a small portion of the countries' forces; (b) is conducted within definite boundaries; and (c) is directed against military forces rather than targets of civilian value. A war is general to the extent that it exceeds these constraints.

Because war is a foreign-policy instrument, one expects a direct correlation between the magnitude of a war's political goals and the scope and intensity of the war. Far-reaching objectives seem likely to lead to a more general war; narrower objectives to a more limited war. Only those who seek to annihilate or completely subdue an adversary launch general wars, one would suppose, while limited wars are initiated by those seeking (in Liddell Hart's phrase) a "better peace."[1]

[1] Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 351.

Efraim Karsh, senior fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and lecturer in the department of political science at Tel Aviv University, is author of *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHRONOLOGY OF THE GULF WAR

1980
Sept. 22 Iraqi forces begin war against Iran.
Sept. 28 Baghdad halts it forces, offers ceasefire; Tehran refuses.
Oct. 28 Iraqi forces occupy Khorramshahr.

1981
Jan. 5-11 Iranian counteroffensive near Susangerd fails.
Sept. 27-29 Iranians break siege of Abadan.
December Iranians retake Bostan, threatening to cut off Iraqi forces in Susangerd.

1982
March 22-30 Iraqi forces driven back in Sush-Dezful area
Apr. 24-May 25 Iranian forces recapture most of Khuzestan.
July 13-Aug. 2 First Iranian offensive into Iraq
Oct.-Nov. Iraqis repulse five large Iranian offensives.

1983
Feb.-Nov. Five major Iranian offensives bring small success.

1984
Feb. Iraqis begin Tanker War on Iranian civilian shipping
Feb. 7-18 First War of the Cities
Feb. 11-24 Largest Iranian offensive to date fails on the central front.

1985
Jan.-Feb. First Iraqi offensive since 1980 on the central front fails.
March 5-25 Second War of the Cities, (goes on intermittently until July)
Aug.-Dec. Iraqi aerial campaign against Kharg Island

1986
Feb. 9-25 Iranian forces capture Faw Peninsula.
May-July Iraqi forces take and lose Mehran.
Aug. 12-26 Successful Iraqi air raids on Sirri Island oil terminal.

1987
Jan.-Mar. Iranians attack Basra.
Jan. 23-Feb. 18 Third War of the Cities
April 14 Kuwait leases USSR tankers.
May 17 USS *Stark* accidentally hit by Iraqi aircraft
July 20 U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 calls for a ceasefire.
July 21-24 U.S. reflags tankers, begins naval escorts; reflagged tanker *Bridgeton* hits naval mine.
Aug.-Dec. Fourth War of the Cities
Sept. 21 Iran *Ajr* captured by U.S. naval forces as it lay mines
Oct. 8-22 U.S.-Iranian naval clashes

1988
Feb.-April Fifth War of the Cities
March Iraqis use gas against Halabja.
April 17-18 Iraqis recapture Faw; U.S. forces destroy two Iranian frigates in a naval clash.
Late May Iranian forces dislodged from Salamcheh, east of Basra.
Late June Iraqi forces recapture the Majnun Islands, lost in 1985.
July Iraqi offensive in Kurdistan
July 3 USS *Vincennes* shoots down an Iran Air flight.
Mid-July First sustained Iraqi incursion into Iran in six years
July 18 Tehran accepts Resolution 598.
Aug. 20 Ceasefire takes effect.

There is little doubt that the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 was based on such a logic of limitation. President Saddam Husayn of Iraq sought to confine the war by restricting his army's goals, means, and targets. Thus, his territorial goals did not go beyond the Shatt al-'Arab and a small portion of Khuzestan, bounded by a line from Khorramshahr to Ahvaz to Susangerd to Musian (see map). As to means, the invasion was carried out by less than half of the Iraqi army — five of twelve divisions. As to targets, Baghdad's initial strategy was one of counter-force, avoiding targets of civilian and economic value and in favor of attacks almost exclusively on military

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targets. (Only after the Iranians struck non-military targets did the Iraqis respond in kind.)

Saddam Husayn probably hoped that a limited campaign would convince Iran's revolutionary regime to desist from its attempts to overthrow him and the ruling Ba'th party. By exercising self-restraint, he sought to signal an intent to avoid general war, with the hope that Tehran would respond in kind, and perhaps even be willing to reach a settlement. In pursuit of this goal, Husayn voluntarily halted the advance of his troops within a week after the onset of hostilities, and then announced his willingness to negotiate an agreement. His error quickly became apparent. While the limited Iraqi invasion did not endanger the revolutionary regime, neither did it drive Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to moderation.

Most governments, of course, would react strongly to an external armed intervention, but a regime under attack is all the more likely to respond with vehemence when it has not yet gained full legitimacy and has revolutionary aspirations. Like the French almost two centuries earlier, the Iranians channeled national (and religious) fervor into an external cause. Instead of seeking a quick accommodation, the authorities in Tehran capitalized on the Iraqi attack to consolidate their legitimacy, diminish the power struggle within their own ranks, and suppress opposition to their regime. As a result, Iraqis paid a far higher price for a limited invasion than Saddam Husayn had anticipated in 1980. He might have heeded the common wisdom about not making war on a revolution.

Curiously, the roles of the two belligerents were reversed just two years later. Iranian troops expelled almost all of the Iraqi forces from Iranian territory by July 1982 and then launched major thrusts into Iraq. At this point, it was Tehran that wished to limit the war to the battlefield (though without moderating its political goal of overthrowing Husayn and the Ba'th party). But the Iraqi leadership, now defending its own territory, concluded that its only hope of persuading the Iranians to desist was to make life as unpleasant as possible within Iran by extending the war to Iran's rear. This it did in two ways.

Beginning in October 1982 the Iraqi air force systematically pounded Iran's oil installation. In August 1986 it carried out the first successful air raid on Iran's oil terminal at Sirri Island (near the Strait of Hormuz). In addition, in early 1984, the Iraqis launched the Tanker War, a campaign against commercial shipping, and oil tankers in particular. This effort threatened to cut Iran's jugular, as 95 percent of its revenues came from oil exports; it also aimed at bringing the great powers into the conflict, in the hope they would pressure Iran to cease hostilities. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 1987 and 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reprinted with permission from Efraim Karsh, *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,* Adelphi Paper 220 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, the Iraqis unleashed violent attacks against Iranian population centers, and the Iranians responded in kind. The first War of the Cities began in February 1984 when the two sides became interlocked in exchanges against each other's civilian populations. They repeated this tactic on a larger and more ferocious scale in following years.

This analysis suggests that, when undertaken unilaterally, the apparently logical apportioning of a war's scale to its purpose may break down. Apportioning must also take account of the opponent. If a government chooses to engage in a limited war for a limited purpose, it must make sure that a certain symmetry of capabilities and goals exists between the two sides. This symmetry holds only when the cost of losing a limited war is rated by the adversary as less than the probable net costs of fighting a significantly wider war. The Iran-Iraq War seems to demonstrate that such a symmetry of interests, stakes, and perceptions is not as common as previously believed. Consequently, small or middle-sized powers can hardly hope for an "assured limited war."

Victory Requires High Morale

Ever since war was transformed in the late eighteenth century from a contest between professional armies into a clash between populations, its prosecution has become decisively linked to the vicissitudes of national morale. No regime can prosecute a war successfully unless a significant portion of the country's population endorses the effort and makes sacrifices necessary to its prosecution. The Iran-Iraq War affords a clear illustration of the influence of national morale; it also shows the limits of that influence.

A combination of religious fervor and nationalist feeling upheld the Iranian national morale and enabled the revolutionary regime to sustain its long and costly war. Tehran prosecuted the war for over eight years under the burden of growing economic hardships and without the aid of major allies. Finally, a collapse of morale, more than any other single factor, led to Tehran's decision last summer to end the struggle and accept Security Council Resolution 598.

At base, Iranian morale rested on the conviction that the fighting was necessary to defend the Islamic Revolution and, by extension, Islam itself. Most Iranians saw it as a righteous war waged by the forces of Islam against the forces of barbarism (*jahiliya*), manifested by the atheistic Saddam Husayn and the wide conspiracy of forces behind him. This view allowed Iranian leaders to flaunt damage wrought by the war. The greater the privation, after all, the more clearly was the revolution's resilience and vigor established. Suffering was transmuted into a tempering of faith. Those who died in the path of God were martyrs, not casualties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After prosecuting the war for three years according to this zealous ideology, Tehran finally abandoned it in early 1984, recognizing that tactics depending on blind fervor alone cost too much in manpower and in morale. The sense of purpose among Iranians dropped after mid-1982, when they no longer defended their own territory but were engaged on Iraqi soil. Economic dislocations occasioned by fighting gave rise to great frustration as shortages of basic commodities grew worse, and a black market and corruption flourished. A mounting human toll and the Wars of the Cities caused a deep war-weariness.

Declining national morale showed in manifestations of discontent, including a drop in the number of volunteers after late 1984 and anti-war demonstrations, most notably in mid-1985. Morale plunged sharply in 1987 as the regime responded inadequately to intensified Iraqi missile attacks on population centers. The decline in volunteers assumed alarming proportions. Growing discontent among the poor who constituted the mainstay of the regime's support had particular importance.

Popular dissatisfaction echoed within the councils of the regime as early as mid-1982, when a loose coalition of military and political figures questioned the logic of taking the war into Iraq. Most of the military leadership opposed this idea because they doubted its likely success. Leading politicians such as Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Mussavi and President Sayyed Ali Khamenei argued against the invasion, worried about its human, material, and political costs.[2] As national spirits fell, such skeptical voices became increasingly influential. In 1984, they succeeded in ending the first War of the Cities and human-wave attacks in favor of more conventional fighting. Nevertheless, it took nearly five years of intensifying dissatisfaction before the authorities accepted the conflict's futility. Only when the aged ayatollah himself became convinced that the war's continuation would lead to complete alienation of the Iranian people did he agree to end the fighting in July 1988.

Oddly enough, the (mistaken) downing of an Iranian airbus by the U.S.S. *Vincennes* on July 3, 1988, in which 290 Iranian civilians were killed, appears to have been the straw that broke Iranian morale. Whether or not the Iranians believed that the incident was a premeditated attack, this event was apparently used by the advocates of a ceasefire (who portrayed it as part of an overall design to subdue Iran) in order both to divert attention from the military setbacks on the Iraqi front, and to mobilize widespread support for the war's termination.

[2] *The Financial Times*, July 10, 1982; *The Sunday Times*, July 25, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Morale Cannot Replace Competence

The Persian Gulf war is often considered a prime example of the decisive importance of ultimate dedication for war-winning capability. The blind devotion of Iran's irregular forces (*pasdaran* and *basij*) and their willingness to suffer heavy casualties tend to be regarded as the major source of Iran's operational successes. Indeed, the "quest for martyrdom" became synonymous with Iran's way of conducting the war, and the diminution of this zeal is often considered the primary reason for the Iranian setbacks of 1988. William F. Hickman explained: "For devout Muslims, to die while doing battle in the cause of Islam is martyrdom, which assures immediate entry into heaven. This belief sustained the Revolutionary Guards and other equally devout fighters on the front with Iraq and gave them the courage necessary to withstand repeated assaults."[3] According to Anthony Cordesman, "it is unclear that [human wave attacks] really inflict higher overall casualties than fighting the same battle with more advanced equipment, and they often have proved successful against Iraq's well-equipped forces."[4]

But a closer look does not substantiate this view. In the first weeks, Iraqi forces secured their initial objectives; the offensive was halted by Husayn's self-imposed restraint, not by the fervor of the *pasdaran*. Later, the *pasdaran* proved an effective military force on just two occasions: in the street battles for Khorramshahr and Abadan, and in the Iranian offensives of late 1981 and early 1982. Even those cases require careful qualification.

In Khorramshahr and Abadan, the success of the *pasdaran* did not stem solely from their revolutionary zeal but from the advantages a built-up area gives to the defender — and from Iraqi operational errors in committing the wrong types of units. Had the Iranians used regular infantry in defense of these built-up areas, they could have achieved like, if not better, results.

Similarly, the relative success of human-wave tactics in the 1981-82 offensives resulted from their incorporation into comprehensive combined-arms operations, carried out under professional military direction. When the direction of the war was placed in the hands of the *pasdaran* in mid-1982, and the conventional conduct of operations gave way to frontal assaults lacking inter-service cooperation, Iranian efforts failed time and again, and at exorbitant cost. Once the Iranians faced up to the reason for their failure in mid-1984, they re-adopted the mixed tactics that had proved effective in 1981-early 1982.

[3] William F. Hickman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 1982* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 20.

[4] Anthony Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 729.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Specifically, the *pasdaran* were transformed into a conventional force, placed under the regular army's control during war operations, and compelled to cooperate with the army. This worked, as evidenced by the Iranian successes in 1986. The capture of Faw Peninsula in February 1986, Iran's most important territorial gain in Iraq, revealed even more planning than the efforts of 1982-84.

Conversely, when the regular army again lost out to the *pasdaran* in 1987 (due to infighting within the regime) Iranian momentum on the battlefield slowed decisively. The large-scale and disorderly Iranian thrusts toward Basra in early 1987 were broken on the Iraqi line of defense. By spring 1988, initiative had passed to the Iraqis. A desperate attempt was made in May 1988 to restructure the Iranian armed forces by appointing the influential speaker of the parliament, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as their supreme commander; but this came too late.

Strategic Bombing Can Work

Air forces can support an overall war effort in two ways: through direct participation in the fighting (close air support, interdiction, transportation of troops, and so forth); and through extension of the war to the opponent's rear (raids on strategic targets and population centers). While a consensus exists on the necessity of tactical air support, strategic bombing is usually considered an instrument of limited value. At best, it is seen as reinforcing existing trends on the battlefield, as a means of deterrence, or as a means of retaliation. At worst, Lawrence Freedman writes, such air strikes are a blunt tool that may "increase the hostility between the two sides and render the objective of a moderate, negotiated peace more distant."[5] Aharon Levran argues that "air power alone, no matter how strong and successful, cannot decide the fate of a war or achieve comprehensive strategic objectives."[6] David Segal extends this reasoning to the Iran-Iraq War, arguing that "from a military point of view, the value of the attacks on Iranian population centers, the 'war of the cities,' has been virtually nil."[7]

Without refuting the necessity of gaining territory, the Iran-Iraq War seriously challenges this skepticism regarding the strategic use of air power. For quite some time, the two parties — the Iraqis in particular — refrained from carrying strategic bombardment to its logical extreme. Moreover, they took care to draw a clear line between attacks on economic targets and reprisals against population

[5] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 98.

[6] Aharon Levran, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1987-1988* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 255.

[7] David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, p. 958.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

centers, with the latter actions tending to be more restrained. But with the shadow of defeat looming after the Iraqi military losses of 1986, Baghdad decisively intensified its countervalue strategy. The effect was immediate: Iranian oil exports fell from an average of 1.6 million barrels per day to just 0.6 million barrels per day.

Strategic bombing, and particularly the bombing of population centers, played the key role in ending the war.

From 1986 on, strategic bombing began to influence decisively the general course of the war. With the ground forces locked in stalemate, the conflict's focus shifted to this sphere, and the campaign against population centers exceeded by far those of previous years in terms of ferocity, scope, and duration. The air struggle, including an exchange of surface-to-surface missiles, reached its peak in the February-April 1988 War of the Cities, leading to a mass exodus of Tehran residents and ultimately to the collapse of Iranian morale. This in turn paved the way for Iraqi military successes of 1988 and the Iranian agreement to stop fighting. Strategic bombing, therefore, and particularly the bombing of population centers, played the key role in ending the war.

In comparison, the use of air power in support of ground operations appears less significant. Initial Iraqi thrusts into Iran were accompanied by only sporadic and disorderly close air support; later though, expanded support by the air force did severely constrain Iranian operational capability. In late 1982-early 1983, the Iraqi air force maintained a rate of over two hundred sorties a day, carried out by well-armed, fully operational aircraft. Battered by these aircraft, Iranian troops had to launch many of their attacks under cover of darkness or bad weather, causing operational difficulties for the attackers. Even here, interestingly, the Iraqis' complete control of the air had a major impact on Iranian morale, as Iranian soldiers knew the skies were the exclusive preserve of the enemy.

Escalation Can Be Rational

Theories of escalation fall, broadly speaking, into two schools of thought. One sees escalation as an involuntary process, "a disaster which sometimes occurred in spite of efforts to prevent it . . . an accident or miscalculation in the fog of war." The other conceives of escalation as a "deliberate, planned, purposive strategy which states use in the pursuit of their interests."[8]

[8] John Baylis et al., *Contemporary Strategy* (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 126.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Iran-Iraq War would seem to be an example of the first interpretation. It was the first conflict since World War I to witness the widespread use of gas; it led to perhaps the harshest attacks on population centers and economic targets since World War II; and it involved an intensive campaign against non-belligerent shipping. Yet a deeper scrutiny of the war finds its escalations and non-escalations the result of a deliberate and rational process, subject to cost-benefit calculations and susceptible to deterrence, having thresholds and limitations.

Iraq's first major act of escalation, the decision in September 1980 to raise the conflict with Iran from border clashes to full-scale war, was an incremental and rational process, taken only after the failure of other attempts to contain the Iranian threat. Similarly, Iran's expansion of the war into Iraqi territory from mid-1982 onward was not completely illogical — it looked for a long time as if Iran might eventually win.[9] Moreover, for all the war's ferocity it did not assume uncontrollable proportions. Both belligerents took great pains to maintain a balance between "compellence" (through the infliction of pain or damage) and the danger of pushing the adversary to a point of no return. Consequently, major escalation did not take place until the Iranian gains of 1986.

Iranian caution stemmed from material and personnel problems; within a year of the war's start, the Iranian air force comprised fewer than a hundred working aircraft. Baghdad's restraint before 1986 seems to have resulted from a mixture of considerations. It reflected a reluctance to antagonize Iraq's supporters, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which feared that Iran might retaliate by broadening the war. Husayn was also unwilling to jeopardize his air force, for serious losses (of pilots even more than aircraft) could have destroyed Iraq's most effective reserve force. Too, the ferocity of Iran's reaction to attacks on its population centers served as a powerful deterrent. Although Iranian surface-to-surface missiles and air raids could not match Iraqi air strikes in scope and intensity, they did expose the fragility of Iraqi national morale by frustrating the regime's attempts to insulate its rear from the war. Above all, Iraqi restraint was designed to prevent irreversible damage to future Iraqi-Iranian relations.

Circumspection and restraint were visible in all three areas of escalation until 1986: attacks on civilian shipping, raids against population centers, and the use of poison gas. Iraqi attacks on Iranian towns were limited in scope, intensity, and duration, and were usually preceded by a prolonged warning campaign intended to leave room for a change in Iranian policy or an evacuation of citizens. Moreover,

[9] See Philip A. G. Sabin, "Escalation in the Iran-Iraq War," in Efraim Karsh, ed., *The Iran-Iraq War: Its Impact and Implications* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when affairs seemed likely to get out of control, as during the first War of the Cities, both sides quickly reached an agreement not to strike indiscriminately at each other's civilian populations, then honored that agreement relatively well.

Similarly, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons was incremental and heavily circumscribed. Saddam Husayn did not resort to lethal gas before indicating his intentions by using tear gas (during the Iranian thrust into Iraq in July-August 1982) and by issuing continuous and persistent warnings about the use of gas. When the Iranian leaders failed to take notice of these warnings, Iraq employed gas only at critical moments, when there was no other way to check Iranian offensives. In the end, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the course of the war; with the exception of the Iraqi recapture of the Majnun Islands in June 1988, there are no reported instances where the use of gas exerted a real influence on the course of a battle. In all, approximately 2 percent of Iran's total casualties were caused by these weapons.

Baghdad's extensive use of gas against its own Kurdish population, where the danger of Iranian retaliation was far less, suggests that its circumspection was dictated by rational calculations exclusively, and not by moral inhibitions or respect for international norms. In March 1988, Iraqi aircraft dropped gas on the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing some 5,000 civilians. Similarly, after the termination of hostilities, when the risk of retaliation was virtually nil, the Iraqi leadership settled accounts with the Kurdish minority by massively gassing the civilian population.

Finally, even Iraq's initiation of the Tanker War in early 1984 produced an Iranian response that was slower and more limited than observers anticipated. The Iraqis appeared to hope that an intensification of attacks on ships in the Gulf would provoke Iran to an extreme reaction, perhaps an attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz. Such an effort would, in turn, leave the Western powers, especially the United States, with little alternative but to intervene in the war. Fully aware of this Iraqi strategic rationale, the Iranians did not fall for the trap.[10] They forewent attempts to block the strait and kept their responses low-key. Tehran did not publicly acknowledge attacks on its shipping and downplayed talk about closure of the strait, correctly pointing out that "the Islamic Republic of Iran would be the first to suffer as a result of the closing of this strait."[11]

This response was the right one. Western powers remained relatively aloof, and it was only two years after the beginning of the Tanker War, in late 1986, that Iranian caution began to falter. In response to an increased Iraqi campaign against Iranian economic

[10] *Radio Tehran in Arabic*, January 3, 1985.
[11] Radio Tehran, May 17, 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targets, including commercial shipping, Tehran intensified its attacks on Iraqi-bound shipping. This intimidated the Kuwaitis to the point that they approached the two great powers with a request for the protection of their tankers. Washington agreed in March 1987 to escort eleven Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf, provided they flew the U.S. flag; one month later Kuwait chartered three Soviet tankers, which continued to fly the Soviet flag.

To keep the pressure on Iraq and forestall the arrival of great powers into the Gulf, the Khomeini government tried to maintain an intricate balance. It engaged in muscle-flexing (such as the deployment of Chinese Silkworm surface-to-sea missiles at the Strait of Hormuz and the conduct of large-scale naval maneuvers) even as it signalled a strong interest in avoiding a crisis. The Iranians made intensive diplomatic efforts to mobilize international opposition to reflagging. They improved relations with the conservative Gulf states, attempted to sow discord among the Western powers, and sought Soviet support to keep the Western states out of the Persian Gulf. Above all, they engaged in extremely circumspect behavior. With the exception of minor incidents, Iranian forces avoided contact with the U.S.-escorted convoys. Instead, they continued the established pattern of intercepting merchant shipping and attacking unescorted vessels.

Also, they sowed naval mines, which combined aggressiveness with elusiveness, allowing the Iranians to challenge the reflagging operation without engaging in direct clashes with the U.S. Navy. Tehran did not abandon caution even when the mining operation backfired and rallied the reluctant Europeans behind the United States. When an American F-14 fired on an Iranian F-4 and a U.S. destroyer fired on two Iranian vessels in August 1987, Tehran hardly responded. When U.S. forces captured an Iranian vessel allegedly laying mines off the Bahraini coast in September 1987, the Iranians limited their response to a vehement denial. The severe escalation of October 1987, when the U.S. Navy sank three Iranian gunboats and destroyed two Iranian oil platforms, prompted an Iranian retaliation mostly against Kuwait.

The only exception to this pattern of Iranian caution occurred in April 1988 when a direct Iranian-American collision took place following the damaging of a U.S. frigate by an underwater mine. Iran's exceptional readiness to clash at this time with the U.S. Navy must be attributed to the timing of the incident: it occurred right after Iranian forces had been dislodged from Faw Peninsula; to avoid further loss of face, the Iranian leadership had little choice but to retaliate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Timidity Is As Dangerous As Temerity

As is well known, states sometimes attempt to attain goals beyond their means; they also pursue policies more limited than their power allows. These two mistakes sound similar but look very different: aiming too high often leads to spectacular failures, whereas aiming too low usually results in missed opportunities. For obvious reasons, the first attracts much more analytical attention than the second. Perhaps because of this, observers tend to interpret almost all strategic mistakes as over-extension.

Certainly they do this in the case of Iraq's 1980 decision to invade Iran. According to this approach, the Iraqi invasion reflected Saddam Husayn's ambitions: the occupation of Iranian territories (the Shatt al-'Arab and Khuzestan); the infliction of "a humiliating and perhaps decisive defeat on the Iranian revolution, which he found troublesome";[12] and the assertion of Iraq as the pre-eminent Arab and Persian Gulf state. Husayn's inability to win the war swiftly, so this argument goes, resulted from the gap between those ambitious goals and the limitations of Iraqi military power. In short, he committed the common mistake of overestimating his power and underestimating his opponent's.[13]

This interpretation of Iraq's initial failure is fundamentally flawed. For one thing, proponents of this approach overlook Baghdad's positive response to Khomeini's triumph. Thus, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr of Iraq referred to Iran as a brotherly nation, linked to the Arab people of Iraq by "strong ties of Islam, history and noble traditions." He also publicly indicated a readiness to continue to abide by the status quo established by the Algiers Agreement of March 1975.[14] But Tehran did not reciprocate this goodwill. In June 1979, the revolutionary regime began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rise up and overthrow the Ba'th regime.[15] A few months later Tehran escalated its anti-Ba'thist campaign by resuming support for the Iraqi Kurds (which had ended in 1975), providing aid to underground Shi'i movements in Iraq, and initiating terrorist attacks against prominent Iraqi officials.

To check these pressures, Baghdad resorted to suppressing Shi'i underground organizations, expelling Iranian citizens en masse, attempting to organize a united Arab front, and supporting Iranian

[12] Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 125. For similar views, see also Ruhollah K. Ramazani, *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 57; and Cordesman, *The Gulf*, pp. 645-46.

[13] On this, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

[14] British Broadcasting System, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 22, 1979; also Iraqi News Agency, February 14, 1979.

[15] *Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 8, 1979, and June 9, 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separatist elements (such as the Iranian Kurds and the Arabs in Khuzestan). But these Iraqi measures failed to impress the revolutionary regime. By late August 1980 the Iranian-Iraqi confrontation escalated to fighting along the common frontier, involving tank and artillery duels, and air strikes. Iran's subversive activities, followed by the border fighting, drove the Iraqi leadership to conclude that it had no means but war for containing the Iranian threat. Faced with growing evidence that Tehran intended to destabilize the Ba'th regime, and aware of Iraq's inferiority in size and resources, Iraqi leaders doubted whether their country could sustain a prolonged confrontation with Iran.

The Iraqi experience, then, indicates that failure in national strategy is not necessarily the consequence of over-confidence. It can arise equally well from the employment of armed force in too limited a way.

Thus, the Iraqi decision to go to war was taken neither easily nor enthusiastically. Husayn did not go to war in pursuit of some wider ambition; he was pushed into it by his increasing anxiety. War was an act of last resort, taken only after trying other means for deflecting Iran's threat. If the Ba'th regime entertained hopes or aspirations beyond the containment of the Iranian danger — as it may have done — these were not the reasons for launching the war but were incidental to it.

The Iraqi experience, then, indicates that failure in national strategy is not necessarily the consequence of over-confidence. It can arise equally well from the employment of armed force in too limited a way. Husayn did not misjudge the balance of power prior to the war, for in the summer of 1980 he had an unquestioned military edge. Nor did he set his sights too high. Instead, he assigned too-limited tasks to the military forces. The Iraqis did not fail because of military power insufficient to their leaders' goals but because those leaders did not ask more of the power at their command. The war showed that setting sights too low can be as harmful to a state's interests as setting them too high.

Conclusions

The Iran-Iraq War provides devastating proof, if such were needed, of the precariousness of armed force as a foreign-policy instrument. The ending of the war on the basis of the 1980 status quo ante after eight years of bitter fighting, over a million human cas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ualties, and exorbitant economic dislocations has left the two protagonists virtually empty-handed, with neither closer to the realization of its political goals than a decade earlier.

And yet, just as Iran and Iraq failed to learn from previous experiences (e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan) that limited wars are bound to expand, so it is doubtful whether the painful record of the Gulf War will reduce future readiness to resort to armed force in the Third World, mainly because this war can hardly be viewed as typical. The ability to sustain such a long and expensive war requires substantial economic and financial resources, as well as an extremely motivated and resilient constituency — both of which are rare commodities in the non-industrial world. In the absence of these factors, future belligerents may view the expansion and escalation of war as the best means to bring about a desirable outcome, either by breaking the opponent's national resolve at all levels or by drawing the superpowers into the conflict. After all, did the collapse of Iranian morale not prove that even the most dedicated population has its breaking point?

Hence, most regretfully, while tempering the bellicosity of both Iran and Iraq and reducing their propensity for military adventurism beyond their frontiers, the eight-year conflict has also raised the potential level of violence in Middle Eastern wars. This is not merely because most Middle Eastern countries cannot afford a prolonged and exhausting war, but also because of the exceptionally mild international reaction to the erosion of several crucial thresholds and "red lines" during the war (primarily the use of gas), further reducing constraints on escalation. This grim outlook has been compounded by the significant acceleration of the already alarming arms race in the region after the war, particularly Saudi Arabia's purchase of long-range Chinese surface-to-surface missiles and reliable reports that Syria and Libya are developing chemical warfare capabilities in addition to procuring more surface-to-surface missiles.

The ending of the Iran-Iraq War may thus augur a period of relative calm, but its lessons and implications do not make the Middle East a safer place.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Does your library subscribe to

The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs?

澳中

Issue 19/20, 1988
Frederick C. Teiwes, Mao and his Lieutenants 1
Slyvia Chan, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Towards a 'Free' Literature 81
Borge Bakken, Backwards Reform in Chinese Education 127
Yan Hao, China's 1.2 Billion Population Target for the Year 2000: 'Within' or 'Beyond'? 165
Tim Wright, 'The Spiritual Heritage of Chinese Capitalism': Recent Trends in the Historiography of Chinese Enterprise Management 185
Nina Halpern, Social Scientists as Policy Advisers in Post-Mao China: Explaining the Patterns of Advice 215
Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Hong Kong: The Decline of Political Expectations and Confidence 241
William R. Jankowiak, The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia 269
Isabelle Thireau, Recent Change in a Guangdong Village 289
Timothy Cheek, The 'Genius' Mao: A Treasure Trove of 23 Newly Available Volumes of Post-1949 Mao Zedong Texts 311
Anita Chan, Self-Deception as a Survival Technique: The Case of Yue Daiyun 345
Reviews
China Stands Up: Ending the Western Presence, 1948–1950, by Beverley Hooper (Arthur Waldron) 359
363

Special offer to three-year subscribers
A complimentary copy of issue 19 & 20
Your subscription will begin with issue 21

Subscription Rates:
Within Australia: $20 per year; students $12 per year.
Outside Australia: US$20/£14 per year (2 issues); students US$12/£3 per year.
Three year subscriptions: $55/US$55/£38 plus a complimentary copy of issue 19 & 20.
Back issues Nos 7 to 10 and 12 to 20 can be purchased at $10/US$10/£7 each.
Subscriptions should be sent to: Contemporary China Centre, RSPacS, ANU,
GPO Box 4, Canberra, 2601, Australia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW GUNRUNNING

by Edward J. Laurance

Between March 1983 and November 1984, Ronald and Barry Semler, owners of the Los Angeles-based trading firm Associated Industries, shipped eighty-seven state-of-the-art American helicopters to North Korea, a country barred from receiving U.S. arms exports. This transaction, serious enough in itself, also provides a case study in the new gunrunning that afflicts the United States.

The helicopters dispatched by the Semlers to North Korea were civilian versions of the military Model 500D produced by Hughes Helicopters, and were convertible to military use. The year, 1983, was a time when international helicopter sales were declining and U.S. manufacturers were in tough competition to maintain their share of the market. Hughes relied on small, aggressive trading firms like Associated Industries to market and export civilian and military versions of its aircraft.

Such exports, though they have military and national security implications, can be perfectly legal — provided that the State and Defense departments give their approval, and that relevant Commerce Department regulations are fulfilled. Of course, the U.S. government would not have approved the sale to North Korea, something the Semlers knew perfectly well. Because the deal was so lucrative, however, they decided to create ways to circumvent the law.

In March 1983, they shipped the first two helicopters to Japan, where the craft were secretly loaded onto a North Korean freighter. The other eighty-five copters found their way to North Korea via a European intermediary, the West German trading company Delta-Avia Fluggerate, the single largest Hughes dealer in Western Europe. Though Delta-Avia was ostensibly set up in 1981 by Kurt Behrens, a Danish national, it was secretly controlled by the Semlers. Conducting the transaction in this way, through a German firm, entailed less risk, for no laws in the Federal Republic explicitly forbade the sale of civilian helicopters to North Korea. (Indeed, the West German government cleared Behrens for his part in the scheme.)

When it came to shipping the helicopters to Europe, the Semlers forged documents that led Hughes to believe the shipments were

Edward J. Laurance, associate professor of political science at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, has served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bound for Nigeria and several West European countries. In reality, however, the shipments traveled a tortuous course. For example, fifteen helicopters were shipped to Antwerp, trucked to Rotterdam, and loaded onto a Soviet merchant ship supposedly bound for Hong Kong, but which actually took the helicopters to North Korea.

The deception through Japan came to light in 1985, prompting a major investigation into the Semlers' activities by U.S. customs investigators. When evidence of their illegal activities became incontrovertible, the Semlers pleaded guilty to four of the twenty-one charges filed against them: tax conspiracy, illegal transfer of funds to Delta-Avia, violation of the Arms Export Control Act, and conspiracy to falsify export documents. Hughes Helicopters was embarrassed by the sale, but no evidence turned up of wrongdoing on its part. Indeed, Associated Industries itself was a legitimate operation, with eighty employees.

The military and political implications of this arms sale caused an international furor. The deal embarrassed the White House acutely, for it took place precisely as the Reagan administration was emphasizing the need to staunch the flow of military technology to the Eastern bloc. The U.S. Defense Department and the South Koreans were upset over the potential for mischief gained by the unpredictable communist state. And an awkward diplomatic situation emerged vis-à-vis American allies (Japan and West Germany in particular) whose lax laws abetted the transfer.

Taken from start to finish, the helicopter incident shows how the new gunrunning works: through the corruption of legitimate corporations, the exploitation of differing national restraints on arms sales, and the connivance of hostile governments. This deal was no isolated event, but a small part of a large and growing problem — the illegal export of American weaponry to the Third World.

The Illegal Market in American Arms

The sale of conventional arms as a tool of U.S. national security policy has always been controversial. In the 1930s, the arms trade was widely believed to be a major cause of wars and conflicts, and muckrakers railed against "merchants of death." Despite mixed evidence presented in the various international and national forums examining this linkage, the United States and the other major arms-producing countries created significant national controls on an arms trade hitherto uncontrolled. In the immediate post-World War II period, Moscow and Washington used arms transfers in the battles of the Cold War. But a chronic lack of cash among recipient nations precluded a significant commercial market in arms, and the tightly controlled military-aid policies of the two powers combined to keep illegal sales to a minimum throughout most of the 1960s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
ILLEGAL ARMS EXPORTS

	FY82	FY83	FY84	FY85	FY86	FY87	FY88	Total
Number of Seizures	765	1,444	1,459	750	802	1,044	361	6,625
Value of Seizures ($1,000,000)	55.6	86.3	85.6	74.8	51.6	75.9	31.1	460.9
Detentions	2,481	3,620	2,329	947	1,062	(NA)	(NA)	10,439
Arrests	195	110	121	184	116	96	69	891
Indictments	171	63	178	425	158	105	101	1,201
Convictions	134	80	92	67	117	45	60	595

NOTE: Data for 1988 include only the first six months. (NA): Data are not available.
SOURCE: U.S. Customs Service, June 1988.

The explosive growth of oil revenues in the early 1970s gave several states the means to make significant arms purchases. Most of this new demand could be met in legitimate transactions, however, thanks to the advent of détente and the Nixon administration's encouragement of commercial arms exports. The illegal arms trade was effectively crowded out.[1] But these boom times for the arms industry were short-lived, as a debate quickly erupted over the costs and benefits of arms transfers, and the Carter administration instituted a policy of restraining arms sales. Reversing the Carter approach, the Reagan administration emphasized the importance of arms transfers and security assistance; but by this time, oil wealth had declined precipitously, and American arms manufacturers, encouraged to expand by the Reagan defense build-up, had an increased capacity with a significantly decreased international market.

Throughout these postwar shifts, the assumption had always been that the illegal trade in American arms was minimal. Now this assumption is in doubt. The 1980s have seen illegal arms sales reach significant levels for the first time in the postwar period. Not since the 1930s has the issue of private manufacturers and trading companies influencing regional conflicts and international politics been so salient. Indeed, the data from recent years bring into question the ability of the U.S. government to control the trade in American-made arms.

Table 1 and Table 2 clearly indicate that the problem of illegal arms sales has grown substantially since 1981. Unfortunately, the tables say little more. Note, for example, that the figure of $460.9 million in Table 1 includes only those items actually seized. It does not take account of successful illegal shipments. Nor does it recognize the many deals nipped in the bud by Operation Exodus, the Reagan

[1] *David J. Louscher, "The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument,"* ORBIS, Winter 1977, pp. 933-64.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
SIGNIFICANT EXPORT CONTROL CASES

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Total	Percent
Types of Cases										
Small Arms	1	2	2	4	5	2	3	1	20	11
Embargo	1	1	1	1	4	0	1	0	9	5
Technology	5	4	10	22	10	6	9	1	67	38
Support	0	4	5	7	16	9	7	6	54	31
Major Weapons	1	1	3	2	5	6	9	1	26	15
Total Cases	8	12	21	36	40	23	27	9	176	100
Major End-Users										
Iran	1	2	2	5	16	8	4	5	43	24.4
Eastern Bloc	4	1	4	10	7	2	5	1	34	19.3

SOURCE: Export Control Enforcement Unit, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., May 1988.

administration's attempt to curtail the export of high technology to Eastern bloc countries.

But not all of these deals are of equal interest or importance. In Table 2 export violations are broken down into five categories: small arms, commercial equipment destined for embargoed countries ("embargo"), technology, support materials, and major weapons systems. The first three will not be analyzed here. Small arms rarely affect national security. Embargo cases — such as the sale of sonars to Chile — generally do not involve concern for national security but reflect a wider policy toward the country in question. Technology cases involve mostly the strategic embargo against the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Although these activities raise extremely interesting and important issues, they clearly involve many different factors than the sale of conventional arms to Third World nations. Thus, the subject here is limited to support materials and major weapon systems.

The category of support material (accounting for over 30 percent of all cases) concerns equipment and spare parts designed to support a conventional war. Examples include inertial navigation systems and night-vision devices sold to Libya; tank and aircraft parts, radar tubes, and fuses sold to Iran; and radars sold to Syria.

Most of the entries in the support category involve end-users of two types. The first are those engaged in conventional conflicts, where there is current or potential American involvement — as in Iran, Libya, and Nicaragua. The second type of end-user is a country whose military capabilities figure prominently in U.S. national security assessments, such as South Africa, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. Because of its long war with Iraq, Iran

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accounted for 29 (or 54 percent) of these cases. Indeed, one of the more celebrated cases was the Inanlou case, which involved ten people who stole and exported over $10 million worth of F-14 and other aircraft parts to Iran.

The second category of cases, major weapon systems, attracts the most attention, for these cases have the greatest potential implications for national security. About 15 percent of all Justice Department "significant cases" fall into this category. These involved thirteen countries as intended or actual end-users. Iran, which appears nine times, is the most commonly intended end-user. Nicaragua, South Africa, and Libya were each involved in three cases, while Syria and the Irish Republican Army were the customers in two cases each. Weapon systems to be smuggled out of the United States to these countries included radars, helicopters, transport aircraft, Harpoon missiles, TOW missiles, anti-tank missiles, F-4 and F-5 fighter aircraft, and main battle tanks.

Unlike the category of support equipment, in which considerable levels of equipment reached their intended destinations, almost all of the equipment in the major weapon systems cases cited in the Justice Department data was intercepted prior to shipment. There were notable exceptions, including the eighty-seven helicopters that reached North Korea, two L-100-30 transport aircraft to Libya in 1986, and one C-46 transport aircraft to Nicaragua in 1987.

Understandably, customs personnel generally have more success in intercepting equipment that is larger than support equipment. But the steady occurrence of the attempts evidences unrelenting pressure for illegal exports, and provides insight into the networks, methods, and personnel involved.

Court documents and interviews conducted by the author permit a few generalizations about participants in the illegal trade of major weapons systems. First, the companies involved in illegal transactions tend to be small, and often they are nothing more than fronts for illegal activity. Second, the trade rarely involves mainstream U.S. defense industries themselves, except as the source of illicitly obtained equipment. Major corporations are usually quick to cooperate with U.S. investigative agencies. But, third, many cases involve employees and former employees of major defense firms, who use their positions to illegally acquire the items to be exported. As a result, the defense industry as a whole has had to take special steps to prevent such occurrences.

Why is the Problem Growing?

A series of structural changes in the arms trade has led to the great increase in illegal commerce during the 1980s. Most important, there is a greater demand for weapons obtained outside normal chan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nels. The 1980s witnessed a concentration of conflicts that created unusually strong pressures to illegally obtain from the United States arms and equipment with the potential for making a critical impact on the conflict. The Iran-Iraq War is the most obvious example; Iran's air force and air defense missile capability were purchased under the shah from the United States, so the U.S. embargo on arms exports forced Tehran to obtain spare parts illegally. During the Falklands War of 1982, two men from New York succeeded in illegally shipping $8 million worth of night-vision goggles to Argentina. As a customs official commented, "until Argentina got these devices, it was fighting blindfolded."[2]

During the Falklands War of 1982, two men from New York succeeded in illegally shipping $8 million worth of night-vision goggles to Argentina. As a customs official commented, "until Argentina got these devices, it was fighting blindfolded."

The proliferation of medium-range, surface-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads also created strong pressures. Even though Washington has signed the Missile Technology Control Regime agreement as a way of restricting the flow of surface-to-surface missiles, the pressure for supplies continues unabated. Thus, two Egyptian military officers and three Americans were charged on June 24, 1988, with plotting to illegally export from Baltimore a box of carbon-carbon (a tightly controlled material used to make warheads more accurate). American officials claimed that the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Argentine governments planned to use the material in a joint program to develop the Condor-3 surface-to-surface missile.

Second, there has been a shift away from bilateral national dealings in favor of arms bazaars. Just a few years ago, only the Farnborough and Paris air shows were available. But now there are many; in the four months between September 21, 1987, and January 28, 1988, for example, twenty-two military equipment exhibitions took place in eight different countries, from Australia to Egypt.[3] The old bilateral system was expensive and troublesome, and it effectively shut many smaller companies and brokers out of the international arms trade. Fairs, by contrast, allow sellers and potential buyers of military wares to converge inexpensively.

[2] *The Washington Post*, April 11, 1985.
[3] "Exhibition Calendar," *International Defense Review*, September 1987, p. 1281.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third, purchasers now frequently demand that the price they pay for military equipment be offset by the supplier.[4] Such offsets can be accomplished in a number of ways (co-production, technology transfer, countertrade). The effect is to include a wider variety of participants in arms deals. Furthermore, because the U.S. government will not be involved in offset arrangements, private American companies must conclude and manage offset deals on their own.

Fourth, because the debt crisis has reduced the capital available for purchasing up-to-date weapons, and so created a major trade in refurbished equipment, an increasing proportion of the international arms trade is in spare parts, which are easier to obtain illegally than whole weapon systems. As a senior Pentagon supply official put it: "We've got a situation that we've never had before in that things like F-14 parts, [and] Phoenix missile parts had no real appeal for criminals up until the last few years — because what would you do with it if you stole it? . . . The temptation is overwhelming for people who are ship's storekeepers, [and] warehousemen, who obviously are not in high-income brackets."[5] Also, many countries switch suppliers under strained conditions (like Iran and the United States), making direct support of equipment in the inventory a problem.[6]

Fifth, private arms dealers have taken on a larger role as middlemen. Throughout the postwar period the United States has been forced to use such individuals when the overt U.S. provision of weapons was either not possible or not desirable, as in the Iran-Contra dealings. At the same time, this practice legitimizes the arms merchants' place in the system, thereby diminishing the ability of governments to control the trade.

A stockpile of surplus and uncontrolled equipment has been growing in recent years, consisting of arms left over from the massive increase in production during the oil price boom of the 1970s, surplus equipment from the Warsaw Pact and other countries initially armed by the USSR, and equipment exported by suppliers (such as the Brazilians) who do not require an end-use certificate. Illegal traders find it easy to acquire weapons from these stockpiles and sell them where they will.

Finally, the clandestine supply network developed for the drug trade is increasingly being used for arms. This efficient network can handle large quantities of goods; it can thereby facilitate the flow of arms into conflicts where black market purchases are preferred.

[4] Stephanie G. Neuman, "Coproduction, Barter, and Countertrade: Offsets in the International Arms Market," ORBIS, Spring 1985, pp. 183-213.

[5] *The Los Angeles Times*, September 1, 1985.

[6] Michael T. Klare, "The State of the Trade," *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1986, p. 15. See also the Testimony of William Robinson, director, Office of Munitions Control, State Department, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, February 20, 1987; and James Kirfield, "What Iran Needs," *Military Logistics*, January/February 1987, p. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All these changes greatly increase the opportunities for illegal dealing. As a consequence, the international trade system in arms may now be more conducive to illegal arms exports than at any time in the post-World War II period.

The Harm to U.S. Interests

The illegal arms trade is deeply detrimental to U.S. interests in a number of ways.

Arming Adversaries. As more Third World countries gain the military power that allows them to challenge even the superpowers locally, the U.S. government must regard many more countries as serious potential adversaries. Iran presents the classic example of this type, for it has been an adversary of the United States since 1979, and sales of American arms to Iran pose a national security problem. A combination of factors — an American-made military infrastructure, an American ban on arms transfers to the ayatollah's regime, and a protracted war with Iraq — caused Iran to become the leading recipient of illegal U.S. military goods.

U.S. pilots flying missions in the Persian Gulf were hampered because Iran's air defense capability had become a function of illegally obtained spare parts from the United States and therefore, in many cases, was simply unknown.

Two examples point to the magnitude of the problem. One was the Inanlou case, mentioned above, which involved $10 million worth of aircraft parts stolen and exported to Iran in the early 1980s. An Iranian businessman operating out of London, Said Inanlou, worked with a U.S. businessman and his associates in San Diego. The American, in turn, recruited American navy personnel to steal parts which were shipped through Inanlou to Iran in the guise of automobile parts and medical supplies. In July 1985, Inanlou was arrested by the British and the entire case was made public.[7] Then, in January 1988, two Iranians were arrested attempting to bribe a Raytheon employee in the effort to obtain an end-user certificate for Hawk missile parts and associated radar equipment. At one point, the Iranians told customs officials posing as Raytheon executives that Iran had over $60 million to spend on a long list of military hardware.[8]

[7] Michael T. Klare, "Secret Operatives, Clandestine Trades: The Thriving Black Market for Weapons," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1988, pp. 16-24; *The Los Angeles Times*, August 21, 1985.

[8] David Hughes, "U.S. Uncovers Extensive Efforts to Procure Weapons for Iran," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, February 1, 1988, pp. 86-87.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military Planning and Threat Analysis. The illegal arms trade complicates the threat analysis so vital to the development and prosecution of U.S. defense plans. Intelligence on the military capabilities of potential adversaries, never an easy task, is rendered much more difficult and less reliable given a virtual open market for arms. The problem is compounded by the need to track the spare parts and support items which now dominate the illegal trade routes. U.S. pilots flying missions in the Persian Gulf were hampered because Iran's air defense capability had become a function of illegally obtained spare parts from the United States and therefore, in many cases, was simply unknown. This involved not only the Hawk missiles obtained during the shah's regime, but also Stinger missiles which had found their way from the Afghan guerrillas to the Persian Gulf.

Conflict Control. The instruments of U.S. foreign policy designed to control conflicts — security assistance, economic aid, arms control negotiations, and efforts to adjudicate regional conflicts involving U.S. interests — far outweigh the use of force as a policy tool. The fact that conflicts are increasingly fueled with illegal arms imports works to frustrate this major tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Some (notably, Stephanie G. Neuman) have argued that despite the illicit trade in arms, and despite the rise of second-tier suppliers such as Brazil and Libya, the two superpowers can still retain effective control over regional conflicts through the use of security assistance.[9] This is true, if "control" means determining a military balance that can bring victory or defeat. For example, Neuman argues that pressure by the United States and the Soviet Union on their respective allies not to sell arms to Iran prevented Tehran from gaining the equipment it needed to tilt the military balance of the Persian Gulf war, despite the thriving black market in arms.[10]

Nevertheless, enough weapons reached Iran to have a significant impact on the war. For instance, the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner by the U.S.S. *Vincennes* in the summer of 1988 occurred just as that ship was repelling an attack by Iranians in small boats. The small arms used in that attack could easily have been acquired on the black market. These attacks certainly contributed to the confusion and hostile environment that prevailed at the time of the shootdown.

Penetration of Military Supply System. The first major case of foreign agents penetrating the U.S. military supply system came to light in July 1985, when five men were arrested in San Diego. They were charged with stealing spare parts for the F-14 from U.S. Navy

[9] Stephanie G. Neuman, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers* (New York: Praeger, 1986), and "Arms and Superpower Influence: Lessons from Recent Wars," ORBIS, Winter 1987, pp. 711-29.

[10] Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988, p. 1055.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stocks and smuggling these to Iran. Most alarming, the active-duty navy supply person who stole the appropriate parts specifically ordered and received them, even though the F-14 was not deployed on his ship! The case set in motion not just a court action but also a host of investigations by the Government Accounting Office and the military services. The Senate held hearings in 1986 on the results of these investigations, and the results were sobering.[11] As one analyst put it: "If it could be done for the F-14, I guess it could be done for the B-1."[12]

The inquiry revealed what everyone inside the supply system already knew: that a combination of outdated computers, huge inventory adjustments, and overworked personnel invited criminal activity. Add to this the Iranian network, armed with lengthy lists of parts (complete with federal stock numbers), and the vulnerability to penetration became evident. Indeed, the real damage done in the F-14 parts case had less to do with the parts actually stolen and more to do with the techniques developed to obtain direct access to the computerized supply system.

Readiness of U.S. Forces. The readiness issue arose in the wake of Richard Nixon's decision to send arms to Israel in the 1973 war, which seriously depleted U.S. stocks of tanks and fighter aircraft. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 requires that the executive branch report on the impact of any sale on the readiness of U.S. forces. Of course, illegal sales ignore such considerations, and may affect readiness without the military being aware of its weakness. In several court cases involving illegal arms exports, the prosecutor cited the impact on the readiness of U.S. armed forces. For example, in the 1985 case concerning F-14 parts shipped to Iran, prosecutors argued that "in one twelve-month period alone, there were 328 instances when F-14 missions had to be scrubbed for lack of the computers, navigational equipment and other parts stolen by the San Diego-based ring."[13] This may not be a totally accurate military assessment, but it does suggest the potential impact of illegal shipments. Similarly, although the sale of weapons to Iran by Oliver North in 1985 and 1986 was not an illegal export in the strict sense, investigations disclosed that the sale of Hawk missile parts to Iran, which bypassed normal military assessments, wiped out fifteen types of spare parts and depleted forty-six more.[14]

Harm to Foreign Relations. A final impact of the illegal arms trade relates to foreign relations between the United States and the countries affected or involved in illegal arms exports. The illegal

[11] United States General Accounting Office, *Problems in Accountability and Security of DOD Supply Inventories*, Report No. NSIAD-86-106BR, June 23, 1986.
[12] *The Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1985.
[13] Ibid., November 26, 1986.
[14] Ibid., October 14, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

export of helicopters to North Korea drew loud criticism from the South Korean government, which demanded that the United States help finance any defense adjustments needed because of the North's "new capacity to conduct infiltration and irregular warfare."[15] The case of the two Egyptian colonels attempting to smuggle material through Baltimore for surface-to-surface missiles could not have come at a worse time, for Washington was still smarting from the May 1988 purchase of Chinese surface-to-surface missiles by Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian recall of its officials implicated in this case was prompt, but the disclosure of the attempt showed that Cairo was no ally in the effort to control ballistic missile proliferation. Iraqi involvement in the Baltimore case created diplomatic problems for American efforts to maintain a neutral stance in the Persian Gulf war. Qatar's black-market purchase of twelve U.S. Stinger missiles hurt its relations with the United States to the extent that the Senate Appropriations Committee prohibited military dealings with this Persian Gulf country.[16]

Recommendations

There is reason to believe that cases prosecuted to date for the illegal export of arms and military equipment from the United States represent only the tip of the iceberg. Yet, even that tip has become a serious problem — and matters will probably get worse. Methods used by the exporters are sophisticated and still evolving; the arms involved are increasing in quantity and military capability; and the effect on U.S. security is growing apace. Obviously, there is no single response to this black market, but the following should be considered.

Declaratory Policy. Every president since Nixon has issued a major statement on the matter of arms transfers.[17] Such statements are not mere talk, but do have an impact on key players in the system, particularly the industries involved in armaments production and exporting. For example, the attitude of manufacturers bounced from despair to delight as a result of the Reagan arms-transfer policy pronouncements, and the recent increase in illegal sales apparently reflects a misperception of current policy as limitlessly permissive. This suggests a caution: much greater care must be taken in enunciating policy. Declaratory policy also has a major effect on U.S. governmental officials. Moreover, bureaucrats take their cues not only from the basic policy, promulgated at the beginning of an administration,

[15] *The Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 1985.
[16] *The New York Times*, June 28, 1988.
[17] Both the Reagan and Carter statements are found in *Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy*, Report Prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, September 25, 1981. The first published statement of the transitional policy of the Ford administration can be found in the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations document, "International Security Assistance Act of 1976" (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 829-55.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but also from policy statements issued as updates. Hence, more stress should also be placed on issuing updates to fine-tune a policy, emphasizing that the initial guidance is not set in concrete.

Control vs. Limitations. In addition to being more carefully phrased, the initial policy statement should be less polemical than those of recent years. A re-emphasis on the concept of control is needed. Too often, everyone for whom the arms trade is vital perceives "control" as meaning simply "less." One of the key reasons that the Carter policy failed was that it emphasized only a gross reduction of arms transfers. Very little encouragement was given to those who sought to control the negative effects of arms transfers through the painstaking task of analyzing individual cases.

Staffing. Too often, U.S. policy makers respond to the arms problem by suggesting new rules, legislative or executive. In the case of arms transfers, these rules are already numerous, from the International Arms Export Control Act to the arcane language of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (Munitions List). But unless agencies are staffed to enforce these rules, people seeking to bend or circumvent the rules will conclude the control effort is not credible. The Reagan administration provided an excellent example of credible enforcement in the Defense Technology Security Agency, an organization started from scratch in 1981 to control the export of strategic technology. By contrast, the State Department's Office of Munitions Control provides an example of a bureaucracy where staffing has not kept up with the demands created by shifts in arms export policy.

Congressional staffing also presents a problem. None of the armed services or foreign relations committees ordinarily deals with these issues. And even when they do, they are staffed to treat the large political issues of security assistance, not the less dramatic, incremental effects created by illegal exports. To meet the national security challenges presented by illegal arms exports, staffs in both the executive and legislative branches must include people familiar not only with policy issues, but also with weapon systems and their effects on conflict control and threat analysis.

The International Angle. Because illegal arms exports from the United States frequently involve crimes in other countries, the U.S. government should consider sharing its experience of the past eight years. In particular, Operation Exodus has been extremely successful in developing procedures that could help other countries in their efforts to arrest illegal arms exporters. Such a sharing of experience is already taking place at the level of high technology and should be expanded to include the entire range of weapon systems and technology, most particularly ballistic missile technology.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These four aspects of policy will not in themselves be sufficient, for the factors that promote illegal arms sales are various and wide-ranging. But the recommendations offered here can make a significant difference.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ETHICS.

Does it have anything to do with Foreign Policy?

FIND OUT.


ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1989 Volume 3
Ten Dollars
ETHICS AND INTERVENTION
Michael J. Smith Ethics and Intervention
Gregory F. Treverton Imposing a Standard: American Democracy and Covert Action
Charles R. Beitz Reflections on Covert Action and Political Ethics
William E. Colby Public Policy, Secret Action
Ralph Buultjens Words and Deeds: Indian Intervention in South Asia
David P. Calleo The American Problem
Gary Sick Moral Choice and the Iran-Iraq Conflict
John W. Dower Pride and Prejudice in U.S.-Japan Relations
Thomas Donaldson Moral Minimums for Multinationals
Robert O. Keohane Closing the Fairness-Practice Gap
J. Bryan Hehir Deterring the Catholic Bishops
John Chamberlin Ethics and Game Theory?
Seymour Martin Lipset Liberalism, Conservatism, and Americanism
Paul Sigmund Legitimacy and Polarization in Latin America
Richard Falk Improving Prohibitions on Biological Weaponry
Robert J. Myers The Carnegie Poll on Values in American Foreign Policy
Kenneth W. Thompson The Literature of Decline
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs

Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
Merrill House 170 East 64th Street New York, NY 10021

☐ Please send me _____ copies of the 1989 edition of ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Volume 3 @$10 per copy ($12 outside U.S. and Canada).
☐ Please send me _____ copies of Volume 2.
Enclosed is $_____

Make checks payable to Carnegie Council. Payment must accompany order.

Shipping charges included.

Name _____ (please print)

Address _____ Apt.

City _____ State _____ Zip

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documentation

UNEARTHING THE GREAT TERROR

by Robert Conquest

The discovery of mass graves at Kuropaty Woods in Minsk marks a new phase in the current Soviet campaign to tell the truth about the Stalinist Terror. The publication of an article in the government's own organ, Izvestiya, *sets an official seal on the matter.*

The Terror by which Stalin consolidated his autocracy was denounced in general terms in Moscow under Khrushchev, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. But no indication of the number of victims was given. There was, indeed, a mass of evidence from unofficial and defector sources, and even deductions from published Soviet material, which made it clear to Western researchers that it was a question of millions shot and many millions sent to high-mortality labor camps.

But it was only in 1987-88 that the Soviet press began to publish dozens of articles and analyses supporting such figures. To take a single example, it was stated in Moscow News *(on May 8, 1988) that during the period 1937-38 in Uzbekistan alone, about 40,000 people were shot by order of the NKVD Troika (a local three-person, pseudo-judiciary body created by Stalin during the Great Terror to expedite the sentencing of "enemies of the people"). Extrapolating, this would mean over a million for the USSR as a whole — and there were other death-sentencing tribunals as well. More recently, according to* The New York Times *(February 4, 1989), in a major Soviet weekly journal with a mass circulation, historian Roy Medvedev offered estimates ranging well into the millions for the number of individuals executed or sent to labor camps in the USSR during the Great Terror.*

But the actual exhumation of masses of victims takes things a step further, both dramatically and evidentially. The new revelations also have implications for Western scholarship. A few writers in the United States have lately argued that the effect and significance of the Terror was much exaggerated. Beginning with Jerry Hough in his rewrite of Merle Fainsod's How Russia is Ruled *(retitled* How the Soviet Union is Governed*), they suggested that only "tens of thousands" might have perished.*[1] *Or, as a more recent "revisionist" book*

[1] Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 176-77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

puts it, "thousands" were killed and "many thousands" imprisoned.[2] *With millions now known to have been killed or sent to labor camps, this position cannot be sustained.*

Other mass graves in the USSR had been discovered before those at Kuropaty, although not under Soviet auspices. At Katyn, some five thousand Polish officers were exhumed during the German occupation. Similarly, at the minor Ukrainian provincial capital Vinnitsa, over 9,000 dead were dug up in 1943 — and, as with Katyn, examined by an international medical commission, including neutrals.

In several ways, however, the Kuropaty graves are indeed a revelation. First, the revisionist estimates for the whole USSR could be tucked into a single corner of this one gravesite of a single minor republican capital! Second, the news of the graves is accepted by the government itself.

It should indeed be noted that Izvestiya*'s estimate of the Kuropaty numbers is lower than that given in the Belorussian press (over 100,000).*[3] *More recently, in the Russian-language Latvian journal* Daugava *(No. 9, 1988), the leading investigator said that even this estimate omits areas not now susceptible to excavation. According to him, the true total is probably 250,000-300,000. Moreover, the Belorussian press has named five other sites (of unspecified size) in and around Minsk alone, while saying that yet others exist near the republic's provincial capitals.*[4]

On the other hand, whatever the Belorussian total turns out to be, it is certainly higher in proportion than that for the USSR as a whole. For some of the dead so far examined came from then newly annexed Western Belorussia (and were shot in 1939-1941). But even if — as on any count seems impossibly low — only 35,000 were shot in the whole of Belorussia in 1937-38, that would mean a million for the USSR, a figure long accepted as a probable minimum. The true total now seems a great deal higher.

The graves have become an important political and emotional issue in Moscow. In January 1989 the Central Committee requested the Supreme Soviet to decree, among other things, proper burial for the victims of Stalinism. Several other mass graves have been referred to, though not yet investigated — one at Bykovna south of Kiev; one at Glukhaya Hill near the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok railway; a "Babi Yar" in Moscow itself . . .

It is now beyond doubt that the Great Terror was conducted on a vast scale; that it was overwhelmingly the main social, political,

[2] J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 8-9.
[3] *Literatura i mastatstva*, June 3, 1988.
[4] *Literatura i mastatstva*, June 24, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and demographic event of the period; and that, far from being a mere episode, it left the post-Stalin Soviet Union (in the words of Joseph Berger, former secretary of the Palestine Communist Party, and himself long in a labor camp) "like a country devastated by nuclear warfare."

N. Matukovskiy, "The Truth about the Kuropaty"[5]

Our newspaper has already written on two occasions of the tragedy which took place in the Kuropaty Woods, not far from Minsk. The tragedy was revealed by accident, last spring. Initially, excavator operator N. Taran, who was digging a trench for a gas main found human skulls and two pairs of shoes; later, while playing the Zarnitsa [summer lightning] military-sports game, digging trenches, Minsk school students found the remnants of more than thirty people. What shook up everyone was one detail: each skull showed a bullet hole, most frequently in the back. Was this, therefore, a mass murder? If so, who were the victims and who were the killers?

The conclusion of archaeologists from the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History is expressed in the newspaper *Literatura i mastatstva* simply and unequivocally: The remains discovered in Kuropaty were those of victims of Stalinist repressions of 1937-1941. However, this assumption by the scientists was insufficient. Unquestionable and irrefutable proof and, above all, eyewitnesses were needed.

On June 14, G. Tarnavskiy, the Belorussian SSR prosecutor, instigated a criminal case. A governmental commission was immediately set up which, in addition to specialists from law enforcement authorities, included noted public figures.

In the course of a few months, the group of investigators did a tremendous amount of work. Eight of the presumed 510 burial sites were exposed, and many expert evaluations were made; 170 witnesses were found and interrogated. And all this after so many years!

A bitter thought gives us no rest; what if the children had been playing their game and dug trenches in another forest? What if the track of the gas main had been dug two or three kilometers to the left or to the right? Why is it that the Kuropaty tragedy remained wrapped in secrecy for several decades?

There were people still alive who saw, heard, and remembered everything which took place. It is incomprehensible: We remember petty personal insults, injustices and words said in the heat of passion for many long years, yet we forget that which it is unforgivable to forget. Is it simply the philistine unwillingness to consider painful

[5] *Izvestiya*, November 27, 1988. Modified version of the account given in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, December 16, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

questions, to stir up the past, indifference toward one's own past and one's history or fear and shame of it? This is not surprising in an atmosphere of civic indifference which is increasingly protecting the "great leader" [Joseph Stalin]. Allegedly, he was not to blame, he personally knew nothing of this. Enough! He knew everything! And this was not because he was properly informed but because those who did the act zealously and strictly followed his "theory." The more socialism in the country, the more enemies in it and the more fiercely they will oppose socialism. This was a monstrous "theory" and equally monstrous "practice."

As I read the minutes of the interrogations and the conclusions of the experts, I unwittingly ask myself again and again: Perhaps we have burdened the reader enough with new facts of the crimes of Stalinism? In the final account, the 27th Congress [of February-March 1986] and the 19th Party Conference [of June 1988] passed judgment on this history. Yes, but [people still] demand that the "father of the peoples" be left to rest in peace, and that we not "defame" our glorious past or exaggerate the scale of the crimes.

The Criminal Investigation

The last word belongs to the documents and the witnesses. It is impossible to quote everything that was gathered in the course of the investigation and so I shall quote merely a few pages from the case in order to recreate, albeit approximately, the picture of what took place in only one place in the country — the Kuropaty.

According to the conclusion of the comprehensive forensic and criminal expertise, the human remains found in six burial places belonged to no fewer than 391 people, 114 of them male, 21 female and the rest impossible to determine. A total of 164 cartridges and 21 bullets from a Nagan revolver were also found.

Of all the personal items which were found in the grave, only one "talked." On a comb, someone had written with a sharp object, in Polish: "Difficult minutes of a prisoner. Minsk. 25 April 1940. Thinking of you makes me despair. 26 April (I cried, a difficult day)."

In the course of the investigation it was established that there were fifty-five witnesses from the neighboring villages of Tsna, Zabolotye, Drozdovo, Malinovka, and Zelenyy Lug who had witnessed the events. To determine the accuracy of the witnesses' testimony, investigators conducted an experiment. They asked witness N. Karpovich to point out in the forest the place where the shooting took place. Although the forest in Kuropaty had changed in the course of several decades, he led the investigators and confidently said to them: "Here." They began to dig and found another big grave with remains.

N. Karpovich: "The people were taken there in the evening. On two occasions I saw them being shot. They were placed above

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the pit, in a row. My father and I approached the pit which was large, about five meters, and was filled with corpses covered with twigs. We raised the twigs and saw people. They were dressed simply, in jackets and their shoes were clearly rural."

N. Nekhaychik: "After the trucks passed, the boys and I counted the shots. There were thirty to forty or, sometimes, seventy. Usually, two to three trucks came but, sometimes, even six, seven."

S. Khmelnikova: "Sometimes the shooting went on every day and sometimes at several day intervals. One could hear shouting and shots. As a rule, the people were being shot in the evenings and during the night. They were being brought from the direction of Minsk in closed vehicles."

I. Alekhno: "The fact that people were being executed in the forest I found from Batyan Grigoriy Ivanovich. He lived in Tsna Village and worked for the NKVD. Once, slightly drunk, Batyan said that he personally had participated in the shootings. He was subsequently expelled from the NKVD for blabbering."

Fifty-five eyewitnesses are almost unanimous in repeating the same facts, complementing each other's statements. Many of them recalled that soon afterwards, bright red mushrooms began to grow in the forest at the place of the execution, resembling chanterelles. Neither adults nor children ever picked them, but looked at them in horror.

However, the witnesses were not able to identify even a single one of the dead. They simply had no way of doing so. But the name of one of the executioners came out, Batyan Grigoriy Ivanovich. He had died immediately after the war. The investigators, however, kept "digging" ever deeper and deeper. They found several former NKVD officials who had been directly involved in the Kuropaty crime.

S. Kharitonovich (since 1938, guard in the inner jail of the NKVD on Uritskogo Street): "The only one among the NKVD investigators I remember is Sheykin. He too was arrested in 1938 and kept in the jail on Volodarskogo Street. Sometimes the investigators ordered us not to let the prisoners sleep at night, which is what we did. If the inmate would fall asleep we would wake him up. I do not remember the names of the inmates. We took them out of the cells in a truck, carrying fifteen to twenty people. I do not know where they were taken. Only once was I taken to cover a grave. The corpses in it had already been covered and we merely smoothed up the ground. All people on duty at the jail participated in the executions: In the night after the execution they would come back at 3 or 4 a.m. and would keep drinking until the morning in the NKVD cafeteria. The next day they would come to work late.

"[One executioner] said that the people were stood by the pit and executed with Nagans. Before the execution the people shouted:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'Long live the Soviet system! Long live Stalin!' The NKVD personnel who had taken part in all of this began to be detained in 1938. Deputy Commander Yermakov could not stand it, and shot himself. The guard Tararukhin worked with me. He could not stand it and submitted his resignation. He was executed. I too wrote a report and at a Komsomol meeting I was severely reprimanded and I was forced to go on working."

The most terrible word at that time was "NKVD." It was whispered with circumspection. However, even at that time there were people in the NKVD who preserved their humanity, despite everything. For example, former prosecutor G. Ruchan, who was interrogated as a witness, lost his position for his refusal to sanction forged cases submitted for consideration by the Troika. Several prosecutors in Minsk paid with their lives for such actions.

V. Karpik (former chairman of the special collegium, Belorussian SSR Supreme Court): "The republic's NKVD leadership encouraged coercive measures of influence during interrogations. No proof of guilt was provided at the trials. I repeatedly sent such cases for additional investigation, for which I was accused of liberalism and, in 1938, removed from my position and expelled from the party."

Concealing the Victims

The list of such witnesses could be continued. However, I kept leafing, page after page, in an effort to find perhaps even a single name, a single specific person who died in Kuropaty. Finally, I came across a sheet which left virtually no hope. It was the interrogation of the former NKVD official K. Kulinkovich, who had worked in the organs for one year as operational representative:

"On June 25, 1941, our organization was evacuated to Mogilev. However, the day after that I and the other operative group were sent to Minsk to destroy the files of the party *raykoms* and *gorkoms* [regional and city party committees] and of the NKVD. By the time we arrived in Minsk these files had already been destroyed during the bombing and the fires. We then destroyed everything else and returned to Mogilev."

Yet something nonetheless remained! This was confirmed during the investigation of the former Belorussian SSR MGB [Ministry of State Security, successor to the NKVD and precursor of the KGB] official V. Mikhayevich who had access to the files of NKVD criminal cases in the 1950s. Although there were many cases, each one of them contained several investigations compressed in no more than two-three pages. All the accused were young people who had crossed the border in 1937-38. All cases were structured identically: On the first page the accused declared himself innocent. On the second he said that he was an agent of foreign intelligence and at the end of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the page was the entry: VMN (supreme penalty), followed by the words: "Sentence executed in Minsk." However, there was not even a hint of the place of execution. Furthermore, there is confirmation (as recorded in the case) that the so-called enemies of the people were executed not only in Kuropaty.

Let us not forget that traces of the crimes were being thoroughly and skillfully concealed. Not only the files were destroyed. The investigation on the Kuropaty case identified more than forty former NKVD personnel. Some of them, including A. Volchek, former chief of the investigations department, I. Kuntsevich, deputy chief of the department, investigators V. Bykhovskiy, V. Yermolayev, K. Kuleshov and others, were criminally indicted. They were sentenced to jail terms. Many of them are already dead or died during the war and the place of residence of others seems impossible to determine. The sentence reads as follows: "For violation of legality."

Yes, they indeed violated the law. That, however, was not why they were detained, but in order to keep the main executioners in Minsk and Moscow looking innocent and pure in the eyes of the people. Look at the impressive chronicle which obtains. The following people's commissars of the Belorussian SSR NKVD were criminally indicted "for violation of socialist legality" and other state crimes:

G. A. Molchanov, former NKVD people's commissar from November 28, 1936, to February 4, 1937. Sentenced to the supreme penalty on November 2, 1937.

B. D. Berman, former NKVD people's commissar from March 4, 1937, to May 22, 1937. Sentenced to the supreme penalty on February 22, 1939.

A. A. Nasedkin, former NKVD people's commissar from May 22, 1937, to December 17, 1938. Sentenced to the supreme penalty on January 25, 1939.

The executioners themselves became the victims of that terrifying Moloch, of the system which today we know as Stalinism. Who will believe that Stalin did not know the reason for which the NKVD people's commissars were being detained in the republic?

The last page of the last volume: "From the resolution on closing the case: Therefore, the investigation has reliably determined that between 1937 and 1941 mass executions by firing [squad] were committed by the NKVD organs in the Kuropaty Forest. It does not seem possible to determine the identity of those who were executed and the specific grounds for the execution (as though such grounds were sought at that time) . . . Taking into consideration the fact that Belorussian SSR NKVD leaders, guilty of such repressions, as well as other individuals were also sentenced to death or have died, the case is therefore closed."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alas, we are unable to determine who was executed at Kuropaty. Why speak of names when we cannot even determine the precise number of victims? The investigators say that no fewer than 30,000 people have been buried in the 510 presumed graves. According to archaeologists, the figure is much higher, based on the fact that there could have been as many as 900 graves but that some of them are under the ring road which circles the edge of the forest.

I am deeply convinced today that a public trial of Stalin should take place as soon as possible. It is not even a question of condemning the cult of Stalin and his main assistants, and rehabilitating the innocent. Stalin and his circle were condemned as early as at the 20th and 22nd CPSU Congresses [of February 1956 and October 1961] and the rehabilitation of those who were repressed goes on. However, some people in our country and abroad believe that it is socialism that is to be blamed for the repressions. The public trial must, in addition to everything else, convincingly prove that socialism has nothing in common with Stalinism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DECLARING STATEHOOD: ISRAEL AND THE PLO

by Daniel Pipes

In perhaps the most important decision ever reached at the United Nations, the General Assembly resolved on November 29, 1947, to divide Palestine into three parts. In the exact wording of the resolution passed: "Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem . . . shall come into existence in Palestine."[1]

As is well known, less than half a year later, on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion stood before the Provisional State Council in Tel Aviv and proclaimed the State of Israel. Much less well known is that a few months after that, on October 1, 1948, Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem, stood before the Palestine National Council in Gaza and declared the existence of the All-Palestine Government (Hukumat 'umum Filastin).

In theory, this "state" already ruled Gaza and would soon control all of Palestine. Accordingly, it was born to lofty proclamations of Palestine's free, democratic, and sovereign nature, and with a full complement of ministers. But the whole undertaking was a sham, for Gaza was run by the Egyptian government of King Faruq, the ministers had nothing to do, and the All-Palestine Government never expanded to all of Palestine. Instead, this state quickly withered into insignificance,[2] *and for the next two decades, the goal of a Palestinian state virtually disappeared. It was seriously revived only after the Six Day War of June 1967.*

Almost exactly forty years after the first proclamation of a Palestinian state, a second took place on November 15, 1988, again before a meeting of the Palestine National Council. This time, Yasir 'Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), declared the existence of a State of Palestine. In some ways, this exercise was even more futile than the first, for the new state was proclaimed in Algiers, at a distance of almost 2,000 miles from the land that would be Palestine; this state controlled not an inch of the territory it claimed; and this one faced a powerful Israeli adversary.[3]

[1] Resolution number 181 (II), *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968), p. 5.

[2] For recent accounts of the All-Palestine Government, see Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 298-303; and Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 23-25. Another Palestinian Arab Congress met under Jordanian aegis in Jericho in December 1948 and proclaimed Palestine "part of Natural Syria." On this meeting, see 'Abdallah at-Tall, *Karithat Filastin: Mudhakkirat 'Abdallah at-Tall* (Cairo: Dar al-Qalam, 1959), p. 378; Avi Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-57* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 13.

[3] Yasir 'Arafat himself had long been skeptical about declaring a Palestinian state. He is quoted telling Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu in early 1978 "that the Palestinians lacked the tradition, unity, and discipline to become a formal state. That a Palestinian state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In brief, the Israeli declaration created a state; the first Palestinian declaration fizzled; and the second was, at best, one step in a complex diplomatic minuet. These fundamental dissimilarities should always be kept in mind in reading what follows, namely the text of the PLO's English translation of its Algiers proclamation and a reprint of the 1948 Israeli document. Thereafter we compare the two, for such an analysis reveals much about the Jewish national movement and its Palestinian doppelgänger.

PLO Proclamation of Independence[4]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. The Palestinian people was never separated from or diminished in its integral bonds with Palestine. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land and its history.

Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national identity, rising even to unimagined levels in its defence, as invasion, the design of others, and the appeal special to Palestine's ancient and luminous place on that eminence where powers and civilizations are joined .... All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political independence. Yet the undying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the land its character, and for the people its national genius.

Nourished by an unfolding series of civilizations and cultures, inspired by a heritage rich in variety and kind, the Palestinian Arab people added to its stature by consolidating a union between itself and its patrimonial Land. The call went out from Temple, Church, and Mosque that to praise the Creator, to celebrate compassion and peace was indeed the message of Palestine. And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave of itself unsparingly in the valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the unbroken chain of our people's rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national independence? And so the people was sustained in the struggle to stay and to prevail.

When in the course of modern times a new order of values was declared with norms and values fair for all, it was the Palestinian

would be a failure from the first day." Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987), p. 28.

[4] "Declaration of Independence" in English translation, distributed on PLO letterhead at the Algiers meeting. The PLO translation into English is not verbatim, but appears to be an attempt to craft a document that resonates for English speakers. Thus, while similar in meaning to the Arabic original, it often differs in nuance. For example, the first line of the Arabic text refers to three "Semitic" faiths, while the English refers to three "monotheistic" faiths. In Arabic, the date of proclamation, November 15, 1988, is hailed as an "immortal day"; in English, it becomes a "day unlike all others."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arab people that had been excluded from the destiny of all other peoples by a hostile array of local and foreign powers. Yet again had unaided justice been revealed as insufficient to drive the world's history along its preferred course.

And it was the Palestinian people, already wounded in its body, that was submitted to yet another type of occupation over which floated the falsehood that "Palestine was a land without people." This notion was foisted upon some in the world, whereas in Article 22 of the Convenant of the League of Nations (1919) and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the community of nations had recognized that all the Arab territories, including Palestine, of the formerly Ottoman provinces were to have granted to them their freedom as provisionally independent nations.

Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in their dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-determination, following upon U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty and national independence.

By stages, the occupation of Palestine and parts of other Arab territories by Israeli forces, the willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes of the majority of Palestine's civilian inhabitants was achieved by organized terror; those Palestinians who remained, as a vestige subjugated in its homeland, were persecuted and forced to endure the destruction of their national life.

Thus were principles of international legitimacy violated. Thus were the Charter of the United Nations and its Resolutions disfigured, for they had recognized the Palestinian Arab people's national rights, including the right of Return, the right to independence, the right to sovereignty over territory and homeland.

In Palestine and on its perimeters, in exile distant and near, the Palestinian Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence. Occupation, massacres and dispersion achieved no gain in the unabated Palestinian consciousness of self and political identity, as Palestinians went forward with their destiny, undeterred and unbowed. And from out of the long years of trial in evermounting struggle, the Palestinian political identity emerged further consolidated and confirmed. And the collective Palestinian national will forged for itself a political embodiment, the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole legitimate representative, recognized by the world community as a whole, as well as by related regional and international institutions. Standing on the very rock of conviction in the Palestinian people's inalienable rights, and on the ground of Arab national consensus, and of inter-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national legitimacy, the PLO led the campaigns of its great people, molded into unity and powerful resolve, one and indivisible in its triumphs, even as it suffered massacres and confinement within and without its home. And so Palestinian resistance was clarified and raised into the forefront of Arab and world awareness, as the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people achieved unique prominence among the world's liberation movements in the modern era.

The massive national uprising, the "Intifada," now intensifying in cumulative scope and power on occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the unflinching resistance of the refugees camps outside the homeland, have elevated consciousness of the Palestinian truth and right into still higher realms of comprehension and actuality. Now at last the curtain has been dropped around a whole epoch of prevarication and negation. The Intifada has set siege to the mind of official Israel, which has for too long relied exclusively upon myth and terror to deny Palestinian existence altogether. Because of the Intifada and its revolutionary irreversible impulse, the history of Palestine has therefore arrived at a decisive juncture.

Whereas the Palestinian people reaffirms most definitively its inalienable rights in the land of its patrimony:

> Now by virtue of natural, and the exercise of those rights historical and legal right[5] and the sacrifices of successive generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their homeland;
>
> In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conference and relying on the authority bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations Organization since 1947;
>
> and in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to self-determination, political independence, and sovereignty over its territory.
>
> The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people; hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine [Dawlat Filastin] on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash Sharif).

The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is for them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a complete equality of

[5] The Arabic original is much simpler: "On the basis of the natural, historical, and legal right of the Palestinian Arab people to its homeland, Palestine, . . ."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions and their human dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself based on freedom of expression and the freedom to form parties. The rights of minorities will duly be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the majority. Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights [for] men or women, on grounds of race, religion, color or sex under the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine's age-old spiritual and civilizational heritage of tolerance and religious co-existence.

The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, at one with that nation in heritage and civilization, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, progress, democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by the Charter of the League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with each other shall be strengthened. It calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance the emergence in reality of our state, to mobilize potential, and to intensify efforts whose goal is to end Israeli occupation.

The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It further announces itself to be a peace-loving State, in adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence. It will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace based upon justice and the respect of rights so that humanity's potential for well-being may be assured, an earnest competition for excellence be maintained, and in which confidence in the future will eliminate fear for those who are just and for whom justice is the only recourse.

In the context of its struggle for peace in the Land of Love and Peace, the State of Palestine calls upon the United Nations to bear special responsibility for the Palestinian Arab people and its homeland. It calls upon all peace- and freedom-loving peoples and states to assist it in the attainment of its objectives, to provide it with security, to alleviate the tragedy of its people, and to help it terminate Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories.

The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter and resolutions. Without prejudice to its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence, it therefore rejects the threat or use of force, violence, and terrorism against its territorial integrity, or political indepen-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence, as it also rejects their use against the territorial integrity of other states.

Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up, and irradiated by the light emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard of freedom, our children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those whose ties to our sacred soil are confirmed in camp, village and town. We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian woman, guardian of sustenance and life, keeper of our people's perennial flame. To the souls of our sainted martyrs, to the whole of our Palestinian Arab people, to all free and honorable peoples everywhere, we pledge that our struggle shall be continued until the occupation ends, and the foundation of our sovereignty and independence shall be fortified accordingly.

Therefore, we call upon our great people to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and defend it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and dignity in that homeland, which is a homeland for the free, now and always.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

> Say: "O God, Master of the Kingdom,
> Thou givest the Kingdom to whom Thou wilt,
> and seizest the Kingdom from whom Thou wilt,
> Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt, and Thou
> abasest whom Thou wilt; in Thy hand
> is the good. Thou art powerful
> over everything."
> Sadaqa Allahu Al-Azim.

Israeli Proclamation of Independence[6]

The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world.

Exiled from the Land of Israel the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom.

[6] Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, 4th ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 125-28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Impelled by this historic association, Jews strove throughout the centuries to go back to the land of their fathers and regain their statehood. In recent decades they returned in their masses. They reclaimed the wilderness, revived their language, built cities and villages, and established a vigorous and ever-growing community, with its own economic and cultural life. They sought peace, yet were prepared to defend themselves. They brought the blessings of progress to all inhabitants of the country and looked forward to sovereign independence.

In the year 1897 the First Zionist Congress, inspired by Theodor Herzl's vision of the Jewish State, proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national revival in their own country.

This right was acknowledged by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and re-affirmed by the Mandate of the League of Nations, which gave explicit international recognition to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to reconstitute their National Home.

The recent holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in Europe, proved anew the need to solve the problem of the homelessness and lack of independence of the Jewish people by means of the re-establishment of the Jewish State, which would open the gates to all Jews and endow the Jewish people with equality of status among the family of nations.

The survivors of the disastrous slaughter in Europe, and also Jews from other lands, have not desisted from their efforts to reach Eretz-Yisrael, in face of difficulties, obstacles and perils; and have not ceased to urge their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their ancestral land.

In the second World War the Jewish people in Palestine made their full contribution to the struggle of the freedom-loving nations against the Nazi evil. The sacrifices of their soldiers and their war effort gained them the right to rank with the nations which founded the United Nations.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The General Assembly called upon the inhabitants of the country to take all the necessary steps on their part to put the plan into effect. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their independent State is unassailable.

It is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign State.

Accordingly we, the members of the National Council, representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the World Zionist Movement, are met together in solemn assembly today, the day of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

termination of the British Mandate for Palestine; and by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people and of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

We hereby proclaim the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called Medinath Yisrael (The State of Israel).

We hereby declare that, as from the termination of the Mandate at midnight, the 14th-15th May, 1948, and pending the setting up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by the Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October, 1948, the National Council shall act as the Provisional State Council, and that the National Administration shall constitute the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, which shall be known as Israel.

The State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture; will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and will loyally uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The State of Israel will be ready to co-operate with the organs and representatives of the United Nations in the implementation of the Resolution of the Assembly of November 29, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the Economic Union over the whole of Palestine.

We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building of its State and to admit Israel into the family of nations.

In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions — provisional and permanent.

We extend our hand in peace and neighbourliness to all the neighbouring states and their peoples, and invite them to co-operate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all. The State of Israel is prepared to make its contribution to the progress of the Middle East as a whole.

Our call goes out to the Jewish people all over the world to rally to our side in the task of immigration and development, and to stand by us in the great struggle for the fulfillment of the dream of generations for the redemption of Israel.

With trust in the Rock of Israel, we set our hand to this Declaration, at this Session of the Provisional State Council, on the soil

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Homeland, in the city of Tel-Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the fifth of Iyar, 5708, the fourteenth of May, 1948.

Differences

Differences in approach between the two declarations are readily apparent. The Israeli document wholeheartedly accepts General Assembly Resolution 181. In contrast, the PLO document hedges, blaming it for Palestinian dispersion and loss of national rights, only grudgingly allowing that it "still provides" the best basis for a Palestinian state. In brief, PLO leaders continue not to endorse Resolution 181 as a whole; they accept only the legitimacy it affords their movement.

Whereas the Israeli charter proffers friendship to the local Arabs, calling upon them "to preserve the ways of peace," the PLO declaration exudes hostility to the "organized terror" of the Israeli forces. Similarly, the Israelis offer good will to the neighboring states, but the PLO says not a word about this (not surprisingly — given its historic ambitions vis-à-vis both Israel and Jordan).[7]

The Israeli declaration, which does not once mention the divinity, is purely secular in spirit; the PLO declaration refers to God six times and closes with a verse from the Qur'an.

The documents also differ in tone. The Israeli resolution is restrained, its language cool, the tone uplifting — all of which suggest calm pride and sober optimism. In contrast, the PLO resolution reverberates with the memory of injustices rendered and grievances recalled. Long, impassioned sentences mix the language of pain ("willed dispossession and expulsion") with assertions of romantic nationalism ("long years of trial in evermounting struggle," "one and indivisible in its triumphs"). Note, too, how very differently the two documents draw to a close:

With trust in the Rock of Israel, we set our hand to this Declaration.

Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been illuminated and our land given life. Our hearts are lifted

[7] On those ambitions, see Asher Susser, *Double Jeopardy: PLO Strategy toward Israel and Jordan* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> up, and irradiated by the light emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard of freedom, our children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those whose ties to our sacred soil are confined in camp, village and town. We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian woman, guardian of sustenance and life, keeper of our people's perennial flame.

This contrast in styles caused one Palestinian, the novelist Anton Shammas, to judge the Algiers text inadequate. Whoever wrote the PLO declaration, Shammas suggested,

> should have relied more on the Ben-Gurion text; some of its genuine, lean grandeur might have come through his version; and some of its concinnity, its concise linguistic approach, might have shortened his version by a (redundant) third, or 500 words. Too little butter spread on too large a pita.[8]

What explains these contrasts in the texts? Circumstances. Israelis were acutely aware of two facts: the historic import of creating the first Jewish state in two millennia; and the invasion of Arab armies set to begin within a few hours. Under these conditions, their text aimed less at raising emotions than at making a declaration for the record. In contrast, the PLO proclamation served only as a diplomatic ploy. It neither marked much of a historical event (especially when contrasted with the Israeli precedent) nor was it a major turning point in the drive for a state. (The next steps included an unsuccessful effort to procure an American visa for Yasir 'Arafat, a speech to the United Nations in Geneva, and an opening of dialogue with the U.S. government.) Given the PLO's predicament, it made obvious good sense to ride the emotional high road.

Similarities

More striking, however, are the points of affinity. These are so numerous, they seem to confirm the rumor that Mahmud Darwish, who drafted the PLO document, kept the Israeli declaration at hand

[8] Anton Shammas, "Palestinians Liberate a Dream," *The Los Angeles Times*, November 21, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while he was composing. Similarities can be seen in subject matter, organization, and even in specific phrasing.

The PLO document repeatedly imitates its Israeli precursor almost to the word. Note three points in particular: both appeal to their hinterlands, promulgate a law of return, and proclaim equal rights for all.

Our call goes out to the Jewish people all over the world to rally to our side.	The State of Palestine . . . calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance the emergence and reality of our state.
The State of Israel will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion.	The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be.[9]
[The state] will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex.	Governance will be based on principles of social justice, equality and nondiscrimination . . . on grounds of race, religion, color, or sex.

Even where wording differs, the subject matter remains similar. Here are five more themes common to the two documents:

Suffering. *David Ben-Gurion devotes three paragraphs to the effects of the holocaust suffered by the Jews in World War II; Yasir 'Arafat laces his entire statement with references to "occupation, massacres, and dispersion" causing the Palestinian people to be "wounded in its body."*

A nation. *Each document claims the sovereignty that nationalist ideology promises each people: the Zionists see this as a "natural right" of the Jewish people; the PLO refers to the "national rights" of the Palestinians.*

Connection to the land. *Both emphasize connections to that piece of territory alternately called the Land of Israel or Palestine. Predictably, the Israeli document focuses on two eras, biblical antiquity and recent decades, while the PLO document stresses that Palestinians were "never separated" from the land.*

International recognition. *The Israeli proclamation claims "explicit international recognition to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to reconstitute their National*

[9] This assertion clashes head-on with the Hashemite policy of considering Palestinians in Jordan as Jordanians first.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Home." Similarly, the PLO holds that "the community of nations" recognized Palestine as a "provisionally independent" nation.

In support of these assertions, each declaration refers to two documents dating from the First World War era. The Israelis note the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and the League of Nations' July 1922 appointment of Great Britain as the mandatory power in Palestine. The first of these called for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," while the second endorsed this formulation verbatim.[10] *As though in direct answer, the PLO resolution refers to two parallel documents — the League of Nations Covenant of June 1919 and the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923. The trouble, from a Palestinian point of view, is that neither of these documents specifically mentions Palestine or the Palestinians by name, nor do they even implicitly refer to them!*[11]

The United Nations. *The Israelis promise cooperation with the "organs and representatives of the United Nations," while the PLO declares its "commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations." (Ironically, promises in the two charters should have been exchanged. As a U.N. pariah, the Israeli government does not often cooperate with the United Nations; while the PLO has not infrequently transgressed the world body's principles.)*

Beyond these similarities, the two documents also resemble each other in what they leave out. Neither makes any mention of borders. Nor does either refer to the well-being of its citizens (in striking contrast to phrasing in the American Declaration of Independence about "the pursuit of happiness"). As Shammas gloomily observes, "People in the Middle East would settle for a plot of land; happiness for them remains yet another distant dream."

Close Palestinian imitation of its Israeli model should come as no surprise, for the Palestinian nationalist movement has long shadowed Zionism in ways small and large. The PLO emulates the World Zionist Organization as the umbrella under which all factions cooperate. Specific agencies (such as the National Association of Arab-Americans and the Holy Land Fund) exactly mimic their Zionist precursors (the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Jewish Fund). Yasir 'Arafat followed Chaim Weizmann's example as the ever-traveling interlocutor with the outside world and the factions of his own movement.[12] *Too, the PLO document reveals with special clarity just how directly the Palestinian nationalist movement draws on its Israeli model.*

[10] For the two texts, see J.C. Hurewitz, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975-79), pp. 106, 306.

[11] Ibid., pp. 179-80, 326-37.

[12] For these and other parallels, see Sadik J. al-Azm, "Palestinian Zionism," *Die Welt des Islams*, 28 (1988), pp. 90-98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the end, the many parallels between the two declarations confirm the old truth that history produces documents more than documents produce history.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Are you concerned about today's social and political problems?

SOCIETY is the magazine you have been waiting for!


Society
Planning, Power & Politics
White Trash • Nicole Hahn Rafter
Encounter Groups Revisited • Kurt W. Back
Commerce in Fetal Tissue • Emanuel D. Thorne
Communications Revolution • Rothman & Turner
Asian Democracy • Nathan Keyfitz
Psychohistory & Liberalism • Bruce Mazlish
The Death Penalty • Nathaniel J. Pallone

Since 1963, SOCIETY has been at the center of debate on the major social and political issues of our day. Operating out of the deep conviction that real-world problems matter, SOCIETY explores the changing needs and concerns of a sophisticated readership that expects fearless, penetrating analysis of the social attitudes and political beliefs underlying the headlines of the moment.

Six times a year, SOCIETY brings you clear thinking and perceptive analysis, presented in readable articles and special features by leading social scientists. It's the publication of choice for those who want to look beyond their own personal and professional worlds, into a larger arena where key thinkers address fundamental issues that concern us all.

Editor-in-Chief
IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ
Senior Editors
HOWARD S. BECKER
AARON WILDAVSKY
Managing Editor
MICHELE TEITELBAUM
Special Editors
NATHANIEL J. PALLONE
(Book Review Editor)
DOUGLAS HARPER
(Photo Editor)
ARTHUR ASA BERGER
(Film and Television Editor)

ADVISORY BOARD
DANIEL YANKELOVICH, The Daniel Yankelovich Group SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Stanford University MICHAEL CURTIS, Rutgers University CHARLES C. MOSKOS, Northwestern University

Associate Editors
LINDA H. AIKEN
PETER L. BERGER
AMITAI ETZIONI
ALLEN D. GRIMSHAW
JEANNE GUILLEMIN
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER
JAMES E. KATZ
NATHAN KEYFITZ
MARCEL C. LaFOLLETTE
GERHARD LENSKI
WILLIAM McCORD
WILSON CAREY McWILLIAMS
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS
KENNETH PREWITT
RAY C. RIST
KENNETH W. THOMPSON
BERNARD L. WEINSTEIN
CAROL H. WEISS
JAMES D. WRIGHT

1988/89 Subscription Rates
Individuals: $30/yr; $55/2 yrs; $75/3 yrs
Institutions: $60/yr; $105/2 yrs; $145/3 yrs
Outside U.S. add $15/yr for surface mail; $35/yr for airmail
Published bimonthly, six times a year ISSN 0147-2011

transaction publishers
Rutgers-The State University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903
201-932-2280

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Essays

THE PATH NOT TAKEN

by Deepak Lal

The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. By Hernando de Soto. New York: Harper and Row, 1989. 271 pp. $22.95.

The roots of Hernando de Soto's book lie in a number of studies and surveys conducted by the author and his colleagues at the Instituto Libertad y Democracia (ILD) in Peru. But the results of those investigations have now flourished into this internationally important work, with its significant implications for both development policy and foreign aid.

De Soto's studies focused on what economists have called the "informal urban" sector of the Peruvian economy. Previous researchers had emphasized the low productivity, wage flexibility, and high levels of underemployment among "the informals" — petty traders, small scale producers, self-employed artisans, and those who provide such services as shoe shining. For the most part, such researchers had looked upon this informal sector as simply a sponge, soaking up rural migrants whose hopes of finding an unskilled job at a relatively high wage were thwarted by the limited number of these jobs in the modern industrial sector. At the same time, however, the previous researchers had assumed that most informals — apart from such obvious exceptions as prostitutes — were engaged in legal activities, and were not a part of the black market endemic to many Third World countries.

By contrast, de Soto and his colleagues found and documented that, at least in Lima, much of the informal activity is illegal. The reason, they learned, is that unskilled rural migrants face exorbitant costs and tremendous bureaucratic corruption when trying to enter into legal trading and production activities. Finally, and happily, de Soto has shown that this informal activity is far more productive than previously thought, though obviously not as productive as it might be if it did not suffer the disadvantages of illegality.

In what is perhaps his most original work, de Soto documents exactly how the complicated and costly legal procedures for setting

Deepak Lal is professor of political economy at University College London.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

up small businesses drive unskilled but highly entrepreneurial rural migrants to provide services outside the law. For example, the ILD found that it takes nearly seven years for people of humbler origins to acquire legal housing in urban areas. Similarly, when ILD's researchers attempted to set up a legal small business (a two-machine sewing operation), it took them 289 days to negotiate the necessary bureaucratic procedures. According to de Soto, the cost (in terms of profits foregone) was "thirty-two times the monthly minimum living wage." Likewise, for existing businesses to remain legal costs about 75 percent of potential profits, with 40 percent of a firm's administrative employees' time devoted to complying with bureaucratic procedures.

ILD surveys indicate the staggering result of this bureaucratization: 48 percent of Peru's economically active population and about 61 percent of its work hours are devoted to these illegal activities, which contribute an estimated 39 percent of the country's gross domestic product. In Lima, about 50 percent of the population lives in homes built illegally by the informal sector and 95 percent of all urban transportation is provided by black market operators.

Despite this evident dynamism, however, the costs of illegality are not to be underestimated. For example, despite the various extralegal methods for devising and enforcing the contracts essential to commerce, the threat of state prosecution constantly hangs over the head of each informal worker. Hence, various growth-promoting techniques — such as the efficient formation and use of capital, and the adoption of an optimum scale of production — are denied to the informals. They have neither legal ownership of their property, nor access to credit and insurance markets.

Consequently, once informals have a foothold in a certain illegal activity, there is an incentive for them to organize and exert political pressure for legal recognition of the status quo. Yet that is, in a sense, just another reflection of the problem. In the existing legal system, laws can be bought and sold. Much effort which could otherwise be spent on productive activity is instead devoted to the pursuit of executive rulings which provide unearned income ("rents") for the few at the expense of everyone else.

Although it is now part of the conventional wisdom of the economics of development to note that much of the statism found in developing countries leads to such unproductive "rent-seeking," de Soto adds two novel contributions to the discussion.

First, he demonstrates that this situation results from the essentially mercantilist mentality that pervades the Third World. It does not arise from a conspiracy by the right or the left: both types of government have followed the policy of selling favors. Nor does the situation owe its existence to the form of government, democratic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or dictatorial. Ninety-nine percent of the Peruvian government's rules affecting economic returns are formulated at the discretion of the executive, and hence are not subject to public consultation or control.

Mercantilism transcends such categories. "The typical European mercantilist state granted privileges to favored producers and consumers by means of regulations, subsidies, taxes and licenses," de Soto notes. And he goes on to observe that, in Peru and in many other developing countries, the law has similarly become a major avenue of redistribution, leading to the development of "redistributive combines" that aim to influence the government and hence to obtain a redistribution favorable to their members. These combines, whose members would otherwise have to engage in wealth-creating activity, devote themselves to competing for the unearned incomes the state can bestow.

As an interesting and important addendum to this point, de Soto argues that wealthy people in developing countries like Peru are *not* adherents of a genuine free-market economy, which requires equality before the law and equal access to it even by people with little means. Instead, Third World elites are closer to the elites of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, who sought exclusive monopolies and other favorable state interventions in return for financing the governments of their benefactors. De Soto writes:

> As a result, the law's beneficiaries are no longer individuals but successful combines .... [T]his characterized the mercantilist states of earlier periods, where groups — guilds, aristocratic families, or large commercial associations — and not individuals had rights. It is this that distinguishes [Peru's economy] from today's market economies.

He continues:

> All of this causes discouragement, uncertainty, and corruption, and fosters social unrest. In the redistributive State, discouragement sets in when, from an early age, Peruvians realize that wealth is not so much the result of labor as of political wheeling and dealing .... Uncertainty is constant in the redistributive state, for Peruvians are aware that the executive branch, which issues some 110 regulations and decisions each working day, can change the rules of the game at any moment without prior consultation or debate. Peruvian law is unstable and unpredictable because it depends on who wins the redistributive wars.

Having established how mercantilism afflicts Peru, de Soto's second major contribution lies in drawing illuminating parallels between the decline of European mercantilism and the current Peruvian situation. Most economic historians, he observes, link the end of European mercantilism to the mass migration to the cities resulting from the growth in population following the decline in plagues, and from the reduction in rural incomes relative to those in urban areas. The rural migrants moved to the cities for the contacts that could

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be made with "the powers that redistributed the national wealth and where the most protected industrialization was occurring."

De Soto continues:

> Then, as now, institutional rigidity and excessive administrative obstacles and confusion prevented the formal private sector or the public sector in the cities from creating jobs as fast as they were needed to absorb the arriving peasants. Informals began to proliferate in Europe. Legions of peddlers invaded the streets, smuggled and illegally produced goods invaded the markets, and illegal suburbs flourished on the cities' outskirts. Persecution of the informals by the authorities caused such marginalization and dissatisfaction among them that there were outbreaks of violence. Then, as now, as the informal economy grew, the burden of taxation began to fall on an increasingly narrow sector of the population, the formal sector, and it had no choice but to reduce its costs and taxes by buying a large proportion of its inputs from informals, creating increasingly large public deficits. As a result, both informals and formals began to disobey the law, triggering the political instability that constant lawbreaking engenders and undermining the authority and legitimacy of the mercantilist state.

De Soto thus shows how the country-to-city migration that accompanied the industrial revolution in Europe threatened and eventually destroyed the cozy relationship between favored merchants and the state. The growth of the informal economy then led to what I have elsewhere described as the very "unMarxian withering away of the State." A similar phenomenon is currently putting pressures on Third World states to move away from their past mercantilist policies.

But the political outcome in Europe varied, de Soto argues, depending upon whether or not the state accommodated the popular pressures for fuller participation in urban economic life. In cases such as England, state-erected monopolistic barriers were abolished, and a peaceful transition to democracy occurred. In other cases, like France and Russia, popular pressures for economic *Lebensraum* were not accommodated, and revolution ensued. That is why, in opposition to the Marxist "Shining Path," which seeks the violent overthrow of the present Peruvian regime, de Soto offers his "Other Path," a democratic alternative for Peru and other Third World countries currently wrestling with political and economic dilemmas.

This Other Path consists of removing the remaining barriers to participation in mainstream economic activity erected by neo-mercantilist states in the Third World. For this task, it is not sufficient to concentrate on reforming macroeconomic policy or trade policy; it is also necessary to revise existing legal systems. Adjustment assistance offered by foreign donors to Third World countries should not be contingent solely upon conditions concerning the money supply, level and structure of tariffs, or sale of public enterprises to the private sector, but should also insist upon examination and reform of existing legal systems. For this task no better consultants are available than de Soto's ILD!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, developing countries concerned about reducing urban poverty should not rely on administrative methods (for instance, those favored by "basic needs" advocates). Such methods are inevitably political, and their fruits are often hijacked by the existing mercantilist interest groups. Rather, priority must be given to the removal of the existing bureaucratic and legal shackles, which prevent poor but highly entrepreneurial people from participating legally in the diverse economic activities currently offered in many developing countries. Law and economics are therefore inextricably entwined in the diagnosis of the Third World's continuing stagnation — and in the prescription for its renewal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE OUTER LIMIT OF GLASNOST?

by Nicolai N. Petro

Inogo ne dano: Perestroyka: glasnost', demokratiya, sotsializm [There is no alternative: perestroyka: glasnost, democratization, socialism]. Edited by Yuriy N. Afanas'yev. Moscow: Progress, 1988. 675 pp. 3 rubles, 10 kopecks.

The thirty-four contributors to this critique of perestroika constitute a *who's who* of the Soviet intelligentsia. More precisely, these prominent sociologists, economists, philologists, historians, scientists, journalists, and writers come from that portion of the intellectual elite that embraces perestroika as the official policy of the Communist party. The editor, rector of the History and Archives Institute, has therefore excluded from his volume opponents of Gorbachev's reforms, skeptics who see the reforms as a short-lived thaw, and radicals who support broader, deeper changes. In effect, this is the "official" frank critique of perestroika.

Inogo ne dano is also, in its own right, a controversial piece of perestroika's brief history. Prior to the 19th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meeting in June 1988, ten thousand copies of *Inogo ne dano* were printed, the intent being to distribute this reformers' manifesto to delegates. But according to delegate Elem Klimov, secretary of the Board of the USSR Cinema Workers' Union, the books were never received.[1] Since the conference ended, ninety thousand more copies have been printed, but this is a mere drop in the ocean and the suspicion has been voiced in the Soviet press that conservatives have somehow managed to block the book's distribution.

However small the book's readership, its publication marks an event in the evolution of perestroika. Afanas'yev gave his contributors an unrestricted mandate: "Write what you think is necessary. What you think about the prospects of the new policies of the CPSU, about who and what hinders their realization." The result demonstrates that perestroika has evolved from a program of economic revitalization into a national catharsis, a soul-searching scrutiny. Its scope includes recent history, social developments, culture, even personal values — all examined in the effort to determine who is to blame for the country's dismal past.

[1] Vera Tolz, "*Inogo ne dano* — A Manifesto of Soviet Reformers," *Radio Free Liberty Research Bulletin*, September 15, 1988, pp. 1-7.

Nicolai N. Petro is Thornton D. Hooper Fellow in International Affairs at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Contents

The essay by Andrei Sakharov, though nominally in the first section on political and economic reform, must be considered separately, for it is something of a showpiece. As ever, Sakharov stands out by dint of his uncompromising honesty. He makes the only reference to the Gulag Archipelago (the national network of prison and labor camps) and to its continued existence. He is one of only three authors to refer to the war in Afghanistan, which he terms "a threat to peace in the entire world" and which, he says, demonstrates the danger and irrationality of a totalitarian society. Sakharov also attacks the KGB for its persecution of dissidents and calls for an inquest into the ties of the KGB with terrorist organizations around the world. He calls for rescission of the death penalty, unconditional freedom for peasants to leave collective farms, and complete freedom of movement within the USSR. Finally, he says, the term of military service should be halved, as should the number of persons serving in the armed forces. Such boldness stands out, and this is revealing. None of the other authors, though given a mandate to "write what you think necessary," takes such potentially dangerous stands.

After Sakharov, the most original contributor to this section is Mikhail Malyutin. He links the growth of "informal organizations" with the budding of public opinion and points out that the informal movement got started in 1982, well before Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to power in 1985. In cities with a population of over one million, he writes, such groups now involve an astounding 30 to 40 percent of young adults in the seventeen to thirty-five age range. Malyutin distinguishes between young people who join informal organizations mostly for social reasons, and those who view such organizations as part of a struggle to obtain greater social justice. The latter, whom he terms *samodel'shchiki* (self-starters), tend to be in their twenties and thirties, and so older than the former.

The self-starters have made the informal organizations increasingly political and interactive, especially the ecological groups, which include remnants of the 1970s human rights movement and thus provide some historical continuity within the opposition. While Malyutin's study concentrates on groups with socialist politics, he acknowledges a "bloc" with non-socialist views that must be considered "a real factor." Malyutin himself rejects a multi-party system as not politically expedient *(vopros ne stol'ko printsipa, skol'ko politicheskoi tselesoobraznosti),* but he does urge the removal of most restrictions on autonomous political activity. Ignoring an informal organization may convert it into a catalyst, he warns, "even a detonator of sudden eruptions of social activity."

A second group of essays focuses on Soviet history, and especially Stalin's role. They reopen the question of how much Lenin and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other Bolshevik leaders contributed, wittingly or unwittingly, to Stalin's rule. Most intriguing here is a piece by the literary critic Igor' Vinogradov, who asks whether truth can be arrived at in stages. With remarkable honesty, he calls for a full and immediate disclosure of all Stalin's crimes, saying this is the only way to recognize the full impact of Stalinism and to move beyond it. Vinogradov devotes considerable attention to the importance of giving complete political expression to public opinion. Side-stepping the question of whether the USSR should have parties other than the Communist party, he argues in favor of allowing the formation of "political social organizations" around spiritual or cultural principles.

A third group of essays, "Return to the Future," looks at the cultural component of perestroika. D. Furman and Vyacheslav Ivanov argue that if perestroika is to succeed, it must reintegrate the "lost names" of Soviet culture, such as those inspired by religious thought: Nikolai Berdyayev, Pavel Florenskiy, and Mikhail Bakhtin. A. Nuykin stresses the need for a common sense of where the Soviet Union is going, a more concrete plan for perestroika, and the popular confidence needed to achieve it.

A Limited View of Perestroika

Had it appeared just two years earlier, *Inogo ne dano* would have stood at the forefront of political debate in the USSR. But coming when it did, at a moment of vigorous debate in the official and unofficial press, at a time when the sacred cows attacked in the book have already been skewered, it serves principally to confirm the lag between official and unofficial discussions. The official criticism in *Inogo ne dano* looks anemic in comparison to the many discussions in *samizdat* publications and in public forums organized by informal organizations. The official critics leave much unsaid.

This comes through most clearly when one examines the treatment of issues with current political ramifications: Lenin's responsibility for Stalinist institutions, the possibility of a multi-party system, the war in Afghanistan, the rehabilitation of political émigrés and domestic dissidents, and the role of popular initiative.

Take the historical quarantine of Lenin — the attempt to isolate him from the infection of Stalinism. Much of the current historical analysis in the Soviet Union seems to reduce Lenin's acceptable legacy to his New Economic Policy, the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, and the few months before his death. Afanas'yev, Bovin, and Moiseyev, however, continue to insist that socialism remains by definition the most humane path of social development and the only one acceptable for Soviet society. Clearly, this is dogma, not argument. Elsewhere, Bovin himself has written that the "new political thinking" is a creative process "not knowing ideological boundaries . . . To reject a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priori any view only because they are stated and developed by non-Marxists or anti-Marxists means demonstrating the narrowness of one's own views."[2] In this instance, however, Bovin was speaking of foreigners who hold such views. Are we to assume, therefore, that under perestroika what is acceptable for foreigners is not acceptable for Soviet citizens? Likewise, the general dismissal of a multi-party system seems contrived. Some, like Vinogradov, apparently wish to allow parties to form, but designate them with the more politically acceptable appellative "social organizations." Others, like Malyutin, admit frankly that it is just not politically "expedient" to urge such a change now.

Surprisingly, given recent descriptions by Soviet sociologists of as many as two hundred different orientations among informal groups, many of *Inogo ne dano*'s authors continue to refer to the absence of a social basis for other parties.[3] Yet, in reality, several political parties have already formed. The Democratic Union party (north-west regional section) has been particularly active in Leningrad and Moscow.[4] Last December 17, also in Moscow, thirty-two delegates from around the country formed the Christian-Democratic party, and named noted Russian nationalist and human rights activist Vladimir Osipov to head it; a Social-Democratic party is due to be formed later this year after an organizational conference in February.[5]

And without a political counterbalance, perestroika can go only as far as the Communist party allows. How can the much-touted objective of *razgosudarstveliniye* (withdrawal of the state from most aspects of social life) occur under one-party rule? As the widely respected economic commentator Vasiliy Selyunin (also a contributor to *Inogo ne dano*) remarked during last year's party conference, "by its very name the Communist Party cannot represent the interests of the cooperatives and the private sector." What is needed, he said, is "another political party with another orientation" that can guarantee real freedom of discussion.[6] With the guidance of government and all society entrusted to a single party, after all, what prevents that party's leaders from deciding that what is best for society is what is best for the party, rather than vice versa? Perhaps, as many of the

[2] A. Bovin, "Novoye myshleniye — novaya politika," *Kommunist* (June 1988), p. 118.

[3] The sociological literature is discussed by Olga Alexandrova, *Informelle Gruppen und Perestrojka in der Sowjetunion: Eine Bestandsaufnahme,* Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 18, 1988. pp. 1, 39-47.

[4] The activities of the Democratic Union have been mentioned in several journals and newspapers, including *Vechernaya Moskva* (September 3, 1988); *Leningradskaya pravda* (October 4, 1988); *Vecherniy Leningrad* (December 5, 1988); and *Argumenty i fakty* (No. 44, 1988).

[5] "Paris Group Announces New Party in USSR," Agence France-Presse, January 6, 1989.

[6] Paul Quinn-Judge, "Why One Reformer is Downbeat," *The Christian Science Monitor,* June 28, 1988, p. 32.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authors hope, a tolerance of diversity can develop within the party, but there are few indications this is occurring spontaneously.

The war in Afghanistan is a case in point. The war has received considerable, albeit one-sided, attention in the media, but only recently has the decision to introduce troops been criticized publicly. It is illustrative of the limits of glasnost or the distance of the authors from popular concerns that a topic so deeply troubling to people in the Soviet Union — Boris Yel'tsyn reportedly remarked that one third of the letters received by the Moscow City party organization dealt with the war — is touched upon so briefly in this volume.

Another limit in official perestroika is revealed by the failure to seriously discuss prominent émigré and opposition figures, most notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn continues to be a litmus test of official toleration, for his case implicitly raises the key issue of those who question socialism: What role are they to play in the new Soviet society? Are they not to be tolerated? Are they to be intellectually tolerated but effectively disenfranchised by a one-party system? Or are they to be fully welcomed into the debate? When literary critic Yelena Chukovskaya published in *Knizhnoye obozreniye* a letter calling Solzhenitsyn an early advocate of glasnost, it evoked more than two hundred responses, overwhelmingly favorable to publishing the author in his homeland and inviting him to return to become part of the process of democratization.[7] But from the authors of *Inogo ne dano*, this subject draws only silence.

A serious shortcoming of *Inogo ne dano* is the authors' dependence on elites and their corresponding lack of confidence in popular aspirations. Indeed, the first thing that strikes a reader of *Inogo ne dano* is its single-minded focus on the party as the source of reform. Nearly all the authors expect the Soviet political leadership to enact perestroika from the top. Despite some encouraging words for independent initiatives from informal organizations (except the reactionary organization Pamyat'), most of the authors see independent groups as playing little more than supporting roles. Restricting the elaboration of reforms to the top, however, smacks more of a desire to control social forces than to unleash them. There is certainly no dearth of opinion about what needs to be done among the over seventy non-official journals published in Leningrad and Moscow alone, but for these views to be heard, as economist Leonid Batkin writes in his contribution to *Inogo ne dano*, the party leadership's attitudes toward differing opinions must change. Glasnost must be

[7] Noted supporters of these proposals included historians Ya. Etinger, and Sergey Burin, literary critic Vyacheslav Ivanov (a contributor to *Inogo ne dano*), mathematician Igor' Shafarevich, and historian Natan Eidelman. "Vernut' Solzhenitsynu grazhdanstvo SSSR," *Knizhnoye obozreniye*, August 5, 1988. "Uchit'sya terpimosti k zhivushchim," *Knizhnoye obozreniye*, August 12, 1988. "Zavershayem obsuzhdeniye stat'i E. Chukovskoy," *Knizhnoye obozreniye*, September 2, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

replaced by freedom of speech, and there must be legal guarantees for the expression of opinions that are at variance with the official view.

In addition, some of the authors insist that the scientific intelligentsia should play a key role in shaping political policies. Moiseyev, Burlatskiy, and Furman even urge the party to institutionalize an advisory "senate" of scientific wise men, a scheme that could easily become a Platonic mechanism for circumventing democracy. What authority and what accountability these wise men would have is not specified, but the proposal suggests a naive and somewhat undemocratic assumption that an educated elite is better qualified to set fundamental policy for the country than are its own citizens. In contrast, the myriad informal cultural associations and popular "village prose" writers stress the need to listen more carefully to the voice of the people, beginning with greater respect for traditional values the regime has scorned, including religion. As Professor A. Tsipko recently argued in a popular Soviet publication, one cannot create a government of laws while clinging to the belief that there are classes and people who do not recognize their own interests and must be dragged by their ears to happiness; nor can freedom of discussion and thought be preserved while rejecting the culture of the past.[8] Ksenya Myalo, writing in the nation's leading cultural magazine *Novyi mir*, put it even more directly. Political leaders must reconnect the "broken thread" to the vital historical and cultural roots of the pre-revolutionary past. Without proper appreciation for these values, she argues, no government can ever hope to gain popular support for its policies.[9]

In sum, the authors of *Inogo ne dano* seek what Gorbachev seeks: to modernize the economy and pluralize the political system, while maintaining a high degree of central planning and a single-party system. Even Gorbachev's most ardent supporters will admit that, so far, this has not proved possible. And it has not proved possible because it is a project wracked by contradictions. A book such as this would have been the place to begin tackling those contradictions. But that is not what the authors have given their country. One can only hope, therefore, that *Inogo ne dano* will not be the height of radical thinking among the Soviet intelligentsia, but one step along the way to a truly free and open discussion of the Soviet future.

[8] A. Tsipko, "Istoki stalinizma," *Nauka i zhizn'*, No. 11, (1988), p. 11.
[9] Ksenya Myalo, "Oborvannaya nit'" *Novyi mir*, August 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

In our Spring Issue:

EDWARD LUTTWAK
on whether we need a new grand strategy:
"If the cruel pattern of Russian history reasserts itself, Gorbachev the autocrat, embittered by the failure of his own liberalization, is the likeliest successor of Gorbachev the reformer."

•

ANTHONY HARTLEY
on Europe after 1992:
"Between the Soviet Union and West Germany there is the potential for a bargain that could mean the break-up of the European Community."

•

DANIEL PIPES
on terrorism and the Syrian connection:
"Assad's hallmark is the closely calculated, low key, and far-sighted use of terror."

•

RICHARD PERLE
on Strobe Talbott:
"Mock horror . . . reminds one of Claude Rains, shocked to discover that there was gambling going on in Rick's Cafe in Casablanca."

•

PETER RODMAN
on William Shawcross:
"Anyone who has earned the wrath of Noam Chomsky can't be all bad."

And much more in the readable foreign policy magazine.
Subscribe Now and

Have Our Wits About You

THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Subscription Department
P.O. Box 3000, Dept. NI
Denville, NJ 07834

Order Today
Call toll-free
1-800-543-4860
Dept. 117

2OR89

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

AFGHANISTAN: THE NEXT STEPS

To the Editor:

Barnett R. Rubin's assessment of the political situation in Afghanistan and his prescription for a solution call for a point-by-point discussion beyond the scope of this letter. Briefly, his analyses are based on a number of fundamental errors — in methodology, semantics, premises, and assumptions — as well as errors concerning cultural facts, political-military realities, and ongoing events.

Rubin all too often confuses words with deeds, ignores experience, accepts rhetoric for results, and takes declarations of honorable intent at face value. He states as undisputed truth propositions that are very much in dispute, e.g., that the Soviets withdrew 50 percent of their forces from Afghanistan by the August 1988 deadline *without replacing them*. His assumption that all participants have put aside national interests to share lofty goals is a generous approach to geopolitics, but one that history has not yet proven reliable.

Here are five areas in which such an optimistic approach fails Rubin:

The United Nations and the Geneva Accords. In urging friends of the Afghans to support the U.N. proposal for a "Government of Peace and Reconstruction" which the Afghans themselves reject, Rubin predicates an idealized United Nations whose officials are disinterested arbiters seeking only peace and justice. One would think we were still back in the 1940s, before experience had dispelled the popular illusion of the United Nations as Tennyson's noble "parliament of the world."

In the case of Afghanistan and the Geneva accords, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and his emissary to Afghanistan, Diego Cordovez, capitulated to Soviet demands at the outset of negotiations, replacing the agenda mandated by the U.N. General Assembly with a Soviet agenda submitted via the Kabul regime and the Nonaligned Movement, then led by Fidel Castro. In the subsequent negotiations, the Soviets made no significant concessions affecting their strategic interest in controlling Afghanistan permanently. As has been pointed out elsewhere by several analysts (including myself), the resulting Geneva accords are defective in numerous respects, which is probably why their contents were kept a closely guarded secret until after they had been signed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The accords were particularly flawed from the point of view of the Afghan people, who are not content to limit themselves to a military defeat of the Soviets and their clients (although this may be, as Rubin says, the main interest of the State Department). The Afghans want, in addition, to regain their independence, autonomy, and freedom as a nation and as individuals. That is what the war has been about and that is what it is still about. Such a goal may seem geopolitically minor and stubbornly idiosyncratic to the chanceries of the world, but it is a fact — the very fact that led to the Soviet invasion, thereby creating the Afghanistan issue. And it is a fact that will have a significant impact on all efforts to design a final resolution.

A Cease-fire in Place. Cordovez's "cease-fire in place" would leave the communist regime in control of Kabul and all other strategic cities, military bases, and the communications and transport systems — while the Resistance would be left holding only the devastated countryside. As experts on guerrilla warfare well know, guerrilla forces are not like a regular army that can be kept under organized discipline. During an extended cease-fire, the resistance volunteers would quickly disperse, and it would be almost impossible to reconstitute them later as a coherent fighting force. Moreover, once the channels of their supply were dismantled, it would take years to reconstruct them.

Meanwhile, the effective communist forces would remain intact. These include special forces, the secret police, the air force, and certain reliable, Soviet-trained elements of the army. Soviet Central Asians passing as Afghans, and the KGB Border Guards units classified as "police," (known to the Resistance as "Jowzjani" or Mongols) who were introduced into Afghanistan in mid-1988 remain after overt Soviet army units reportedly have departed. All of these presumably would remain under the continuing de facto command of Soviet advisers and with continuing Soviet resupply.

Since it was only the active, internationally supported Resistance that compelled the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime to negotiate in the first place, dissolution of the Resistance would obviate the Soviet need to carry on any but the most superficially cosmetic further negotiations.

A Neutral Interim Government. The effort to create an interim government made up of men "impartial" between the communist and the anti-communist populations is equally unrealistic. The illusory independence of such a government was demonstrated by the Vichy regime in World War II. Moreover, where is one to find these "neutral" men? During the first two years of communist rule all but a handful of Afghanistan's experienced political leaders were wiped out: a calculated massacre of 35,000 to 50,000 former high- and mid-level officials, intellectuals, and other potential non-communist lead-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ers — the country's entire educated leadership class. (This is one reason why the Resistance itself has problems establishing a government.)

As for "impartiality," after the events of the last ten years, those who are not with the Communists are profoundly against them. The differences are not a matter of ordinary political disagreement, susceptible to neutrality or compromise; this is a clash of diametrically opposed systems. In fact, as Rubin knows better than most, it is a clash between the oppressors and the oppressed: between the killers and torturers on the one hand, and their victims on the other.

The only individuals who might be both willing and able to identify themselves as "impartial" in these circumstances are a few opportunists, notorious among their countrymen (if not to the outside world) for their willingness to cut their cloth to fit the day's political fashion. Others, like former prime minister Hassan Sharq (whom Rubin mentions), though not party members, are known Soviet agents. Moreover, the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy are so thoroughly infiltrated and controlled by communist agents — including KhAD — that it would be difficult to carry out any policies independent of, let alone contrary to, Soviet wishes. Rubin does not discuss this, nor the similar problem of Soviet "advisers" who now run every branch of government and who will (Moscow says) remain under the terms of various agreements.

A Permanent Broad-Based Government. To urge us to simply put our faith once again in the good offices of the United Nations is naive. Cordovez's track record is such that the Resistance refuses to deal with him, and his current proposal is far less impartial than it sounds. When one examines the fine print, it turns out that the terms "broad-based government" and "government of reconciliation," as used by officials on all sides, are euphemistic code words disguising a coalition regime in which key positions (not just sports ministries, as Rubin's article suggested) would be held by Communists and non-party Soviet agents.

The USSR and a Non-communist Afghanistan. As for Soviet willingness to accept or encourage a genuinely non-communist Afghan government, Rubin's speculative hopes are surprising. Not too much should be made of the fact that the Soviets are once again revising history to exculpate their current leaders by blaming those dead and gone; that has been a standard operating procedure in Moscow for decades. While individual Afghan Communists have always been expendable, Soviet leaders have repeatedly declared that their clients must have a significant role in any future government and that Moscow will support them by "all necessary means." In direct talks in Islamabad in January 1989, Yuli Voronstov, deputy foreign minister and ambassador to Kabul, told Resistance leaders

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the Soviet Union is determined to maintain its *political* and economic interests in Afghanistan and warned that if the Resistance refuses to share power with the Communists, the USSR will introduce "new military means" in Afghanistan.

In sum, Rubin is perennially an optimist, and one would like to be able to share his optimism, but the road to hell still has the same pavement. Generous hopes are not an adequate basis on which to risk the future of a people — not to mention the long-term, geopolitical interests of the United States and its allies. It is regrettable that he does not apply to this and related political issues in Afghanistan the same rigorous standards of evidence and documentation that he applied in his distinguished investigations into human rights violations there.

Rosanne Klass
Freedom House

The Author Responds:

Rosanne Klass makes a number of statements about me and what I supposedly believe. I do not recognize myself in her characterization, but I daresay the readers of ORBIS are more interested in Afghanistan than in me. Hence I will confine myself to discussing her comments concerning five aspects of the situation in Afghanistan.

The United Nations and the Geneva Accords. Klass attributes the format of the Geneva negotiations to a capitulation by the United Nations to Soviet demands. In fact, the United Nations acted as a mediator, relaying messages and facilitating discussions among parties who were members of the United Nations, namely the USSR, the United States, Pakistan, and the Kabul regime. It is not the fault of Perez de Cuellar and Cordovez that the U.N. General Assembly accepted the credentials of the Kabul regime; it was a fact they had to work with.

The format of the negotiations resulted from these multilateral consultations. In 1982, as I understand it, Pakistan Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan concluded that, given the stand of the USSR at that time, it was possible to have negotiations without the participation of either Moscow or the Afghan Resistance (which was then composed of numerous organizations without even today's loose coalitions of parties). This was a decision made by the government of Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq and supported by the Reagan administration, not a concession to the Soviets by the United Nations. The resulting talks were indeed "flawed," as are most political activities, but they should be judged by their results.

Klass states that in the course of these negotiations "the Soviets made no significant concessions affecting their strategic interest in controlling Afghanistan permanently." But the Soviets did commit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

themselves to withdrawing all of their troops from Afghanistan in a nine-month period, half to be withdrawn in the first three months. Did the Soviet troops in Afghanistan not affect the ability of the Soviet Union to control Afghanistan? On the contrary, after the withdrawal began, several provincial capitals fell to the Resistance.

As I write in late January 1989, Soviet troops are apparently withdrawing from Kabul, and the regime can hardly feed itself because the Resistance has cut all the roads to the capital. Soviet civilian advisers are being withdrawn, according to the State Department, although, as Klass notes, the Soviets have stated that they have the right to keep them there. The families of Afghan secret police members are being sent to the Soviet border region, where the troops are being concentrated before crossing into the USSR. These are precisely the conditions, created by the flawed negotiations, that will give the Afghans a chance, as Klass says, "to regain their independence, autonomy, and freedom as a nation and as individuals."

A Cease-fire in Place. Cordovez's proposal was not for a "cease-fire in place," leaving "the communist regime in control" of all the strategic assets. Such a cease-fire *has* been proposed by Moscow and Kabul. But the main point of Cordovez's proposal was that, before the cease-fire took effect, the regime would have to leave power and be replaced by a Government of Peace and Reconstruction. The text of Cordovez's proposal explicitly states that the new government would have to be in charge of the military and police forces. The Jamiat-e Islami resistance organization correctly pointed out that this proposal would require very detailed and specific arrangements to assure that the regime did not retain authority over those forces. Jamiat argued that such arrangements were not possible. No negotiations ever took place to explore whether they might have been possible, and it is now a moot point.

Klass refers to the "dissolution" of the Resistance and the dismantling of its "channels of supply." The Geneva accords do not envision the dissolution of the Resistance, nor have they led to such a result, as I have noted above, but, on the contrary, to its greater strength and unity.

The first instrument of the accords did indeed appear on the face of it to require the dismantling of the Resistance's Pakistan-based supply network. In her Summer 1988 *Foreign Affairs* article, Klass argued that this was the only interest the Soviets had in the accords; I had originally thought that they would insist on this dismantling as a condition for withdrawal of their troops, but that the Resistance was strong enough militarily and politically to win under those conditions. It turns out we were both wrong. As I pointed out in my ORBIS article, under the doctrine of "symmetry," Washington has claimed that it has the right to keep supplying the Resistance as long

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the USSR supplies Kabul, and it has done so. Remarkably, the Soviets continued to withdraw their troops, despite repeated threats and protests. Klass should remember her own warning to me about not confusing "words with deeds" or "rhetoric with results."

Klass makes a number of claims about the secret introduction of Soviet troops and militia. The only specific case she mentions is the Jawzjani militia in Qandahar. She claims that "Jawzjani" means "Mongol," which is wrong. Jawzjan is a province of northern Afghanistan having a border with Soviet Uzbekistan. The peasant population is mostly Uzbek and Tajik, but the landlords in the area are mostly Durrani Pashtuns (members of the same tribal confederation as the Afghan kings). Anthropologists have found that this was one of the few regions of Afghanistan where significant economic and social inequality coincided with an ethnic cleavage. They found considerable resentment among Uzbek and Tajik peasants of the Durrani Pashtun *khans*.[1]

Hence it is not at all unthinkable, given that this flat area has been under consistent Soviet control since 1980, that the Soviets have managed to organize some Uzbeks and Tajiks of Jawzjan into an anti-Durrani militia. This militia has been sent to Qandahar, the center of the Durrani Pashtuns, where the Jawzjanis have committed acts of great cruelty. According to reports, the militia has very poor, even hostile, relations with the local party and army organizations, which are also Pashtun. "For this reason," Naim Majrooh writes, "the Russians are trying to reduce the number of the militiamen in Kandahar."[2]

A Neutral Interim Government. Klass attacks the notion of an impartial government, and the notion is indeed a bit strange in the Afghan context. In fact, however, the individuals whom Cordovez mentioned as candidates for the government (former King Zaher Shah and three of his ministers) are all in basic sympathy with the Resistance, although they have not participated directly in its political or military activities. Does Klass actually consider these men to be "opportunists, notorious among their countrymen (if not to the outside world) for their willingness to cut their cloth to fit the day's political fashion?" Our late mutual friend, Professor Sayd Bahauddin Majrooh, to whom she first introduced me in 1983, had often advocated a political solution based on a transitional role for the former king. In fact, this may well be the reason Majrooh was assassinated in February 1988.

[1] Richard Tapper, "Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Intergroup Conflict in North-Central Afghanistan," in M. Nazif Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, eds., *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives* (Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1984), pp. 230-46.

[2] Naim Majrooh, "Special Report from Kandahar and Helmand," *Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin*, December 1988, pp. 29-30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Klass notes that I "mention" Hasan Sharq, a "known Soviet agent." I did more than "mention" him: I wrote that "though not a party member, [he] had been closely linked to Najibullah's Parcham faction and had served the regime as ambassador to India, one of its top diplomatic posts." I referred to him precisely in order to describe why he cannot succeed as a neutral figure.

A Permanent Broad-Based Government. Klass criticizes the United Nations and the proposal for a "broad-based government."

On the first: it is not true that "the Resistance" refused to deal with Cordovez. As I stated in my article, the Shi'i parties based in Iran met with him in Tehran. The Pakistan-based Sunni parties voted four-to-three not to meet with him in July 1988, although Mawlawi Yunus Khales, when he was alliance spokesman, had met Cordovez in both New York and Peshawar. The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), the party in which Klass herself has the most friends and contacts, favored meeting with Cordovez. High-level representatives of NIFA have met him in both New York and Islamabad. Moreover, the United Nations was deeply involved in organizing the talks between the *mujahidin* and the Soviets; and the *mujahidin*, while they dislike Cordovez personally, have remained in close contact with Perez de Cuellar's office and are asking for a larger, not a smaller, U.N. role in resolving the conflict.

On the second point: Klass lumps together two different terms — "broad-based government" and "government of reconciliation" — which the Kabul regime would like to confuse, as Klass does. The latter term refers to a specific proposal, made by the Soviets and Kabul, which Klass and I agree has no future.

"Broad-based government" is a general term for a government composed of a variety of political forces, which is indeed necessary for peace in Afghanistan. Realistically, any such government would have to exclude the Communists, but it could not succeed if it were composed only of members of the Peshawar bureaucracy, as was the alliance's "interim government" of June 1988. Nowhere in my article do I say, nor do I believe, as Klass implies, that the Resistance should accept any proposal in which "Communists and non-party Soviet agents" hold key posts.

But the subject of a broad-based government brings up a point that I now believe to be the major flaw in my article. In my analysis of Afghan political culture, I focused on the institution of the *Loya Jirga*, the great tribal council. I did not adequately appreciate the extent to which this institution arouses suspicion among non-Pashtun peoples of Afghanistan as well as the younger generation of Islamic political activists. The similar Islamic notion of *shura* (Arabic for consultation or council) now appears to be dominant among the Resistance. In the *shura*, representation is by political affiliation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than by tribal-ethnic ties, and it derives from the common religion of Islam rather than from the tribal culture of a particular ethnic group. Hence the resistance coalitions in both Iran and Pakistan have agreed in principle on the formation of an appointed interim *shura*.

The USSR and a Non-communist Afghanistan. Vorontsov, too, has accepted the idea of a *shura* (in the negotiations during which he met the *mujahidin* leaders from both Iran and Pakistan, as well as the former king), but insisted on some representation — not dominance — for Afghanistan's Communist party, the PDPA. It was this insistence that led the Resistance to break off the talks in early January 1989. As Klass observes, Vorontsov has also stated that — despite everything — the USSR will maintain its political and economic interests in Afghanistan. I am sure it would like to do so, but I would again ask for attention to deeds rather than words, and results rather than rhetoric.

Recent developments have confirmed the importance I gave to the search for a political solution, if not in the specific forms I described. As the noose tightens around Kabul, the political capacity of the Resistance to form a broad-based government becomes the key to victory.

Those of us in the West who have worked with the Afghans during this struggle are aware of how little we have done compared to the sacrifices they have made. Nevertheless, the support they have received was necessary to their successes. Rosanne Klass, in particular, deserves a great deal of credit for the work she has done to publicize the Afghan cause. I personally owe her a great deal. I look forward to the day when she will realize that she made a vital contribution to a successful effort.

Barnett R. Rubin
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Yale University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brief Reviews

WORLD POLITICS

Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism. David C. Martin and John Walcott.

Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System. Evan Luard.

Danger and Survival. McGeorge Bundy.

Defending Peace and Freedom. Brent Scowcroft et al., eds.

Innovation and the Arms Race. Matthew Evangelista.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance. David S. Yost.

Strategic Minerals. Ewan W. Anderson.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

Adjustment with a Human Face. Volume 2, *Ten Country Studies.* Giovanni Andrea Cornia et al., eds.

After Reagan: Confronting the Changed World Economy. C. Michael Aho and Marc Levinson.

American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919-33: Implications for the Third World Debt Crisis. Stephen A. Schuker.

International Economic Cooperation. Martin Feldstein, ed.

Resisting Protectionism. Helen Milner.

WAR STUDIES

Ending a Nuclear War. Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., eds.

Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making. Ted Greenwood.

The Nassau Connection: The Organization and Management of the British Polaris Project. Peter Nailor.

New Weapon Technologies and the ABM Treaty. Herbert Lin.

Vietnam at War. Phillip B. Davidson.

Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. Ronald Schaffer.

The World Atlas of Warfare. Richard Holmes, ed.

THE UNITED STATES

The Course of American Diplomacy. Howard Jones.

Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today. Harvey Klehr.

George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. David Meyers.

National Security Planning. Michael M. Boll.

Restructuring American Foreign Policy. John D. Steinbruner, ed.

Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era. Steven Emerson.

EUROPE

Greece under Socialism. Nikolaos A. Stavrou, ed.

My Century: The Odyssey of a Polish Intellectual. Aleksander Wat.

Poland Challenges a Divided World. John Rensenbrink.

Les religions d'un president: Regards sur les aventures du mitterrandisme. Jean Daniel.

The Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe. Joseph Rothschild.

Sophisticated Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent, 1968-1987. H. Stuart Hughes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and the German National Identity. Charles Maier.

THE SOVIET UNION

A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials. Alexander G. Rahr.

Directory of Full and Candidate Members of the Soviet Central Committee. Theodore W. Karasik.

Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds.

The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000. Alexander Yanov.

Self-Government and Freedom in Russia. Sergei Pushkarev.

Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials. Albert L. Weeks.

The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare. Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

The Soviet Union and the Challenge of the Future. Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan, eds.

Stalin: Man and Ruler. Robert H. McNeal.

THE MIDDLE EAST

As Others See Us: Mutual Perceptions, East and West. Bernard Lewis et al., eds.

Beirut: City of Regrets. Eli Reed and Fouad Ajami.

Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986. Will D. Swearingen.

Palästina im Umbruch, 1856-1882. Alexander Schölch.

The Shah's Last Ride. William Shawcross.

Sojourners and Settlers: The Yemeni Immigrant Experience. Jonathan Friedlander, ed.

A Soldier in Search of Peace. Avraham Tamir.

Workers on the Nile. Joel Beinen and Zachary Lockman.

AFRICA

Africa and Israel. Olusola Ojo.

African Capitalism. Paul Kennedy.

The Crisis and Challenge of African Development. Harvey Glickman, ed.

How Can Africa Survive? Jennifer Seymour Whitaker.

Oliver Tambo and the Struggle against Apartheid. E.S. Reddy, ed.

Red Star over Southern Africa. Morgan Norval.

Surrender or Starve: The Wars Behind the Famine. Robert D. Kaplan.

The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds.

LATIN AMERICA

Central America: Democracy, Development, and Change. John M. Kirk and George W. Schuyler, eds.

Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. Robert A. Pastor.

Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade. Scott B. MacDonald.

Guatemala's Political Puzzle. Georges A. Fauriol and Eva Loser.

La Hoz y el Machete. Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz.

1984 Nicaragua. Xavier Zavala, ed.

Quién es Quién en Nicaragua? Manuel Jiron.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS
by Adam M. Garfinkle

Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism. By David C. Martin and John Walcott. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 304 pp. $22.50.

The Reagan administration entered office asserting that terrorism was the "ultimate violation of human rights," and promising "swift and effective retribution" against terrorists. Unfortunately, the administration did not determine how to carry out this promise before making it. Martin and Walcott, reporters for CBS Television and *The Wall Street Journal* respectively, here chronicle the Reagan administration's attempts to redeem its promise, from inauguration through the counter-terror effort's downfall in the Iran-Contra affair. They argue that this effort — it did not amount to a program — was undone by several factors, the most important being that the United States could never discover an effective deterrent. Bureaucratic infighting also confounded the undertaking: members of the national security community fought for the counter-terror mission, but no official had the power to coordinate efforts, and the president never appointed a czar.

The best parts of the book are the detailed, gripping accounts of the 1985 hijackings of the *Achille Lauro* and TWA Flight 847, the 1986 strike on Libya, and the ordeal of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon. In addition, by demonstrating the high costs incurred by the Reagan administration's failure to settle turf battles in the counter-terror program, the book makes a point that the incoming Bush administration would be well-advised to heed. B.B.

Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study of the Principles of International Order. 2nd ed. By Evan Luard. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. 317 pp. $44.50 ($14.95, paper).

Evan Luard is an optimistic realist with a grounding in the classics of political philosophy and with many decades of experience. This volume, a revised edition of a text more than twenty years old, examines international warfare since 1945 with a mind to limiting it. Luard's thesis is direct and persuasive: two bonds hold all societies together — explicit law and implicit normative conventions. It is fruitless, he argues, to try to tame international politics with the former; imperative to try to tame it with the latter.

Luard's exposition is clear and unencumbered with jargon. Moreover, his theoretical framework enables the author to expound in straightforward fashion what others make into convolutions and confusions. Toward the end of the book, Luard even manages to state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on a mere two pages eighteen General Conclusions, such as, "External wars are more often undertaken to restore a status quo previously disturbed . . . than to change it." These are, quite possibly, the most valuable two pages in all recent literature on international relations.

In its first edition, this book found widespread use as a text in Britain and the Commonwealth, but not in the United States. Now, as American academic departments in international relations shed the decaying vestiges of behaviorism, one hopes they too will take advantage of Luard's concise, clear, and temperate text.

Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. By McGeorge Bundy. New York: Random House, 1988. 735 pp. $24.95.

Bundy served as special assistant to the president for national security in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and as such had a share of responsibility for the doctrine of assured destruction. But for anyone expecting first-hand insights into the history of nuclear strategy, *Danger and Survival* is a disappointment in three parts.

Part one deals with well-studied events of the 1940s and 1950s — the decisions to make the A-bomb and H-bomb, to drop two of the former on Japan, to design the Baruch-Lilienthal Plan, and so on. The second, only one-seventh of the book, deals with the period of Bundy's participation in government. The third deals with the last two decades.

Bundy's opinion, which oozes from every chapter, is that the existential nuclear *peril* is infinitely more important than the nuclear *balance*. Applying this *idée fixe* to the entire nuclear era gives Bundy license to characterize American policies, with few exceptions, as a trail of lost opportunities and needless provocations. It also allows him to make dozens of more discrete judgments, such as blaming the Indian bomb of 1974 on Nixon's decision to send an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal in 1971.

Walter Lippmann once said that we generally do not first see and then define; we first define and then we see. In Bundy's case, examination of the nuclear era does not lead to his conclusions about it; his premises about it lead to his view. So if one buys the central premise, one will likely buy Bundy's interpretations, large and small. If not, then not.

Defending Peace and Freedom: Toward Strategic Stability in the Year 2000. The Atlantic Council's Working Group on Strategic Stability and Arms Control. Edited by Brent Scowcroft, R. James Woolsey, and Thomas Etzold. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1988. 216 pp. $26.50 ($14.75, paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most remarkable thing about this volume, whose first editor is now President Bush's national security adviser, is how unremarkable it is. The nine essays and introductory group report competently echo the consensus that exists among America's centrist strategic thinkers — for example, on the U.S. need to keep building ICBMs. Although several of the essays (particularly those by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Fred S. Hoffman) articulate common wisdom so thoughtfully as to appear novel, there is in fact nothing novel presented here, not even one fresh idea. On the contrary, the volume evidences thinking in a groove so deep that, despite being the result of deliberations held only last summer, it is already behind the times. The two newest candidates for top billing on the arms control stage — conventional and chemical arms — are barely mentioned. It is easy to agree with Raymond Garthoff's dissenting footnote to the group report, to the effect that because the study "fails to recognize the pitfalls of resting on familiar deterrence doctrine," it does not meet the objective of looking as far as the year 2000.

Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies. By Matthew Evangelista. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. 300 pp. $32.95.

Disturbed by the superficiality of theoretical explanations of the technological arms race, Matthew Evangelista analyzes anew Soviet and American ways of developing military technology. He argues that American arms are developed from below, by scientists and engineers in private corporations, and climb upward until approved by officialdom. Early on, bureaucratic processes are most important; later on, external reactions (allied and Soviet) and broad political factors take over. Soviet military technology is a top-down process. Leaders decide what they need, and order their scientists and engineers to produce it. So, threat assessement dominates in the beginning, and then bureaucratic processes take over. The result is that, while the two sides do respond to each other, their bureaucratic cultures are so different that the action-reaction relationship is far more complex than often depicted.

This sounds plausible but there are problems. Evangelista's picture of U.S. and Soviet differences is too simple and we know a lot less about Soviet processes than Evangelista implies. It is also incorrect to assume, as Evangelista does, that the United States is always first to innovate, after which the Soviets copy the innovation and replicate it in vast numbers. Certainly, in defensive technologies since 1972, the reverse has generally been the case. Moreover, it is not obvious where one deployment cycle stops and another begins; where one marks it rather depends on whom one wishes to blame for it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The main problem with the book is less its analysis than its policy recommendations. Evangelista insists that the United States must restrain its technological dynamism, assumed to be the starting point to each new cycle of the arms race. Even if this were true, it does not follow that the Soviet Union lacks other motives for military innovation and competition.

Innovation and the Arms Race is just a fancy way to argue for unilateral American arms control. In the end, we get the same old line: SDI is bad, disarmament is good, and the arms race has more or less been the fault of the United States since the late 1940s. This deserves the same old response: baloney.

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance. By David S. Yost. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. 352 pp. $30.00.

President Reagan's televised address to the nation in March 1983 transformed the debate over nuclear weapons. In the 1960s and 1970s, the controversies concerned missile launchers, the vulnerability of weapons, and "protective" counterforce systems. In the 1980s, the great controversy centered on ballistic missile defense (BMD), its feasibility and its implications.

Yost examines the BMD controversy by assessing the likelihood of the Soviets' developing BMD and then evaluating the effects of BMD on NATO. He explains that BMD strains the traditional fault lines of the Western Alliance by causing American allies to wonder whether a U.S. BMD will protect them (even as they wonder about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella). BMD also induces them to ask whether the United States, given its pursuit of missile defense, is seriously pursuing arms control, a traditional West European concern.

By taking the perspective of U.S. allies, Yost distinguishes his treatment of the BMD question from that of others. Unfortunately, in analyzing this new problem, his book covers much familiar ground; the main points could have been made in half the space. Also, Yost tries to resolve some perennial controversies — what factors determine Soviet military deployments and arms control policy — that will probably never be settled conclusively, and are anyway not essential to his study. B.B.

Strategic Minerals: The Geopolitical Problems of the United States. By Ewan W. Anderson. New York: Praeger, 1988. 176 pp. $39.95.

No advanced industrialized country should take for granted the natural resources upon which it relies, especially if it is heavily dependent — as is the United States — on foreign suppliers. Unfortunately, the thinkers and doers who steward America's welfare too

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

often fail to recognize this. One main reason has to do with the subject's sheer complexity; understanding the problems of strategic supplies requires a knowledge of technology, geology, economics, politics, and geopolitics.

But help is here. Anderson describes the critical issues of strategic minerals in clear, concise fashion. He defines the strategic minerals; enumerates the minerals and products for which the United States depends on outsiders; examines the vulnerabilities these dependencies create; and describes the threats that could exploit those vulnerabilities. At each point, the reader knows exactly where he is and why he is there. As a result, though Anderson's volume contains enough authoritative information to be a reference work for policy makers and resource managers, it is sufficiently well-written to be a primer for the intelligent layman. R. Daniel McMichael

---

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
by Patrick Clawson

Adjustment with a Human Face. Volume 2, Ten Country Studies. Edited by Giovanni Andrea Cornia, et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 301 pp. $55.00.

The case studies brought together here are highly uneven, and some display considerable errors in reasoning. For example, Leonel Figueroa's chapter on Peru implicitly assumes that lower government expenditures for health and education mean reduced welfare for the poor, missing the point that many adjustment programs aim to increase efficiency and cut costs. Other essays are admirably executed, however: The study of Ghana by UNICEF shows that programs which reach the poor are generally low cost; what drives up government social spending are the sophisticated hospitals and universities. And Dagmar Raczynski's chapter on Chile argues that nutrition programs there were "clearly successful" until 1982, and that the evidence after that is ambiguous — a refreshing change from the polemics that often characterize analyses of Chile under Pinochet.

Unfortunately, in establishing a standard for analysis, most of the authors chose to gauge a new policy's effectivenesss by comparing its results to the status quo ante. This can be misleading. In many of these cases, the economy was initially on such a steep downward path that nothing short of a miracle could have reversed the deterioration. Under such circumstances, a policy should be considered a success if it limits the damage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After Reagan: Confronting the Changed World Economy. By C. Michael Aho and Marc Levinson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 231 pp. $11.95 (paper).

The spreading enthusiasm for free markets in the 1980s — evidenced in movements toward privatization in China, the Soviet Union, and much of the Third World — has gladdened the hearts of pro-capitalists. Not unrelated has been the spectacular rise of newly industrialized capitalist countries in East Asia during the same ten-year period. Aho and Levinson almost ignore these developments. Writing from a liberal perspective, they often support government regulation as the way to correct perceived shortcomings in the operation of the free markets. Their analysis ignores recent academic work in their own field, and proffers such unsupported, dubious generalizations as: "questions of corporate nationality have come to possess little relevance." The authors argue that the main changes in the international environment in recent years — the decline of American dominance, and the rise of international capital markets that pronounce instantaneous judgment on government actions — create a need for more international economic cooperation and coordination. Both this general conclusion and many of their specific policy suggestions appear unrelated to their analysis.

Despite such flaws, and despite the book's almost breezy tone, *After Reagan* is nonetheless a useful compendium of major international economic issues facing the Bush administration. Chapters discuss such issues as restoring balance between expenditure and income; managing exchange rates; debt and development; tactics for achieving a more level field in world trade; trade policy for sensitive sectors; regulating international finance; and foreign investment in the United States.

American "Reparations" to Germany, 1919-33: Implications for the Third World Debt Crisis. By Stephen A. Schuker. Princeton Studies in International Finance, Number 61. Princeton, N. J.: International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, July 1988. 170 pp. $6.50.

In the world of international debt, "cannot" often means "will not." This is the important thesis of Schuker's important book: international debt payments depend more on political factors than on economic ones. Schuker supports his thesis with detailed research of the 1930s, disproving the notion that Germany and other large debtors were unable meet their debt payments. He then draws useful — if sometimes recondite — parallels to the 1980s.

Schuker's most intriguing thesis holds that differing attitudes by the governments of creditor nations crucially affected repayment. For example, in the 1930s, the U.S. government (under the influence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of New Dealers) was supremely indifferent to the interests of bondholders and refused to consider sanctions to prevent default. By contrast, Britain favored bondholders and, where its influence was felt, obligations were honored, sometimes (as in Australia and New Zealand) at the cost of subtantial privation. The most telling case is Argentina, which paid its British bondholders regularly, while generally ignoring American creditors.

Although Schuker's argument has implications for the Third World debt crisis, his descriptions of the current scene are not as careful as his historical scholarship. He would have done better to let the obvious analogies speak for themselves. For example, Brazil has not paid as much as 4 percent of its gross domestic product in any year since 1982; Colombia — which has never rescheduled its debt — paid 7 percent in 1987. "Cannot" means "will not."

International Economic Cooperation. Edited by Martin Feldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. 327 pp. $50.00 ($17.95, paper).

The National Bureau of Economic Research has commendably produced a volume of four essays by distinguished analysts of international economic affairs that is nonetheless accessible to the nonspecialist. Each essay considers a single topic — macroeconomic policy, exchange rate coordination, trade policy, and developing country debt — and each is followed by several commentaries.

Stanley Fischer's analysis is properly skeptical of the advantages of macroeconomic policy coordination: "The best that each country can do for other countries," he says,"is to keep its own economy in shape." Richard Marston is optimistic about controlling exchange rates to reduce volatility. But Feldstein in his introduction wonders what would have happened if the U.S. dollar's real value had been stabilized during the first half of the 1980s. It is not clear, he argues, that the results would have been better than the results that arose from volatility. J. David Richardson's article on trade policy and Jeffrey Sach's on the debt of developing countries are solid, but more in line with the conventional and media wisdom: resist protectionism, and pressure banks to acknowledge losses on loans to developing countries more openly.

Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. By Helen Milner. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 321 pp. $29.50.

In a sense, the 1970s were much like the 1920s, in that both were marked by high unemployment, and substantial agricultural and industrial over-capacity, especially in Europe. During the twenties, these factors created pressure for the strong protectionist mea-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sures adopted between 1928 and 1932. By contrast, the 1970s and 1980s have seen a smaller increase in protectionism, mainly in the form of non-tariff barriers. Milner sets out to analyze this contrast.

Arguing that firms with integrated international production or important export markets will oppose protectionism, Milner presents eighteen case studies to support her thesis. But the scant detail she provides about individual companies does not fulfill the author's avowed intention to concentrate on corporations rather than industries. In the end, therefore, Milner's analysis is unconvincing. For one, it is by no means clear how much influence individual firms have over the public decision making that determines trade policy. For another, Milner practically ignores an important alternative explanation for the containment of protectionism in the 1980s: that policy makers learned from the experience of the 1930s, and concluded (correctly) that protectionism contributes to economic depression.

WAR STUDIES
by Bruce Berkowitz

Ending a Nuclear War: Are the Superpowers Prepared? Edited by Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. 184 pp. $28.00.

To reflect revisions in its strategic doctrine since the late 1970s, the U.S. government has developed forces and plans for frustrating Soviet war objectives and ending a nuclear war on favorable terms. Under this policy, which seeks not "prevailing" in a nuclear war but "countervailing" in it, concepts such as "nuclear escalation control" and "intra-conflict negotiations" have taken on greater importance. Of course, negotiating peace amid a nuclear war would be difficult, and that is why essays like these which explore the difficulties and offer possible solutions are welcome.

But as one might expect, the quality of thought in this collection is not uniform. Much of the book consists of entirely predictable analyses of Soviet military doctrine, concluding that the Soviets reject Western concepts of deterrence and escalation control and are committed to total victory. In addition to being difficult to substantiate, such conclusions are too vague to be of use in policy planning.

Two essayists stand out, however. Leon Sloss, a key player in the development of current U.S. strategic policy, provides a systematic assessment of the operational requirements for maintaining command and control in a nuclear war. The other exceptional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contribution is by Colin Gray, who analyzes the objectives (and hence military plans) that would best ensure the West's ability to end a nuclear war on a favorable basis. Gray's thoroughly logical and convincing analysis is often counter-intuitive, and calls into question much of the accepted wisdom underlying current U.S. strategic thinking.

Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making. By Ted Greenwood. New York: University Press of America, 1988. 256 pp. $15.75 (paper).

Until the emergence of the Strategic Defense Initiative, debates over strategic policy, weapon deployment, and arms control were dominated by controversies over MIRVs (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles: the technology behind multi-warhead ballistic missiles). MIRVs presented major problems for the vulnerability of U.S. nuclear weapons and the verification of arms control. Thus, the question of how the superpowers came to acquire MIRVs and how the technology could have been averted became a key question of the late 1970s.

Greenwood examines the origins of the technology that led to the development of MIRVs and traces the adoption of this technology through to the Pentagon's acquisition of the missiles. He then turns to the political side of the process, analyzing why the Department of Defense's leadership committed itself to the system. Finally, Greenwood examines the controversy that eventually surrounded the deployment of MIRVed systems, analyzing why the system survived when others, such as the early U.S. ABM systems, did not.

The present work is a paperback reprint of a study originally published in 1975, but even after fourteen years, this study wears well. It remains a state-of-the-art analysis of bureaucratic machinations and the politics of military acquisition and policy making. Greenwood weaves archival research, interviews, and public information into a lucid account, shows how a major military system evolved from conception to deployment, and thus makes his book a case study worth reading, even though the attention once focused on MIRVs has shifted to other issues.

The Nassau Connection: The Organization and Management of the British Polaris Project. By Peter Nailor. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988. 144 pp. $23.00.

Was it easier a generation ago for democratic governments to purchase major new weapon systems? Rather than assume so, one ought to consider this brief history of the British Polaris program and its difficulties, written by Nailor on the basis of official archives, interviews, and his own personal experience. One difficulty the Brit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ish government faced was diplomatic. The Polaris purchase was undertaken when the United States government cancelled its air-launched missile, the Skybolt, which it had previously promised to sell to Great Britain. London had to set aside this affront while soliciting political support for the new missile. Then, within the military, British leaders had to take the strategic bombing mission away from Bomber Command, whose existence rested upon that function, and transfer the mission to the Royal Navy, which did not want it. And all of this was in addition to the challenges of developing, deploying, and supporting a new, complex weapon in a time of austerity.

That Nailor's study was published by the British government's printing service suggests at least implicit official sanction and, as one would expect with a study so sanctioned, it does not examine in detail the internal politics of the Ministry of Defence or the Royal Navy. Nor does it mention the domestic controversies raging at the time about whether Britain should maintain nuclear weapons at all. Nevertheless, the book is a welcome addition to the comparatively small stock of material available on the development of Britain's nuclear forces.

New Weapon Technologies and the ABM Treaty. By Herbert Lin. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988. 92 pp. $12.95 (paper).

Most supporters of arms control rank the 1972 ABM Treaty among the most significant arms control treaties, and they therefore see any threat to it as potentially threatening to superpower arms control in general. Lin analyzes this threat.

Specifically, he looks at various new technologies for ballistic missile defense that differ from the technology — the large, fixed radar systems and interceptor missiles — envisioned by framers of the ABM Treaty. Lin focuses mainly on directed energy systems; anti-aircraft missiles that have at least some anti-ballistic missile capabilities; and small, mobile sensors originally developed for tactical operations. He then shows how each could be deployed in a way that would circumvent the ABM treaty. Finally, Lin defines what levels of performance would be needed to give these weapons an anti-strategic missile capability, and suggests how the technical characteristics associated with such performance can be controlled. Most of Lin's suggested control measures depend on limits to testing.

To his credit, Lin does not become preoccupied with the controversial debate between the "broad" interpretation of the treaty and the "narrow" interpretation favored by proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Instead, he provides a professional, concise analysis of military systems that have emerged largely through the unplanned evolution of technology. The result is a useful book, no matter what position one takes on the arms control debate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975. By Phillip B. Davidson. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. 838 pp. $27.50.

Why did the United States lose the war in Vietnam? The question continues to draw answers from former participants. Davidson, a lieutenant general and chief intelligence officer to Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, provides a richly detailed work (through 1969, less so after) emphasizing the bureacratic dynamics of U.S. military policy and the correlation between those dynamics and the action on the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the narrative does not lead up to the concluding chapter, "Why We Lost the War." Here, Davidson maintains that North Vietnam had a strategy well-suited to its strengths and weaknesses, and that the U.S. government never understood this. He concludes that the United States should have played to its own strengths by putting fewer limits on its military power, while the government of South Vietnam needed to reform and, thereby, win over its people. But if the problem was thus essentially strategic, then Davidson's narration of bureaucratic confusion is largely irrelevant. There is another problem with this post-mortem: Davidson does not so much solve the conundrum of American strategy as re-enact it. For example, a greater use of American force — in the form of search and destroy missions (which Davidson favored) — would have nullified Saigon's campaign to win hearts and minds.

For all its length and detail, therefore, this volume is wired with intellectual short circuits. Though masterful as military history and filled with new data in that regard, as interpretation it is a muddle. A.M.G.

Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. By Ronald Schaffer. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 272 pp. $12.95 ($8.95, paper).

Once the Industrial Revolution reached maturity and wartime factories became "the home front," the line between soldier and civilian became blurred. But nothing blurred this distinction so completely as strategic bombing. Schaffer examines both the development of strategic bombing and the controversies evoked by such operations. He shows how the existence of new, long-range weapons offered the opportunity to destroy an opponent's homeland and the military imperative to do so, lest the enemy build similar weapons. Focusing most of his study on World War II decisions to bomb civilians, Schaffer finds a significant range of opinion in American political and military circles regarding the morality of mass bombing; in fact, even individual officials held conflicting views. In the end, Schafer conludes that the attacks were carried out, despite great U.S. losses and questionable effectiveness, because the bombers were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

readily available, because precision bombing proved ineffective, and because U.S. leaders felt obliged to use all means possible to defeat the Axis powers.

This is a fine, compact history of strategic bombing, and a good analysis of the controversies surrounding such operations. Throughout, it shows the complexity of collective decision making that weighs moral against military imperatives.

The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History. Edited by Richard Holmes. New York: Viking, 1988. 304 pp. $40.00.

The study of war has entered the popular market, with a host of non-specialist magazines and now books for the coffee table. Even a few years ago, books designed for coffee tables consisted mainly of pictures, and had little or no substance, but that is no longer the case, as the work under review shows. The authors strive intelligently to show how war shapes history, and how society shapes the waging of war. Holmes, who has previously written a number of books on military history, contributes about half the essays, covering military affairs from the Industrial Revolution through the ground operations of World War II. Other respected British scholars and strategists take up topics ranging from warfare in ancient civilizations to more recent developments such as strategic bombing and guerrilla warfare.

Not so much an "atlas" as a colorful and well-produced introduction to military history, this tome combines fine production values with a compact, usable history of warfare. Along the way, it shows the coffee-table book can also be a respectable work.

THE UNITED STATES
by Adam M. Garfinkle

The Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the Present. By Howard Jones. Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988. 747 pp. $24.95.

Jones's masterful work on the history of American diplomacy warrants an exception to the usual ORBIS policy of not reviewing textbooks. He describes more than two centuries of U.S. diplomacy, eschewing both canting criticism and jingoist praise, in a narrative style that is as matter-of-fact as one could reasonably expect. To remain objective while relating the events of two hundred years, including the passionately debated events of recent years, is no small accomplishment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What interests the author theoretically is the historical assessment of the "personalities, security interests, and expansionist tendencies behind the formulation of America's foreign policy." He argues that despite an idealistic vocabulary, American leaders have been realists in pursuing the national interest as they saw it — a thesis unlikely to spark great controversy. Jones also argues that domestic and foreign policies cannot be separated, and he practices what he preaches. The result is not only a fine text and an invaluable reference, but a source of guidance from the American past.

Far Left of Center: The American Radical Left Today. By Harvey Klehr. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1988. 310 pp. $29.95.

Non-radicals rarely write dispassionate descriptions of the radical left. Klehr has. Apart from a hint of a sermon in its conclusion, *Far Left of Center* provides a succinct yet detailed, carefully researched, and temperate essay in three parts. Klehr's aim in the book is to further a kind of political truth-in-advertising, for he notes that far left groups often hide their true agenda and observes that "it is hard to understand why any American or anyone concerned about democracy, freedom, and liberty would be anything but hostile to communism." That said, Klehr believes his aim is best served by description without embellishment, by letting the record speak for itself. He does. In that sense, the book's argument, insofar as it has one, is implicit in its design.

Klehr starts with the Communist Party USA, tracing the leadership, party-line, front organizations, influence on the labor movement, and relations with other leftist organizations. The second part describes a host of radical sects and splinter groups, mostly Maoist and Trotskyite. Part Three covers the offshoots of the New Left, establishing inter-group connections and sketching their recent institutional evolutions. Six groups are detailed: the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador; Clergy and Laity Concerned; Mobilization for Survival; the National Lawyers Guild; the Rainbow Coalition: and the Institute for Policy Studies. Especially laudable is Klehr's care not to lump such groups with either conventional Communists or pacifists or other "soft" left groups.

For anyone seeking a fine reference guide to the American left's myriad organizations, coalitions, and fronts, *Far Left of Center* offers the answer.

George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. By David Meyers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 402 pp. $32.50.

What is one to make of George Kennan, the enigmatic Mr. X who has been so much a part of postwar U.S. foreign policy? Social conservative, devout Protestant, former geopolitical realist, and one-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time racial elitist, he lines up with liberals on virtually every strategic issue and has done so for some time. Is Kennan a model of inconsistency, as many believe, or is he rather consistent, albeit in accord with unconventional principles? Has old age eroded his analytical skills or rather made him wise? Although historian John Gaddis has already been chosen to write the authorized biography, readers who cannot master their impatience should take a look at Meyers's work.

Meyers has had access to some new documents, and his information-rich presentation weaves Kennan's personal life together with his professional life as a public servant. But Meyers cannot seem to decide how important old cables and memos are, how they relate to decisions taken, and whether the twists of Kennan's career were based more on his principles, his personality, or on the normal whims of public life. The reader who begins puzzled remains puzzled; questions asked remain questions unanswered. Nevertheless, our puzzlement over Kennan has been rendered far more interesting by the many new pieces Meyers has laid on the table, particularly those of a more personal nature. Certainly, Meyers has raised the standard of expectation that Gaddis must meet.

National Security Planning: Roosevelt Through Reagan. By Michael M. Boll. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988. 288 pp. $26.00.

In the words of Colin Powell, national security adviser under President Reagan, "issues come and go; process is always important." As evidence, one need only point to conspicuous policy failures that were really failures of the national security planning process: the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Iran-Contra affair are two examples that immediately come to mind.

In his preface, Michael Boll writes that he intends to show how the process of planning U.S. security policy has shaped the policy itself. He refers to the "bargaining" that takes place between the executive and legislative branches as the "dynamic political process" that occurs within the American political system. Unfortunately, the book largely ignores such internal phenomena. Virtually the entire text is a simple narrative of post-World War II foreign policy. Chapter titles such as "Strategic Planning Under Truman" and "Defense Planning and the Budget" suggest that the author will discuss what happens behind closed doors at the White House or the Pentagon, but even here he deals only with the results of the process rather than the process itself. As historical accounts go, this one is well-written; the problem is that the author promised something more. B.B.

Restructuring American Foreign Policy. Edited by John D. Steinbruner. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989. 260 pp. $29.95 ($10.95, paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whatever their individual merits, the seven essays in this volume have no business cohabiting in one book. Barry Bosworth and Robert Lawrence have written a fine essay on America's global economic role; William Kaufmann weighs in on fiscal planning for defense, emphasizing (as is his wont) all the things the United States does not need — the D-5 missile, any new ICBMs for at least five years, *that* many Trident submarines, or *that* many navy ships. Kenneth Flamm and Thomas McNaugher write on "rationalizing" technology investments, arguing that the United States would get the most out of its research and development dollars if it concentrated its subsidies on the earlier rather than the latter stages of research. The editor offers a theoretical essay on the prospects for "cooperative security." Other pieces include "Socialist Reforms and the World Economy," "The East Asian Laboratory," and an essay on the Arab-Israeli conflict by Harold Saunders.

Such sweeping contents require the editor to integrate all into a single broad theme, leading to very broad generalizations and a few pieties. Steinbruner tells us that the world is changing and that American foreign policy must adjust. The essence of this change, he says, is that the U.S. economy is not in "stable harmony" with international markets, and its relative decline will eventually affect all American security and foreign-policy relationships. That seems harmless enough, but he goes on to assail economic sanctions and military coercion as "increasingly unreliable instruments unless set in a legitimizing context," advocating instead "refined principles of diplomacy" premised upon "the principles of reason and equity" which "promote internationally the central feature of its political system — the rule of law." As Brookings is something of a Democratic State Department in escrow, one cannot avoid speculating about the intended audience for such words. But Governor Dukakis lost, so we shall probably never know.

Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era. By Steven Emerson. New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1988. 256 pp. $17.95.

The Iran-Contra affair revealed that the Reagan White House used the National Security Council as an operational unit, circumventing other government agencies, including the CIA. Emerson here draws on many interviews and documents to show that wasn't the half of it. The 1980 rescue mission that failed in the Iranian desert, he claims, led the Pentagon to build its own covert operations units and engage in secret activities — some successful, others botched — on five continents. Soon, things were roguishly out of control: Emerson reports that "a transvestite prostitute and an inebriated counterintelligence man almost blew some of the govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment's most classified operations one late night in Baltimore." In 1983, the army shut down many of its operations, secretly court-martialing some of its officers.

But the Reagan White House, Emerson argues, saw the Pentagon's experiment as a way to bypass congressional oversight, and resorted to similar arrangements for irregular intelligence capability. Emerson thinks it no coincidence that many of the figures in the Iran-Contra mess — Secord, Hakim, Dutton, and others — were involved in the failed 1980 raid, and worked together after it on a number of secret Pentagon projects.

Although Emerson's account must be read warily in the absence of a fuller documentary record, his book has the flavor of reality. And if only half his allegations are true, Emerson has proved himself a masterful investigative journalist. But since journalists rarely admit to their uncertainties, it is best to defer the rewriting of history, pending further research.

EUROPE
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Greece under Socialism: A NATO Ally Adrift. Edited by Nikolaos A. Stavrou. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Aristide Caratzas Publisher/Orpheus Publishing Inc., 1988. 428 pp. $29.95.

Andreas Papandreou, prime minister of Greece and leader of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), was reported to be incensed about this collection of scholarly essays on his governing record. Apparently, he resented the suggestion in one of the book's working titles that his regime was in decline. Now that Papandreou's government is falling apart, "decline" sounds like a euphemism.

The essays gathered here analyze the ideology of Greek socialism, PASOK's defense policy, Soviet manipulation of political opinion and the Greek press, relations between Greece and the Common Market, and PASOK's infatuation with the Third World's radical movements and regimes. A contributor who prefers to use the pseudonym "Jeffrey Schaffer" provides a colorful political portrait of Papandreou.

In the end, the contributors agree that PASOK's inflammatory, anti-Western rhetoric wrought deep changes in the values and social attitudes of Greek society. And in this way, Papandreou's populist posturing may have long-term effects on the stability of southeastern Europe, with unpredictable consequences.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My Century: The Odyssey of a Polish Intellectual. By Aleksander Wat. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1988. 407 pp. $35.00.

Few intellectuals are more qualified than Wat to analyze the utopian mind. After spearheading leftist avant-garde culture in interwar Warsaw, Wat met the reality of Stalinism during the years he spent in the Soviet Union, including one in the Gulag. A maverick poet, always at odds with the powers-that-be, Wat died in exile in 1967, profoundly embittered and disenchanted with communism. He came to regard Stalinism not simply as a terrorist system generated by one man's paranoia, but as a structural design bent on the "killing of the inner man."

Conceived as "oral history," this spoken memoir bears witness to the most unsettling political and metaphysical dilemmas of the twentieth century; it stands on a par with works by Arthur Koestler and Manes Sperber. Much to Wat's credit, however, he does not allow his reflections to evolve into simple moral judgments. Rather, he provides an immensely insightful, extraordinary exercise in moral introspection and analysis. Urged on by Czeslaw Milosz, his congenial interviewer, Wat engages in labyrinthine digressions on the logic of radicalism, with its substitution of reason by faith and its suspension of all critical faculties. The reader will enjoy Wat's gripping psychological skills and profit from his intense sense of history.

Poland Challenges a Divided World. By John Rensenbrink. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1988. 246 pp. $19.95.

Poland's alternative political culture, symbolized by Solidarity (though not limited to it), represents an embryonic new society. A new generation of workers has been radicalized; novel forms of autonomous social activities have emerged; and an independent media network flourishes. All of this is part of the long-term, ineradicable effects of the "new evolutionism" advocated by Walesa and his advisers.

Thus reasons Rensenbrink in a book that discusses both the compelling social demands for political renewal and the constraints on it. Vividly written, drawing from the author's first-hand acquaintance with the Polish situation, *Poland Challenges a Divided World* emphasizes the potential for a non-violent overhaul of existing institutions and the maturing of a self-governing society. Within this process, Rensenbrink rightly observes, Solidarity has been a responsible political actor. Instead of blindly rejecting the institutions of Polish society, which would ruin its chances to influence the political process, the organization seems to limit its goals to "modest but significant modification in an already established system of authoritarian socialism."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The problem is that even such a limited agenda sounds unacceptable to the apparatchiks. It is not the opposition, but the party that must realize the urgency of a fair compromise. Rensenbrink's heartfelt call for the "end of the cold war" remains wishful thinking unless Jaruzelski's regime decides to make peace with Polish society.

Les religions d'un president: Regards sur les aventures du mitterrandisme. By Jean Daniel. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1988. 352 pp. Fr110.

According to Jean Daniel, editor of the influential leftist weekly *Le nouvel observateur* and one of François Mitterrand's personal confidants, the French president continues to nourish a deep resentment of capitalist values. Given that Mitterrand is a socialist, that may not be surprising. But it is surprising given that, under Mitterrand, the French Socialist party has grown de-radicalized and increasingly social democratic. To many, indeed, the man who once personified the French Left's Jacobin aspirations has begun to seem a committed democrat and unrepentant Atlanticist.

In *Les religions d'un president*, Daniel's penetrating portrayal of Mitterrand's enigmatic personality challenges all such conventional wisdom about the intellectual origins and make-up of Mitterrandism. Throughout Mitterrand's metamorphoses, Daniel tells us, he has remained loyal to his youthful abhorrence of money and its meaning. (Ironically, Mitterrand shared this hostility to capitalism with his political nemesis, Charles de Gaulle, who was also raised in the spirit of "social Catholicism.")

But Daniel also shows us how Mitterrand's success within French radical culture — including the marginalization of the French Communists — owed less to such doctrinaire zeal than to shrewd maneuvering and an astute re-shaping of leftist themes. An English translation of this sophisticated, elegantly written volume is needed.

The Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe. By Joseph Rothschild. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 257 pp. $24.95.

According to Rothschild, the Kremlin's attempt to create a homogenous East European community of socialist states has failed. Revival of repressed nationalisms and cultural differences has shaken the fragile legitimacy of the Soviet-sponsored ruling elites. The present situation is but a precarious stalemate between the local passions and a Soviet leadership unwilling to curtail its domination.

Rothschild condenses an enormous amount of information in this succinct and thoughtful survey. He shows how the resurgence of political movements rooted in national tradition has been a spontaneous, human answer to the ritualism of official political life. And

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he argues that a resurgence of diversity, apparent at both the institutional and social levels, threatens to efface the few remnants of bygone Stalinist internationalism, including the fiction of a "socialist fraternity" of states and peoples. The current tension between Hungary and Romania, which threatens to worsen everyday, adds further evidence to Rothschild's thesis on the inevitable resurrection of long-denied ethnic aspirations. Thousands of refugees from Romania have fled to Hungary, and the border between the two countries is now one of the most explosive in Europe.

Sophisticated Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent 1968-1987. By H. Stuart Hughes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. 172 pp. $20.00.

Welsh nationalism and Poland's Solidarity both reflect discontent with existing social and political conditions, but does that make them varieties of the same historical phenomenon? For Hughes, it does. These dissimilar movements illustrate his thesis that the political divide in Europe has less importance than the dissident mentality and an allegedly eternal vocation for protest.

Hughes proposes that 1968 inaugurated a reactionary age in both Eastern and Western Europe, a temporary victory of conformism and opportunism over imagination and hope. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the Prague Spring and the Paris student rebellion proceeded from the same impulse. Utopian impulses in the West differ in structure from attempts to dismantle the totalitarian structure in the East. To overlook this is to transform one's analysis of dissent into a mere formal exercise, impervious to cultural specificity.

The reader who expects an analytical approach to the strategies of European dissent will be confused by this idiosyncratic, subjective essay. Despite these reservations, this book evinces Hughes's impressive familiarity with diverse intellectual environments, and his ability to link culture and politics in a seductive — although questionable — synthesis.

The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and the German National Identity. By Charles Maier. Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 227pp. $22.50.

A debate is raging in West Germany between conservative historians, for whom National Socialism was only a variety of the totalitarian evil, and those who consider the Holocaust the ultimate horror. "Historicist" conservatives like Ernst Nolte want to restore the sense of continuity in German history, in part by abolishing long-respected taboos concerning the Holocaust. In contrast, liberals insist that the moral foundations of the Federal Republic must take precedence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over loyalties to an archaic *Heimat* (homeland). Jürgen Habermas, the social philosopher, accused the conservatives of irresponsible nationalism and proclaimed the need to safeguard "constitutional patriotism" as the moral cement of the Bonn Republic. The issue touches upon the Germans' self-conception, with its unhealed traumas and unavowed yearnings, including the search for a national identity.

Maier brilliantly captures the major themes of this ongoing debate among West Germany's foremost historians and social scientists. His balanced — though never impersonal — reflections illuminate the motives of the protagonists. He disentangles the complex web of historical, psychological, and political threads in what might otherwise appear purely speculative strife. Although Meier's personal sympathies lie with the liberals, he acknowledges that their perspective runs the risk of producing "a simplistic and politicized historiography." The conservative alternative, however, can lead to an even more dangerous sterilization of the ethical sense and a pseudo-escape from the overwhelming burden of the past.

THE SOVIET UNION

by Nicolai N. Petro

A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials. 4th Edition. Compiled by Alexander G. Rahr. Munich: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1988. 241 pp. $10.00. **Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials.** Compiled by Albert L. Weeks. Washington, D.C: The Washington Institute Press, 1988. 134 pp. $69.95. **Directory of Full and Candidate Members of the Soviet Central Committee.** Compiled by Theodore W. Karasik. Sherman Oaks, Calif.: Theodore W. Karasik, 1988. 114 pp. $25.00.

The tedious charting of the careers of leading Soviet officials, has become something of a cottage industry. Each of these three directories covers much the same territory, but with its own distinct quality.

Rahr's biographic directory has become a standard reference. In addition to lists of members of major state and party organizations, and the novel listing of "selected proponents of perestroika," Rahr provides a detailed chronology of the education, career, war experience, travel abroad, major speeches and publications, and awards — as well as apparent patrons and expertise — of the Soviet elite. Rahr, unfortunately, omits an index, a major shortcoming in a reference book of this sort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Weeks lists names and titles of leading Soviet figures according to their party function, down to the members of Central Committee departments. For members of the Politburo and Ministry of Defense, he offers one paragraph biographies. The book ends with a handy index of names and government entities.

Karasik, a staff member at the Rand Corporation, concentrates exclusively on members of the Central Committee, including the Politburo and Secretariat, for whom he offers extensive biographies, emphasizing career moves. The rest of the directory lists full members and candidate members alphabetically, with current titles, positions, addresses, and even phone numbers. A short roster of leading organizations, as Rahr provides, would be helpful.

The difficulty with all three compendia is their accuracy. Current information is elusive and recent rapid turnovers in the party hierarchy make these directories quickly obsolete. Week's directory has been revised once since 1987; Rahr's every two years. Karasik offers a revised compilation four times a year and provides updates upon request for an additional fee.

The market for such information extends beyond professional Kremlin watchers to businesses in search of introductions, groups promoting people-to-people exchanges, and human rights organizations targeting individuals in the political establishment. The three volumes are more complementary than mutually exclusive, and relatively inexpensive, so it makes sense to buy them all.

Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 510 pp. $32.50 ($15.95, paper).

Bialer and Mandelbaum have brought together a group of distinguished authors who distill much valuable information about the origins of the current systemic crisis in the USSR. S. Frederick Starr discusses historical patterns of reform; Robert Campbell the dysfunctional Soviet economic model; Thane Gustafson and Timothy J. Colton the political and structural difficulties of systemic reform. Their informative and suggestive writing makes it all the more disappointing, therefore, that the concluding sections on Russia's role in the world and its relationship with the United States do not fulfill the title's promise. Indeed, despite contributions by renowned scholars (including Robert Legvold and William Hyland), the volume offers precious little in the way of policy recommendations. Several contributors hold that reform processes in the Soviet Union may inspire sympathy, but that there is little the United States should do to encourage them. All the authors agree to is the unremarkable conclusion offered by Joseph S. Nye that "Gorbachev's domestic policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is an important American interest for a variety of reasons" — but no consensus emerges about what that American interest actually is.

The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000. By Alexander Yanov. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 302 pp. $24.95.

Is Russian nationalism a threat to the relative liberalism of *glasnost*? With a masterful command of sources, Yanov argues that devotees of the "Russian Idea" — the myth of the Russian nation's unique predestination — do indeed aim to seize political power. He holds that a Russian "New Right" could succeed in reversing current trends and establishing a military despotism, perhaps by the end of the century.

The relevance of this provocative book is enhanced by its knowledgeable examination of contemporary Russian nationalist trends. Perhaps the most distressing phenomenon is the ongoing merger of the Russian nationalist and traditionalist movement and the neo-Stalinist faction of the Communist party and the intelligentsia. In the latter faction, to be sure, Marxism and Leninism still ensure a veneer of "internationalism." But links between the "patriotic association" Pamyat and the KGB, the army, and the Ligachev faction of the party leadership show the shallowness of their differences. Extreme nationalism has ceased to be a fringe phenomenon; rather, it may provide the means for some Soviet leaders to preserve their power.

The author holds that Soviet scholars in the West underrate the likelihood of such a frightening dénouement to the ideological showdown now under way in the Soviet Union. But if so, the reason lies in the highly heterogeneous structure of Russian nationalism (which Yanov acknowledges) and in the demonstrated strength of the "liberal" faction that seems to be Gorbachev's power base. V.T.

Self-Government and Freedom in Russia. By Sergei Pushkarev. Translated by Paul Bannes. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 158 pp. $15.95 (paper).

Drawing on his earlier work, Pushkarev (1888-1984) produced as his last book this brief but well-written, balanced account of his countrymen's striving for freedom since the eleventh century. After a quick look at the pre-1800 era, he delves into nineteenth-century projects for constitutional reform, and ends with Lenin's New Economic Policy of 1922-26.

The scholarly flaws here are few, and some are presumably the translator's. Thus, the body that became the upper house in 1906 is confusingly called both State Council and State Soviet. But the author himself may be responsible for alleging that the imperial adviser K. P. Pobedonostsev held effective power during the reign of Alexander III, a notion long since disproven. The last chapter, dealing with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Revolution and Civil War, would have benefited from attention to the extensive, recently published American research on the period. Generally, however, Pushkarev's facts are straight and his interpretations scholarly, if not always convincing. Some of his best pages are devoted to the peasantry.

In the introduction, Nicholas Riasanovsky says that the book contains "nostalgia for the Russia that was and its unrealized historical possibilities." No doubt it does. But in the book's foreword, Nicolai Petro calls attention to the historical debates in today's USSR and the emergence — among contemporary Soviet journalists, novelists, and historians — of opinions not so different from Pushkarev's. Increasingly, it seems, some of those "historical possibilities" for which Pushkarev waxed nostalgic may yet be realized. If so, his writings may one day seem to look forward as well as backward.

Donald W. Treadgold

The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons. By Richard H. Shultz, Jr. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 283 pp. $16.95 (paper).

A multilateral approach makes this volume one of the best studies on its topic. Three perspectives are presented: the historic (an examination of Soviet attitudes toward "national liberation" movements); the theoretical (an analysis of Marxist-Leninist interpretations of revolutionary warfare); and the practical (a study of Soviet support for four specific insurgent organizations in Vietnam, Israel, Namibia, and Central America).

The author's Soviet-centered outlook is a virtue when he seeks to illuminate Moscow's perceptions, but it has limitations when assessing Moscow's achievements. The analysis of SWAPO (the South West Africa People's Organization) illustrates this point: Shultz ably dissects the system of direct and indirect Soviet support for SWAPO, but provides no explanation for SWAPO's unimpressive military performance. In the case of Central America, the author fails to point out that, regardless of Soviet wishes, Salvadoran communist insurgents have shifted from insurrectional to protracted revolutionary warfare. Unfortunately, the book was completed before recent political changes raised doubts about the extent to which the Kremlin retains the old aggressive attitudes toward low-intensity warfare in the Third World. Still, the author's critical assessment of U.S. military capabilities, political will, and conceptual understanding of the threat posed by Soviet-supported insurgencies remains entirely valid.

M.R.

The Soviet Union and the Challenge of the Future. Volume 1, Stasis and Change. Edited by Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan. New York: Paragon House, 1988. 555 pp. $29.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Just five months after Gorbachev took power in 1985, an international conference of Soviet scholars met in Geneva to consider "The Fall of the Soviet Empire: Prospects for Transition to a Post-Soviet World." Despite some controversy surrounding the sponsors of the conference (and editors of this volume) — the Professors' World Peace Academy, which is closely tied to the Reverend Sun Myung Moon — those responsible for the conference and for this book have provided a noteworthy service in persuading some of the world's leading Soviet scholars to speculate on the nature of a post-Soviet world. As used during the conference, "post-Soviet" referred not to the Soviet Union's demise, but to a dramatic change in the Soviet system of government, including those changes implied by Gorbachev when he speaks of "radical reform."

This first volume includes twenty-three papers and comments on the nature of the Soviet system, its state of crisis, the prospects for transition, and what the alternatives to the present may be. Authors include such luminaries as Richard V. Burks, Robert F. Byrnes, Leszek Kolakowski, Richard Lowenthal, Michael Voslensky, and Peter J.D. Wiles. Their views range widely, some even rejecting the premise of the conference that the current Soviet system is in immediate danger. The result provides stimulating reading on the future of the Soviet system, as well as a cause to look forward to subsequent volumes.

Stalin: Man and Ruler. By Robert H. McNeal. New York: New York University Press, 1988. 389 pp. $34.95.

Marxism-Leninism has become a single unit, despite the obvious contradictions between its two components. In contrast, few people speak of Leninism-Stalinism, despite the obvious continuities. McNeal is a welcome exception. He opposes the widespread tendency to see Stalin as a cynical tyrant whose career was almost unrelated to ideology. "Stalin could manipulate theory and policy for self-interested ends," McNeal writes, "but he was in his way a deeply committed Marxist-Leninist and a champion of class struggle."

Unfortunately, the promise of this insight is not fulfilled. Indeed, the major flaw in this biography is that it is too biographical. Concentrating on Stalin's personality is a worthwhile undertaking, but only if it does not obscure Stalinism's systemic features, which permitted his odious personality to accomplish so much. McNeal believes that Stalin's warfare against his own party apparatus was short-lived and did not characterize the logic of the Stalinist system. To be sure, he concedes, Stalin was ready toward the end of his life to stage a super-purge, but this derived from a psychotic vision of class struggle. In short, McNeal argues, though the tyrant went mad, the system he created was not structurally conducive to atrocities. It so happens

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that McNeal's interpretation is contradicted by the ample literature on Stalin and Stalinism currently published in the USSR under the banner of *glasnost*. V.T.

THE MIDDLE EAST
by Daniel Pipes

As Others See Us: Mutual Perceptions, East and West. Edited by Bernard Lewis, Edmund Leites, and Margaret Case. New York: International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, 1985. 310 pp. $20.00.

Edward Said's 1975 attack on Orientalists in general and Bernard Lewis in specific provoked a debate that still continues. In *As Others See Us*, Lewis musters some strong support to help him argue (1) the weakness of Said's case and (2) the value of the Orientalist enterprise. Most of the book looks at the ways in which Westerners and Muslims, Chinese, Japanese, and Indians have seen each other. A brief section at the end considers mutual perceptions between Muslims on one side and Chinese and Indians on the other.

Some of the chapters are brilliant. Fedwa Malti-Douglas shows why Said's attempt to tie Orientalists to imperialism fails ("one man's scholar is another man's Orientalist"); G.M. Wickens absolves Orientalists of responsibility for the life-in-the-harem type of soft pornography; William E. Naff demonstrates the utter irrelevancy of Said's paradigm in the case of Japan; and Carl Steenstrup muses on the whole enterprise of cross-cultural studies (coming up with such offbeat but important insights as, "what is trivial in one language is trivial also in translation").

Perhaps because it was published as a double issue of the *Comparative Civilizations Review*, this excellent book has led an utterly obscure existence. Even at this late date, however, the publishers should begin to advertise and distribute *As Others See Us*; failing that, they should pass it on to another company that will do so.

Beirut: City of Regrets. By Eli Reed and Fouad Ajami. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988. 188 pp. $34.95 ($19.95, paper).

Reed took the 128 color pictures and Ajami wrote the 47 pages of text in this vivid survey of Beirut as it exists today. As ever, Ajami writes with a rare lyrical skill (especially notable since his English is a learned language). Having grown up in Beirut, he presents his overview of the city's history with a bitter fondness. Not surprisingly, Ajami is best at evoking the ironies and foibles of Beirut's ruin. "By

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the early 1980s, in the city that had parodied Paris there was now a parody of Iran's theocratic revolution; parody had replaced parody." "No one could really 'win' in Beirut. In the mid-1970s, the combatants fought over beachfront hotels, over once-proud places. A decade later, they were fighting over shells of gutted buildings."

To a reader familiar with Lebanon's fate but lacking in first-hand experience of the war, Reed's photographs have power and immediacy. A number of pictures show gunmen, but most do not. The gunmen wear expressions exactly like those of the gang members that maraud in large American cities — violent, arrogant, and profoundly uncivilized. The rest of the population appears either to be cowering or desperately pretending that the gunmen do not exist. As a result, even pictures of the most normal events (of bathers, of a christening, of a fashion show) reek of falsehood. The gunmen define all: the central reality as well as the pretense that that reality can be denied.

In a century in which most horrors have been perpetrated by an over-powerful state, *Beirut: City of Regrets* provides an awful reminder that this is not the only danger. Anarchy can also lead to tragedy. The numbers of casualties may be smaller, but the viciousness is no less horrifying.

Moroccan Mirages: Agrarian Dreams and Deceptions, 1912-1986. By Will D. Swearingen. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 217 pp. $37.50 ($14.95, paper).

On one level, *Moroccan Mirages* is about land, water, and plants; on another, it deals with the dynamics of imperial rule, the impact of ideas, and the lasting legacy of colonial patterns. Swearingen brings many surprising points to light in his excellent, original study of Morocco's historical geography. He shows, for example, how a faulty notion that Morocco had once been the "granary of Rome" inspired the French conquerors of Morocco in the 1920s to make Morocco their granary too — with disastrous results for agriculture in Morocco (which is no one's granary) and France (which serves very well as a granary). Then came the California interlude in the 1930s, when *colon* agricultural spies sent samples of grafts and cuttings by mail back to Morocco.

But most important for present-day Morocco were the ambitious efforts to bring vast areas of Moroccan land under irrigation through the construction of dams. Swearingen shows how this program in effect subsidized the largest, richest landowners — namely the French and some of the Moroccan elite — at the expense of millions of peasants. He convincingly shows that, all the many changes in Morocco since the 1930s notwithstanding, this misguided colonial policy remains solidly in place even today. As the population soars,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so do financial disparities; and favoritism bestowed on the rich creates an agrarian predicament that "has the potential to develop into a severe crisis in the non-distant future."

Palästina im Umbruch, 1856-1882: Untersuchungen zur wirtschaftlichen und sozio-politischen Entwicklung. By Alexander Schölch. Stuttgart: Franz Steinger Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986. 303 pp. DM 82.

The study of the Arab-Israeli conflict has, in recent years, taken on a more historical cast, with new attention being paid to such issues as nineteenth-century Palestinian demographics, great power actions after World War I, and (especially) the events surrounding the creation of Israel. Schölch does not attempt to participate in any of these controversies, but he has ransacked archives in five countries to make available fresh and important information to ascertain "the characteristics that Arab-Palestinian society exhibited before the immigration of European Jews." The data he brings to light in this rambling but rich study should affect the debate.

Schölch titles his study "Palestine in Upheaval" because the quarter-century under review witnessed the emergence of some basic features which soon became critical to Palestine's future. These included a demographic surge, a decline in the power of local warlords, the export of agricultural produce, the British occupation of Egypt, and the first Zionist *'aliyah*. Further, Schölch argues that the combination of the Ottoman Empire's centralizing policies and European penetration meant that Palestine in those years became a real political and administrative unit in the eyes of contemporary observers. "In this regard," he concludes, "the delineation of the boundaries of the Mandate for Palestine after World War I was not an arbitrary act."

The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally. By William Shawcross. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. 463 pp. $19.95.

There is drama in the story of Pahlevi's last year and a half, from his leaving Iran until his death in July 1980. But there is actually rather little story. Shawcross, the talented author of *Sideshow*, has done his best to eke out the details of this sad, small tale. But this reader concludes that he has pretty much wasted his time, and Shawcross himself seems to know it. For all his efforts to fill out *The Shah's Last Ride*, he relies heavily on that favorite trick of the schoolchild who has to write a paper but has nothing to say — he adds padding. The shah having spent a few weeks in Morocco, we are treated to a full biography of Moroccan King Hasan. Almost anything that will fill a few pages does — gossip about sexual escapades at the court in Tehran, technical explanations of the shah's various ailments, the history of Panama, even the political philosophies of the agents who dealt with the shah for the various governments. *The Shah's Last*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ride proves that too many investigative journalists are working away in our midst. Having run out of subjects, they are reduced to "investigating" small, flimsy sideshows.

This said, *The Shah's Last Ride* is a well-written and engrossing tale. Aside from several tirades against Henry Kissinger, Shawcross offers a generally balanced account. He sees the shah's failings and those of everyone else, but he also appreciates the man's human dimensions and is sensible to the whole event's tragic overtones.

Sojourners and Settlers: The Yemeni Immigrant Experience. Edited by Jonathan Friedlander. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988. 188 pp. $34.95.

Yemenis make up one of the smallest and most exotic immigrant groups to the United States — some 10,000 in all. Most of the immigrants are concentrated in three areas — Detroit, Buffalo, and the San Joaquin Valley in California — where they work, respectively, in automobile factories, steel factories, and fruit and vegetable fields. Their experience is brought to life by the quite wonderful pictures in this lavish volume (for which the University of Utah Press should be congratulated, especially at so reasonable a price). In particular, the illustrations show the stark contrast between the splendid geography in Yemen and the utter tawdriness of the Yemeni life in the United States; and how the men who stand proud in 'Amran, Yemen, turn into the most common manual laborers in Lackawanna, New York. Most of the chapters document this small community; in the most analytic effort, Georges Sabbagh and Mehdi Bozorgmehr show the almost imperceptible ways by which single male transients eventually become settler families.

If Yemeni immigrants almost disappear in the vastness of the United States, Manfred W. Weiner shows that Yemeni emigrants are a very major phenomenon. One-fourth of the adult male population is estimated to have left North Yemen, and its absence has deeply affected virtually every aspect of life in the country, including the role of agriculture, investment patterns, the place of women, demographics, social mobility, and foreign policy. It is clear that whatever the short-term benefits, such heavy dependence on outside employment holds great dangers for the Yemens.

A Soldier in Search of Peace. By Avraham Tamir. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 259 pp. $22.50.

Tamir is the consummate insider of Israeli politics. Never elected to anything, he has nonetheless been intimately involved with almost everything, often at the highest levels. He stood in Ben-Gurion's office seven months after Israel's birth; participated in every Arab-Israeli war; helped with the Camp David negotiations; joined the internal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struggles over the war in Lebanon; and took part in secret diplomacy with Jordan. Obviously, Tamir knows a lot that has never been told. But beyond an occasional hint, he does not tell much of it here.

Sober and reasonable, free of vituperation and illusion, Tamir's broad-ranging book is divided into three sections. One deals with the processes leading to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, another with the war in Lebanon. The last takes up a potpourri of topics, from the most central (the occupied territories and the country's future) to the peripheral (the author's brief and inglorious relationship with Idi Amin). In telling his story, however, Tamir sticks to well-known chronologies, and his attitude never wanders far from basic Labor sensibilities. He is polite to the Likud, careful what he says about U.S.-Israeli relations, and pedantically attentive to issues such as planning for Israeli national security.

This does not mean the book has no personal dimension — it has: a maddening one. Tamir laces his account with anecdotes, but virtually every one seems selected and edited to tell all and reveal nothing. Given the author's eventful life, one hopes he plans to write another book. A.M.G.

Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954. By Joel Beinen and Zachary Lockman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 488 pp. $75.00.

Beinen and Lockman offer an eccentric reading of Egyptian history between the British colonization and the rise to power of Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir (Nasser). They argue two main points: that the early 1900s saw the urban workers "cohere into a new social class" and that by the late 1940s this class had become "a highly visible and politically significant force in Egyptian society."

The first point is no more than a matter of semantics (especially when one is dealing with so thoroughly a non-industrialized country as was Egypt in 1900), and thus bears little discussion. But the second point is demonstrably false, for the authors' own data show that the workers' efforts repeatedly met with frustration — at the hands of the industrialists, government officials, or Muslim Brethren. Further, Beinen and Lockman admit that 'Abd an-Nasir finished off the workers' power in the "historic compromise" of 1954. That does not leave much of a "politically significant force," and this reader finished well over four hundred pages of text with the distinct sense that he'd been had.

Perhaps the clue to the goal behind this odd enterprise lies in Beinen and Lockman's reliance on such terms as "the hegemonic [i.e., non-Marxist] scholarly interpretations of Middle Eastern history," "the world capitalist system," "the capitalist mode of production," "compradors," and the "reactionary and parasitical class of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

large landowners." Their use of these shopworn phrases suggests that this is not a book about Egypt so much as it is a statement within the closed world of Marxist scholarship.

AFRICA
by Peter Duignan

Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspective. By Olusola Ojo. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 181 pp. $23.50 (paper).

Ojo, a Nigerian, examines Israeli-African relations from about 1960 to the late 1980s, with special attention to Israel's connections with Nigeria and South Africa. Along the way, he presents detailed information on aid, trade, diplomatic representation, and military assistance. He concludes that Africa's break with Israel did not work in Africa's favor; that the Arab states should no longer be allowed a veto over Africa's choice of friends; and that a Middle East peace settlement should not be a precondition for the resumption of ties between Africa and Israel.

When it comes to Israeli ties with South Africa, however, Ojo asserts that Africa has a legitimate interest in opposing the two states' association. But, avoiding a moralistic perspective, he acknowledges it would be unrealistic for Africans to demand the termination of all Israeli-South African links.

African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendency. By Paul Kennedy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 233 pp. $12.95 (paper).

As Kennedy sees it, Africa's future remains clouded by its mercantile, statist inheritance from the colonial powers, by an attraction to politics as the instrument for economic advancement, and by the strong urban bias of most African economies. Even prior to independence, sons of the indigenous African elite had come to regard salaried jobs, rather than self-employment, as the preferred path to economic security. When post-colonial Africans did engage in entrepreneurship, they generally went into commerce rather than manufacturing or agriculture, and they almost universally depended upon the state to provide capital and protection against competitors.

Although it is not always clear that Kennedy is happy with his well-documented conclusions, he does demonstrate that Western-style capitalism has never been seriously tried in Africa; that anti-capitalist perceptions and behavior have played a major role in creating and perpetuating Africa's economic backwardness; and that Africa's present economic crisis requires a break with this tradition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and a deaf ear for the siren song of socialism. Wisely, he suggests that the production of goods for local consumption is one area where would-be African entrepreneurs might successfully compete with more sophisticated foreign enterprises. But the cultural question remains: would even such a modest starting point find acceptance in an environment permeated by nationalism, politicization of the economic processes, and excessive expectations? M.R.

The Crisis and Challenge of African Development. Edited by Harvey Glickman. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. 272 pp. $42.95.

A new consensus has taken hold in the West on the matter of policy toward Africa, one which de-emphasizes social engineering programs and favors private investment. This book challenges that consensus. Although the contributors acknowledge that post-colonial states have many failings, they reject the prescription of Western-style market reforms. Princeton Lyman argues that the West must provide more aid, instead of shirking its charitable responsibilities. Barbara Lewis agrees — and would have the aid used to extend the feminist agenda to Africa, especially with regard to agricultural development. Raymond R. Hopkins contends that the political costs of loosing free markets in Africa outweigh the benefits of economic efficiency. Vremudia P. Diejomach, in making the case for controlled foreign investment, contends that the East Asian models of successful economic development embodied in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are not generally applicable to the African continent, because these Asian countries were never really aligned with the Third World. Aid officials in Washington and Tokyo whose jobs depend on the continued outpouring of funds to Africa will rejoice in the conclusions of this book. No responsible centrist scholar can accept them.

How Can Africa Survive? By Jennifer Seymour Whitaker. New York: Harper and Row, 1988. 264 pp. $19.95.

The grim pessimism of the title question gives some sense of the tribulations that Africans have endured since the optimism of the 1960s. Whitaker, a staff member of the Council on Foreign Relations, examines with verve what she calls "the role of pre-modern states in a modern world," the general causes of Africa's failures, foreign aid, demographic problems, ecological deterioration, the role of education, and prospects for the future. Yet the completeness and objectivity of her diagnoses are open to question. She blames too much on South Africa — and says little about the *pieds rouges* (those Western experts who too often gave post-colonial Africans the wrong advice). There is no analysis of Marxism-Leninism's resounding economic failures in Angola and Mozambique, or elsewhere in Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor does Whitaker mention deeds of cooperation between South Africa and its neighbors, such as the building of the Cabora Bassa dam and developing the port of Maputo in Mozambique. In sum, this is Africa seen through one set of liberal lenses. Worse still, Whitaker proposes no practical solutions to Africa's mighty problems; perhaps she regards her book's title as a rhetorical question. To catch up on Africa's crisis, read instead (editor) Robert Jackson's *Politics and Government in African States, 1960-1985* (Hoover Press, 1986).

Oliver Tambo and the Struggle against Apartheid. Edited by E.S. Reddy. New York: Apt Books, Inc., 1988. 169 pp. $27.50.

Reddy's largely propagandistic effort reflects the values of his employer, the United Nations. Specifically, this slim and expensive volume seeks to establish an attractive public persona for Oliver Tambo, the figurehead of the African National Congress of South Africa, by uncritically reprinting his speeches and other documents.

When not parroting Nelson Mandela's rhetoric, Tambo's own speeches simply strive to convince the world's democracies that the ANC's struggle is justified. Thus we read statements to the effect that, unless the "world" destroys South Africa for the ANC, a "bloodbath in South Africa is inevitable." But no mention is made of the ANC's own role in provoking such an outcome. Nor is anything said of the organization's anti-democratic internal structure and allegiance to global anti-democratic goals — manifested in its support for the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, the Cuban occupation of Angola, and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Also conspicuously absent are examples of Tambo's habitual expressions of gratitude to the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc, and mention of the symbiotic relationship of the ANC with the South African Communist party. In sum, the volume amounts to a portrait of Tambo so uncritical, it might have been written by the ANC propaganda organs. M.R.

Red Star over Southern Africa. By Morgan Norval. Washington, D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1988. 218 pp. $18.95.

This highly conservative description of Soviet machinations in Africa illustrates an error that too often plagues anti-Soviet analysts dealing with the Third World. The author simply attributes African Marxism-Leninism to Muscovite plots, rather than to the African intelligentsia's fondness for power, its misunderstandings of the modern world, and its opposition to the West. In a peculiar way, the work mirrors those leftist analyses which also see Africans as mere auxiliaries of East or West. Thus, Norval is quite wrong to describe the anti-communist Angolan and Mozambican resistance organizations, UNITA and RENAMO respectively, as "democratic" or "pro-West-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern." They are neither; instead, they are highly personalistic and rooted in the peculiar political traditions of Africa.

One additional complaint: the book looks as though it were published before the invention of proofreading; misspellings, typos, and elementary factual errors adorn virtually every page. Nevertheless, even if overenthusiastic and ill-edited, the book provides a usefully detailed description of African resistance to Marxism-Leninism and Soviet adventurism. In so doing, Norval has helped all those interested in the continent's realities, for these aspects of African politics are conspicuously absent from the majority of works on Africa. M.R.

Surrender or Starve: The Wars behind the Famine. By Robert D. Kaplan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988. 188 pp. $24.95.

Overlook the date and setting, and this work could pass for a study of the Ukrainian famine Stalin contrived in the 1930s. Drawing on personal research in the Sudan and Ethiopia, Kaplan compellingly demonstrates that the Ethiopian famine of 1985-86 was manufactured by the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam. From the regime's perspective, the mass extermination of the few successful Ethiopian farmers (called "kulaks" by the regime — the very term used by Stalin) made perfect sense, as did the mass displacement of the population from relatively developed Eritrea and Tigray to backward areas in the southwest. These actions destroyed the independence of the peasantry, denied recruits to the ethnic insurgents in the north, and impoverished all involved, then made them subservient to the government. That hundreds of thousands of people died in the process apparently mattered nothing to the regime.

Nor, apparently, did it matter much to world opinion that the indirect subsidies provided by Western humanitarian organizations and governments made them in some degree complicit in this state-sponsored genocide. Kaplan's careful documentation of the record may change that, but decades of experience suggest his work will become obscure testimony buried in the public archive, waiting for a generation more willing to confront unpleasant facts about the Third World. M.R.

The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-1960. Edited by Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988. 651 pp. $17.95.

The transfer of power in Africa, says contributor Basil Davidson, also entailed a transfer of crisis. What Gifford and Louis have done is to assemble a study on that "transfer of crisis." Although many of the usual complaints against collaborative studies — overlap, varying quality, lack of cohesion — can be lodged against this one, the book

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is nonetheless a major study. Some contributions deal with general subjects, such as Crawford Young's "The Colonial State and Post-Colonial Crisis." Some focus on the fates of particular territories, like Michael Crowder's analysis of Botswana. And some are bibliographies (on Anglophone Africa, on the French, Italian, Belgian, and Portuguese territories).

Many essays emphasize "the Marxist sentiment that a clean break must be made with the colonial past," and the editors' introduction lambastes "the undoubted greed and cunning of Africa's colonial exploitation." Still, the contributors know that the colonial powers did not engineer all of post-colonial Africa's troubles.

LATIN AMERICA
by Michael Radu

Central America: Democracy, Development, and Change. Edited by John M. Kirk and George W. Schuyler. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988. 224 pp. $39.95.

Most contributors to this collection are obscure figures from minor Canadian universities and colleges, and their essays, reiterating familiar slogans in strident voices, will only generate further misunderstanding of Central America. Among the less obscure figures represented in this collection are Guillermo Ungo, a political figurehead for the Salvadoran guerrillas; Ed Asner, Hollywood's self-appointed expert on Central America; and Wayne Smith, a passionately obsessed enemy of the Reagan administration.

The presence of such figures provides a few valuable insights for students of Central America or of the American radical left. For example, Blase Bonpane, the ex-Maryknoll priest expelled from Guatemala for open support of the Marxist-Leninist insurgents, admits that his liberation theology "is quite prepared to make [political] value judgments," making it easier to understand why the Guatemalan government dismissed this priest's claims of pious innocence. Similarly, when Asner complains of the U.S. Congress's "McCarthyism," it becomes evident that he is a radical — not simply a concerned but misguided citizen who found a cause in a place he cannot comprehend.

Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. By Robert A. Pastor. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988. 392 pp. $ 24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How did a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist regime come to power in Nicaragua in 1979? And why did the United States allow such a thing to happen? Pastor, a National Security Council expert on Latin America during the Carter administration, provides more than a few answers. In the beginning, it seems, the Carter administration had no policy on Nicaragua, only a general human rights policy. What actually convinced Carter that Somoza had to go was the support of the Sandinistas by Presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela and Omar Torrijos of Panama. In a tragicomic scenario, the Latin American presidents expected Washington to prevent the Sandinistas (FSLN) from taking power because of their ideology. But Washington, having scrapped its "inordinate fear of communism," followed the Latins' apparent lead, and the result was a new type of dictatorship in Nicaragua that neither Caracas, Panama City, nor Washington knew how to tame.

Pastor still misses one part of the story: the nature of the Sandinistas at their moment of victory. Intelligence sources, scholars of the day, and the written record of all FSLN factions accurately depicted the FSLN as a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist organization — faction-ridden, perhaps, but totalitarian. Pastor seems to think otherwise. But his important account does not make clear whether this information was lacking within the Carter administration or whether the administration was simply unwilling to face reality.

Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade. By Scott B. MacDonald. New York: Praeger, 1988. 312 pp. $12.95 (paper).

MacDonald manages to avoid the hysterical, self-deluding claims of those who blame Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia for what is essentially an internal American problem. Consequently, his may be the most balanced and unemotional of the many recent books on the drug issue.

MacDonald carefully examines (1) the enormous temptation for Latin American peasants to produce coca rather than other crops; (2) the incentives for residents of tourist spots like the Bahamas and Mexico to serve as middlemen; and (3) the great power of Colombian and Mexican criminal gangs to encourage or enforce such leanings. He convincingly concludes that drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean, far from being an aberrant criminal enterprise, is principally an economic and social phenomenon. In short, he says, the drug trade is here to stay, unless the United States and Western Europe are prepared to cope with their own social problems, where the demand for drugs is rooted.

Guatemala's Political Puzzle. By Georges A. Fauriol and Eva Loser. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988. 224 pp. $24.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Guatemala, the most populous and economically significant Central American country, is also scene of one of the world's longest running Marxist-Leninist guerrilla campaigns. Unfortunately, academic and pseudo-academic literature on the country has been so completely dominated by political emotions, particularly leftist ones, it is nearly impossible for the reader to find a balanced, serious, and unbiased analysis of Guatemalan realities. Happily this volume provides such an analysis, at least in part.

Fauriol and Loser take particular interest in the political dynamics that culminated in 1985 with the free election of Guatemala's first civilian president in twenty-one years. These dynamics included shifts in the military's attitudes, the economic situation, and in Guatemalan society. Unfortunately, the authors are less interested in and informed about the structure, mentality, and ideology of the Guatemalan revolutionaries — even the names of some important groups are misspelled. The authors' lack of depth in this area led them to neglect important connections, for example, the link between the near-total suppression of the guerrillas by 1984 and the military's subsequent decision to return to the barracks. The pioneering quality of this volume, however, makes it extremely useful despite such lapses.

La Hoz y el Machete: La Internacional Comunista, América Latina y La Revolución en Centroamérica. By Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1986. 445 pp. ¢500 (paper).

Central America's Communist parties are much in the news, yet their origins remain little known, and that makes this volume a useful contribution. Although Cerdas draws heavily on secondary sources, he displays an impressive knowledge of the Latin American parties, the intellectual atmosphere prevailing on the left during the 1920s and 1930s, and Moscow's attitudes toward Latin America.

The author's thesis, amply demonstrated, is that Stalin's Comintern misunderstood, manipulated, and ultimately sacrificed the communist movement in Central America. He shows the complete artificiality of Comintern ideology vis-à-vis Central America's realities. But Cerdas errs on one crucial point, implying that a better understanding of Central American realities by Stalin and his aides could have produced better results. This fails to appreciate the extent to which the problem lay with communist ideology as such. Communists and Communist parties in the region, including El Salvador's party under the leadership of Agustín Farabundo Martí, were far closer to the philosophy of the Comintern than to the philosophies in their own countries. Comintern manipulation and arbitrary decisions may have weakened the Salvadoran Communists during the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

failed 1932 insurrection, but their graves were largely dug by their own ignorance of local realities.

1984 Nicaragua. Edited by Xavier Zavala. San Jose, Costa Rica: Asociación Libro Libre, 1985. 290 pp. ¢285 (paper).

The best of Nicaragua's intelligentsia have contributed to this volume. Not surprisingly, all of them oppose the Sandinista regime, either as part of the still tolerated opposition, as exiles, or as leaders of the Contras. As its Orwellian title indicates, this volume is clearly partisan; it is also a very sophisticated analysis of post-1979 Nicaragua.

After a majestic introduction (a poem by Pablo Antonio Cuadra), Enrique Bolanos, leader of Nicaragua's Private Enterprise Council, details the Sandinistas' economic policies and their results: a worthless currency, an annual inflation rate over 1000 percent, and self-confessed international bankruptcy. Attempts to manipulate the Catholic Church are examined by Roberto Cardenal, while Xavier Zavala analyzes the state of education — essentially a failed and costly exercise in brainwashing, paid for by well-wishers from abroad. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, a former editor of *La Prensa* and until recently one of the Contra leaders, reports on the state of the media. Union leader Carlos Huembes gives an accurate and unsettling picture of the state of the labor unions, and Arturo Cruz, Sr., writes about the political situation. The authors are uniformly well informed about the present condition of Nicaragua and back up their accounts with ample evidence.

Quién es Quién en Nicaragua? By Manuel Jiron. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Radio Amor, 1986. 497 pp. ¢995.

Following the overthrow of the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas provided themselves with a *nomenklatura* faster than Castro did in Cuba, and far faster than the communist regimes that took power in Eastern Europe during the late 1940s and early 1950s. How did they accomplish this task so rapidly? The explanation that emerges from this "Who's Who in Nicaragua" begins with a picture of the regime that is far from the picture presented in America, by left or right. Jiron finds in Nicaragua an exceedingly small, urban, educated, and self-perpetuating elite, divided less by ideology than by personalities. Revolutionary leaders marry daughters of the upper bourgeoisie; that class, in turn, uses its name or marital assets for continued political, financial, and social gain.

Most of the biographies included here are of persons Jiron has known personally — whether in his anti-Somoza days or as a supporter of the resistance. (The author was a prominent radio broadcaster and enemy of the Somozas in Nicaragua; now, his stations have been closed and he himself forced into exile.) Obviously, any volume

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of this scope will have errors, and Jiron's is no exception. As one might expect, given his methodology, most of his errors concern second-echelon Sandinistas, who do not come from the middle or upper classes. Nevertheless, this is an essential source for anyone interested in the sociology of the Sandinista Revolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Go straight to the source

By the time the local media have finished processing the news from Israel and the Middle East, the results can be somewhat diluted. **The Jerusalem Post** has an international reputation for accurate and authoritative reporting, and is often quoted by the international press. **The Jerusalem Post International Edition** is made up from six days of daily in-depth reporting, specially selected and edited for our subscribers world-wide. Get the news directly from Israel, written by the people who live it.

Take advantage of our free trial subscription offer and receive three weekly issues–a $5.25 single-copy value–FREE. Then, if you don't want to continue, write "cancel" on the invoice when it comes, mail it back and pay nothing. If you decide to continue, you'll receive an additional 30 weeks (33 issues in all) for only $22.87.

THE JERUSALEM POST
INTERNATIONAL EDITION

FREE TRIAL SUBSCRIPTION

Yes, please send me three free copies of THE JERUSALEM POST INTERNATIONAL EDITION.

If I decide to continue, I'll receive an additional 30 weekly issues (33 in all) for just $22.87 (This special offer saves me $29.63 off the cover price).

If I decide not to continue, I'll write "cancel" on the invoice when it comes, return it and owe nothing.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State/Zip .....

Send this coupon to: **THE JERUSALEM POST INTERNATIONAL EDITION P.O.Box 282, Brewster, NY 10509-9981**

LIMITED TIME OFFER.

Valid for new subscribers only. **S93OR**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Journal of International Studies

Published three times a year at the London School of Economics

Recent articles include:

Immanuel Wallerstein	*The Reagan Non-Revolution*
Robert S. McNamara	*Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: Is Star Wars the Answer?*
Fred Halliday	*State and Society in International Relations*

Forthcoming articles include:

Paul Teague	*The British Trades Union Congress and Membership of the European Community*
Michael C. Williams	*Rousseau, Realism and Realpolitik*
Special Issue Winter 1989	*The International Relations of Japan*

Subscription information:

Individuals £13.00 per annum
(overseas £15.00, US $28.00,
Canada $32.00)

Students £7.00 per annum
(overseas £9.00)

Institutions £25.00 per annum
(overseas £30.00, US $60.00,
Canada $70.00)

Enquiries to:

MILLENNIUM: Journal of
International Studies
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ASIAN SURVEY

A Monthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs

Asian Survey, an internationally respected journal of Asian affairs, is an indispensable source of information and analysis for academics, government and military officials, business executives, and journalists, whose professions require them to keep well informed on a wide range of Asian issues and developments. Leading American and foreign scholars provide readers with authoritative views and analyses of the politics, economics, and foreign relations of Asian countries, including Northeast, Southeast, South Asia, and the Pacific region. The journal's annual surveys of developments in each Asian nation, published each January and February, are invaluable as summaries of the previous year's major events in the twenty-three countries covered. Now in its twenty-ninth year, **Asian Survey** is the only monthly academic journal of its type published in the United States.

Editorial submissions and correspondence may be sent to: Asian Survey, Institute of East Asian Studies, Room 516, University of California, 2223 Fulton Street, Berkeley, California 94720.

Subscriptions: In the U.S., $35.00 a year for individuals; $20.00 a year for students; $70.00 a year for institutions; outside the U.S., add $8.00 for postage. Single issues of the current volume: $5.00 for individuals and students, $6.00 for institutions . Back issues of prior volumes: $6.00. ***Send orders to:*** *Asian Survey,* University of California Press, Periodicals Department, Berkeley, CA 94720.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIVE IN JAPAN

Individuals with an interest in international relations and experience in business education, teaching or related fields interested in teaching English for one year or longer in Japan to employees of major corporations should send photo and resume to:

International Education Services
Shin Taiso Bldg., 10-7, Dogenzaka 2-chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan
Tel: (03) 463-5396
Fax: (03) 463-7089

Degree required

BAFFLED BY SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS?

Then perhaps we, unlike the Minotaur, can guide you through the labyrinthine issues confronting Southern Africa.

We at the
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
make no claim to a monopoly of objectivity, but ...

Founded in 1934, we are a totally independent, non-governmental and privately funded research and communications body situated on the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand, dedicated to examining without bias the relationship of South Africa with both the Southern African region and the world at large. Of necessity, we also devote considerable attention to relationships *inside* our country. A non-racial organisation, the Institute is debarred by its constitution from promoting any official policy or interest.

For details of subscriptions, membership and our wide-ranging activities, embracing conferences, lectures, research, bibliographies and monographs — as well as our periodical publications, contact:

Alan Begg
Editorial Officer

Phone (011) 339-2021
Telex 4-27291
Fax +27 11 403-1926

SAIIA
PO Box 3196
Braamfontein
2017 Johannesburg

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Philadelphia Papers

The Subtlest Battle

Islam in Soviet Tajikistan

Muriel Atkin

In *The Subtlest Battle,* Muriel Atkin reports on Islamic life in the Soviet republic of Tajikistan, and particularly on the efforts of Muslims to maintain their religion against the pressures of an avowedly atheistic state. Looking beyond official institutions and religious figures, she shows how a flourishing "unofficial Islam" has come to serve the religious needs of many Tajiks. And she inquires into the possibility, now much debated in the West, that the Soviet Muslim republics might provide the foundations for a political challenge to the Soviet state.

Muriel Atkin is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at George Washington University. She is the author of *Russia and Iran, 1780-1828*, and numerous articles on Islam in the Soviet Union.

$8.00

ISBN 0-910191-09-3
ISSN 1041-9039

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

3615 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(215) 382-0685

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Without refuting the necessity of gaining territory, the Iran-Iraq War seriously challenged a prevailing skepticism regarding the strategic value of air power....The air struggle reached its peak in the February-April 1988 War of the Cities, leading to a mass exodus of Tehran residents and ultimately to the collapse of Iranian morale. This in turn paved the way for Iraqi military successes in 1988 and the Iranian agreement to stop fighting.

Efraim Karsh
"Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War"

When Gorbachev made headlines at the United Nations by proclaiming that "the use or threat of force no longer can or must be an instrument of foreign policy," he was not breaking fresh theoretical ground. And when he announced unilateral military cuts that would "maintain our country's capability at a level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency," he was merely giving a three-year-old policy dramatic formulation for the general public.

Steven P. Adragna
"A New Soviet Military? Strategy and Doctrine"

Because Soviet military industries out-perform their civilian counterparts — owing to more and better managers, higher-quality materials, and better personnel — Soviet leaders are using them to assume the jobs of collapsing civilian industries. This, in turn, becomes an economic equivalent of martial law.... [It] could allow the Kremlin to improve its forces at lower cost and increase its capacity for a major arms build-up.

Senator John McCain
"A New Soviet Military? Weapons and Budgets"

Between ages ten and thirteen, most Soviet children are first exposed to military training, paramilitary games, and target shooting. In 1977, 40 percent of all schools had their own firing ranges, but the figure is now higher. Children also have opportunities to learn parachute jumping, radio operation, martial arts, and any other "sport" deemed applicable to the needs of the military.

Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer
"A New Soviet Military? The Next Generation"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED